throbber

`(Slip Opinion)
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`
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2018
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`
`Syllabus
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`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`RUCHO ET AL. v. COMMON CAUSE ET AL.
`APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
`
`MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
`No. 18–422. Argued March 26, 2019—Decided June 27, 2019*
`
`Voters and other plaintiffs in North Carolina and Maryland filed suits
`
`challenging their States’ congressional districting maps as unconsti-
`tutional partisan gerrymanders. The North Carolina plaintiffs
`claimed that the State’s districting plan discriminated against Demo-
`
`
`crats, while the Maryland plaintiffs claimed that their State’s plan
`
`discriminated against Republicans. The plaintiffs alleged violations
`
`
`of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
`teenth Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Article I, §2. The Dis-
`trict Courts in both cases ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the de-
`fendants appealed directly to this Court.
`
`
`Held: Partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions be-
`
`yond the reach of the federal courts. Pp. 6–34.
`
`(a) In these cases, the Court is asked to decide an important ques-
`
`tion of constitutional law. Before it does so, the Court “must find that
`the question is presented in a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ that is . . . ‘of a
`
`Judiciary Nature.’ ” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332,
`
`
`342. While it is “the province and duty of the judicial department to
`say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, some-
`
`times the law is that the Judiciary cannot entertain a claim because
`
`
`it presents a nonjusticiable “political question,” Baker v. Carr, 369
`U. S. 186, 217. Among the political question cases this Court has
`
`identified are those that lack “judicially discoverable and manageable
`
`standards for resolving [them].” Ibid. This Court’s partisan gerry-
`mandering cases have left unresolved the question whether such
`
`claims are claims of legal right, resolvable according to legal princi-
`——————
`*Together with No. 18–726, Lamone et al. v. Benisek et al., on appeal
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`from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
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`

`

`2
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`RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE
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`
`Syllabus
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`ples, or political questions that must find their resolution elsewhere.
`
`See Gill v. Whitford, 585 U. S. ___, ___.
`
`Partisan gerrymandering was known in the Colonies prior to Inde-
`
`pendence, and the Framers were familiar with it at the time of the
`
`drafting and ratification of the Constitution. They addressed the
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`election of Representatives to Congress in the Elections Clause,
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`Art. I, §4, cl. 1, assigning to state legislatures the power to prescribe
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`the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” for Members of
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`Congress, while giving Congress the power to “make or alter” any
`such regulations. Congress has regularly exercised its Elections
`
`
`Clause power, including to address partisan gerrymandering. But
`the Framers did not set aside all electoral issues as questions that
`only Congress can resolve. In two areas—one-person, one-vote and
`racial gerrymandering—this Court has held that there is a role for
`
`the courts with respect to at least some issues that could arise from a
`
`State’s drawing of congressional districts. But the history of partisan
`gerrymandering is not irrelevant. Aware of electoral districting prob-
`lems, the Framers chose a characteristic approach, assigning the is-
`
`sue to the state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the
`Federal Congress, with no suggestion that the federal courts had a
`role to play.
`
`
`Courts have nonetheless been called upon to resolve a variety of
`
`
`questions surrounding districting. The claim of population inequality
`among districts in Baker v. Carr, for example, could be decided under
`basic equal protection principles. 369 U. S., at 226. Racial discrimi-
`nation in districting also raises constitutional issues that can be ad-
`
`dressed by the federal courts. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S.
`339, 340. Partisan gerrymandering claims have proved far more dif-
`ficult to adjudicate, in part because “a jurisdiction may engage in
`
`
`constitutional political gerrymandering.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526
`U. S. 541, 551. To hold that legislators cannot take their partisan in-
`terests into account when drawing district lines would essentially
`
`countermand the Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political
`
`entities. The “central problem” is “determining when political ger-
`
`
`rymandering has gone too far.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 296
`(plurality opinion). Despite considerable efforts in Gaffney v. Cum-
`
`mings, 412 U. S. 735, 753; Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, 116–
`117; Vieth, 541 U. S., at 272–273; and League of United Latin Ameri-
`
`
`can Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 414 (LULAC), this Court’s prior
`cases have left “unresolved whether . . . claims [of legal right] may be
`
`brought in cases involving allegations of partisan gerrymandering,”
`Gill, 585 U. S., at ___. Two “threshold questions” remained: stand-
`
`ing, which was addressed in Gill, and “whether [such] claims are jus-
`ticiable.” Ibid. Pp. 6–14.
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`

`

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`
`3
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`Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019)
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`
`Syllabus
`
`
`(b) Any standard for resolving partisan gerrymandering claims
`must be grounded in a “limited and precise rationale” and be “clear,
`
`
`manageable, and politically neutral.” Vieth, 541 U. S., at 306–308
`(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). The question is one of degree:
`
`How to “provid[e] a standard for deciding how much partisan domi-
`nance is too much.” LULAC, 548 U. S., at 420 (opinion of Kennedy,
`
`
`J.). Partisan gerrymandering claims rest on an instinct that groups
`with a certain level of political support should enjoy a commensurate
`level of political power and influence. Such claims invariably sound
`
`in a desire for proportional representation, but the Constitution does
`not require proportional representation, and federal courts are nei-
`ther equipped nor authorized to apportion political power as a matter
`of fairness. It is not even clear what fairness looks like in this con-
`
`text. It may mean achieving a greater number of competitive dis-
`tricts by undoing packing and cracking so that supporters of the dis-
`
`advantaged party have a better shot at electing their preferred
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`candidates. But it could mean engaging in cracking and packing to
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`
`
`ensure each party its “appropriate” share of “safe” seats. Or perhaps
`it should be measured by adherence to “traditional” districting crite-
`
`
`ria. Deciding among those different visions of fairness poses basic
`questions that are political, not legal. There are no legal standards
`
`discernible in the Constitution for making such judgments. And it is
`only after determining how to define fairness that one can even begin
`
`to answer the determinative question: “How much is too much?”
`
`
`The fact that the Court can adjudicate one-person, one-vote claims
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`does not mean that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable.
`
`This Court’s one-person, one-vote cases recognize that each person is
`entitled to an equal say in the election of representatives. It hardly
`follows from that principle that a person is entitled to have his politi-
`
`cal party achieve representation commensurate to its share of
`statewide support. Vote dilution in the one-person, one-vote cases re-
`fers to the idea that each vote must carry equal weight. That re-
`quirement does not extend to political parties; it does not mean that
`each party must be influential in proportion to the number of its sup-
`
`porters. The racial gerrymandering cases are also inapposite: They
`call for the elimination of a racial classification, but a partisan ger-
`
`rymandering claim cannot ask for the elimination of partisanship.
`Pp. 15–21.
`
`
`(c) None of the proposed “tests” for evaluating partisan gerryman-
`
`dering claims meets the need for a limited and precise standard that
`is judicially discernible and manageable. Pp. 22–30.
`
`(1) The Common Cause District Court concluded that all but one
`of the districts in North Carolina’s 2016 Plan violated the Equal Pro-
`tection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Demo-
`
`
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`

`

`4
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`RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE
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`
`Syllabus
`crats. It applied a three-part test, examining intent, effects, and cau-
`
`sation. The District Court’s “predominant intent” prong is borrowed
`from the test used in racial gerrymandering cases. However, unlike
`
`race-based decisionmaking, which is “inherently suspect,” Miller v.
`Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 915, districting for some level of partisan ad-
`vantage is not unconstitutional. Determining that lines were drawn
`
`
`on the basis of partisanship does not indicate that districting was
`constitutionally impermissible. The Common Cause District Court
`also required the plaintiffs to show that vote dilution is “likely to per-
`
`sist” to such a degree that the elected representatives will feel free to
`ignore the concerns of the supporters of the minority party. Experi-
`ence proves that accurately predicting electoral outcomes is not sim-
`ple, and asking judges to predict how a particular districting map
`will perform in future elections risks basing constitutional holdings
`on unstable ground outside judicial expertise. The District Court’s
`
`third prong—which gave the defendants an opportunity to show that
`discriminatory effects were due to a “legitimate redistricting objec-
`
`tive”—just restates the question asked at the “predominant intent”
`prong. Pp. 22–25.
`
`
`
`(2) The District Courts also found partisan gerrymandering
`claims justiciable under the First Amendment, coalescing around a
`
`basic three-part test: proof of intent to burden individuals based on
`
`their voting history or party affiliation, an actual burden on political
`speech or associational rights, and a causal link between the invidi-
`
`ous intent and actual burden. But their analysis offers no “clear” and
`
`
`“manageable” way of distinguishing permissible from impermissible
`
`partisan motivation. Pp. 25–27.
`
`
`
`(3) Using a State’s own districting criteria as a baseline from
`
`which to measure how extreme a partisan gerrymander is would be
`indeterminate and arbitrary. Doing so would still leave open the
`
`question of how much political motivation and effect is too much.
`Pp. 27–29.
`
`
`
`
`(4) The North Carolina District Court further held that the 2016
`
`
`Plan violated Article I, §2, and the Elections Clause, Art. I, §4, cl. 1.
`But the Vieth plurality concluded—without objection from any other
`
`Justice—that neither §2 nor §4 “provides a judicially enforceable limit
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`on the political considerations that the States and Congress may
`
`take into account when districting.” 541 U. S., at 305. Any assertion
`
`
`that partisan gerrymanders violate the core right of voters to choose
`their representatives is an objection more likely grounded in the
`Guarantee Clause of Article IV, §4, which “guarantee[s] to every
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`State in [the] Union a Republican Form of Government.” This Court
`has several times concluded that the Guarantee Clause does not pro-
`
`

`

`
`
`5
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`Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019)
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`Syllabus
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`vide the basis for a justiciable claim. See, e.g., Pacific States Tele-
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`phone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118. Pp. 29–30.
`
`
`
`(d) The conclusion that partisan gerrymandering claims are not
`justiciable neither condones excessive partisan gerrymandering nor
`
`condemns complaints about districting to echo into a void. Numerous
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`States are actively addressing the issue through state constitutional
`
`
`amendments and legislation placing power to draw electoral districts
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`in the hands of independent commissions, mandating particular dis-
`tricting criteria for their mapmakers, or prohibiting drawing district
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`lines for partisan advantage. The Framers also gave Congress the
`power to do something about partisan gerrymandering in the Elec-
`
`tions Clause. That avenue for reform established by the Framers,
`
`and used by Congress in the past, remains open. Pp. 30–34.
`318 F. Supp. 3d 777 and 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, vacated and remanded.
`ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
`
`
`ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a dis-
`
`
`
` senting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ.,
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`joined.
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`
`

`

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` Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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`
`
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
` Nos. 18–422, 18–726
`_________________
`
` ROBERT A. RUCHO, ET AL., APPELLANTS
`
`18–422
` v.
` COMMON CAUSE, ET AL.; AND
`
`ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
`
`THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`LINDA H. LAMONE, ET AL., APPELLANTS
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`18–726
`
`v.
`O. JOHN BENISEK, ET AL.
`
`ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
`
`THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
` [June 27, 2019]
` CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
`Court.
`
`Voters and other plaintiffs in North Carolina and Mary-
`
`land challenged their States’ congressional districting
`
`maps as unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders. The
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`North Carolina plaintiffs complained that the State’s
`
`districting plan discriminated against Democrats; the
`Maryland plaintiffs complained that their State’s plan
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`discriminated against Republicans. The plaintiffs alleged
`that the gerrymandering violated the First Amendment,
`the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
`ment, the Elections Clause, and Article I, §2, of the Con-
`stitution. The District Courts in both cases ruled in favor
`
`
`

`

`2
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`RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`of the plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed directly to
`
`this Court.
`
`These cases require us to consider once again whether
`claims of excessive partisanship in districting are “justici-
`able”—that is, properly suited for resolution by the federal
`courts. This Court has not previously struck down a
`districting plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerry-
`mander, and has struggled without success over the past
`several decades to discern judicially manageable stand-
`
`ards for deciding such claims. The districting plans at
`issue here are highly partisan, by any measure. The
`question is whether the courts below appropriately exer-
`cised judicial power when they found them unconstitu-
`
`tional as well.
`
`
`
`I
`A
`The first case involves a challenge to the congressional
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`redistricting plan enacted by the Republican-controlled
`North Carolina General Assembly in 2016. Rucho v.
`Common Cause, No. 18–422. The Republican legislators
`leading the redistricting effort instructed their mapmaker
`
`to use political data to draw a map that would produce a
`
`congressional delegation of ten Republicans and three
`Democrats. 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 807–808 (MDNC 2018).
`
`As one of the two Republicans chairing the redistricting
`
`committee stated, “I think electing Republicans is better
`
`than electing Democrats. So I drew this map to help foster
`what I think is better for the country.” Id., at 809. He
`
`
`
`further explained that the map was drawn with the aim of
`electing ten Republicans and three Democrats because he
`did “not believe it [would be] possible to draw a map with
`
`11 Republicans and 2 Democrats.” Id., at 808. One Demo-
`cratic state senator objected that entrenching the 10–3
`
`advantage for Republicans was not “fair, reasonable, [or]
`balanced” because, as recently as 2012, “Democratic con-
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`
`

`

`3
`
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`
`
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` Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` gressional candidates had received more votes on a
`
` statewide basis than Republican candidates.” Ibid. The
`General Assembly was not swayed by that objection and
`approved the 2016 Plan by a party-line vote. Id., at 809.
`In November 2016, North Carolina conducted congres-
`
`sional elections using the 2016 Plan, and Republican
`
`candidates won 10 of the 13 congressional districts. Id., at
`
`810. In the 2018 elections, Republican candidates won
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`nine congressional districts, while Democratic candidates
`
`won three. The Republican candidate narrowly prevailed
`
`in the remaining district, but the State Board of Elections
`called a new election after allegations of fraud.
`
`
`This litigation began in August 2016, when the North
`Carolina Democratic Party, Common Cause (a nonprofit
`
`organization), and 14 individual North Carolina voters
`sued the two lawmakers who had led the redistricting
`effort and other state defendants in Federal District
`
`Court. Shortly thereafter, the League of Women Voters of
`
`North Carolina and a dozen additional North Carolina
`voters filed a similar complaint. The two cases were
`consolidated.
`
`
`The plaintiffs challenged the 2016 Plan on multiple
`
`constitutional grounds. First, they alleged that the Plan
`
`violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
`the electoral
`Amendment by
`intentionally diluting
`strength of Democratic voters. Second, they claimed that
`the Plan violated their First Amendment rights by retali-
`ating against supporters of Democratic candidates on the
`basis of their political beliefs. Third, they asserted that
`
`the Plan usurped the right of “the People” to elect their
`preferred candidates for Congress, in violation of the
`
`requirement in Article I, §2, of the Constitution that
`Members of the House of Representatives be chosen “by
`
`the People of the several States.” Finally, they alleged
`that the Plan violated the Elections Clause by exceeding
`
`the State’s delegated authority to prescribe the “Times,
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Places and Manner of holding Elections” for Members of
`Congress.
`
`
`After a four-day trial, the three-judge District Court
`unanimously concluded that the 2016 Plan violated the
`Equal Protection Clause and Article I of the Constitution.
`
`The court further held, with Judge Osteen dissenting, that
`
`the Plan violated the First Amendment. Common Cause
`v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (MDNC 2018). The defend-
`ants appealed directly to this Court under 28 U. S. C.
`
`§1253.
`
`While that appeal was pending, we decided Gill v. Whit-
`ford, 585 U. S. ___ (2018), a partisan gerrymandering case
`out of Wisconsin. In that case, we held that a plaintiff
`
`asserting a partisan gerrymandering claim based on a
`theory of vote dilution must establish standing by showing
`he lives in an allegedly “cracked” or “packed” district. Id.,
`at ___ (slip op., at 17). A “cracked” district is one in which
`a party’s supporters are divided among multiple districts,
`
`so that they fall short of a majority in each; a “packed”
`district is one in which a party’s supporters are highly
`
`concentrated, so they win that district by a large margin,
`
`“wasting” many votes that would improve their chances in
`others. Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4).
`After deciding Gill, we remanded the present case for
`further consideration by the District Court. 585 U. S. ___
`
`(2018). On remand, the District Court again struck down
`the 2016 Plan. 318 F. Supp. 3d 777. It found standing
`
`and concluded that the case was appropriate for judicial
`resolution. On the merits, the court found that “the Gen-
`
`eral Assembly’s predominant intent was to discriminate
`against voters who supported or were likely to support
`
`non-Republican candidates,” and to “entrench Republican
`candidates” through widespread cracking and packing of
`
`
`Democratic voters. Id., at 883–884. The court rejected the
`
`defendants’ arguments that the distribution of Republican
`
`and Democratic voters throughout North Carolina and the
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`

`

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`
`5
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` Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`interest in protecting incumbents neutrally explained the
`
`2016 Plan’s discriminatory effects. Id., at 896–899. In the
`
`
`end, the District Court held that 12 of the 13 districts
`constituted partisan gerrymanders that violated the Equal
`Protection Clause. Id., at 923.
`
`The court also agreed with the plaintiffs that the 2016
`Plan discriminated against them because of their political
`speech and association, in violation of the First Amend-
`ment. Id., at 935. Judge Osteen dissented with respect to
`
`that ruling. Id., at 954–955. Finally, the District Court
`
`concluded that the 2016 Plan violated the Elections Clause
`and Article I, §2. Id., at 935–941. The District Court
`enjoined the State from using the 2016 Plan in any elec-
`tion after the November 2018 general election. Id., at 942.
`
`The defendants again appealed to this Court, and we
`
`postponed jurisdiction. 586 U. S. ___ (2019).
`B
`
`The second case before us is Lamone v. Benisek, No. 18–
`726. In 2011, the Maryland Legislature—dominated by
`
`Democrats—undertook to redraw the lines of that State’s
`
`eight congressional districts. The Governor at the time,
`Democrat Martin O’Malley, led the process. He appointed
`a redistricting committee to help redraw the map, and
`
`asked Congressman Steny Hoyer, who has described
`himself as a “serial gerrymanderer,” to advise the commit-
`tee. 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 502 (Md. 2018). The Governor
`
`later testified that his aim was to “use the redistricting
`process to change the overall composition of Maryland’s
`
`congressional delegation to 7 Democrats and 1 Republican
`by flipping” one district. Ibid. “[A] decision was made to
`go for the Sixth,” ibid., which had been held by a Republi-
`
`can for nearly two decades. To achieve the required equal
`
`population among districts, only about 10,000 residents
`
`needed to be removed from that district. Id., at 498. The
`
`2011 Plan accomplished that by moving roughly 360,000
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`

`

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`6
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`RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`voters out of the Sixth District and moving 350,000 new
`voters in. Overall, the Plan reduced the number of regis-
`
`tered Republicans in the Sixth District by about 66,000
`and increased the number of registered Democrats by
`
`about 24,000. Id., at 499–501. The map was adopted by a
`
`party-line vote. Id., at 506. It was used in the 2012 elec-
`tion and succeeded in flipping the Sixth District. A Demo-
`crat has held the seat ever since.
`
`In November 2013, three Maryland voters filed this
`lawsuit. They alleged that the 2011 Plan violated the
`First Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Article I, §2,
`of the Constitution. After considerable procedural skir-
`mishing and litigation over preliminary relief, the District
`
`Court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 348
`
`F. Supp. 3d 493. It concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims
`were justiciable, and that the Plan violated the First
`Amendment by diminishing their “ability to elect their
`candidate of choice” because of their party affiliation and
`
`voting history, and by burdening their associational
`rights. Id., at 498. On the latter point, the court relied
`upon findings that Republicans in the Sixth District “were
`burdened in fundraising, attracting volunteers, campaign-
`ing, and generating interest in voting in an atmosphere of
`general confusion and apathy.” Id., at 524.
`
`The District Court permanently enjoined the State from
`
`using the 2011 Plan and ordered it to promptly adopt a
`new plan for the 2020 election. Id., at 525. The defend-
`ants appealed directly to this Court under 28 U. S. C.
`
`§1253. We postponed jurisdiction. 586 U. S. ___ (2019).
`
`II
`A
`
`Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to
`deciding “Cases” and “Controversies.” We have under-
`
`stood that limitation to mean that federal courts can
`address only questions “historically viewed as capable of
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`7
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` Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`resolution through the judicial process.” Flast v. Cohen,
`
`392 U. S. 83, 95 (1968). In these cases we are asked to
`decide an important question of constitutional law. “But
`
`before we do so, we must find that the question is presented
`
`in a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ that is, in James Madison’s
`
`words, ‘of a Judiciary Nature.’” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
`Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 342 (2006) (quoting 2 Records of the
`Federal Convention of 1787, p. 430 (M. Farrand ed. 1966)).
`
`Chief Justice Marshall famously wrote that it is “the
`
`province and duty of the judicial department to say what
`
`the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177
`(1803). Sometimes, however, “the law is that the judicial
`
`department has no business entertaining the claim of
`
`unlawfulness—because the question is entrusted to one of
`the political branches or involves no judicially enforceable
`
`rights.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 277 (2004) (plu-
`rality opinion). In such a case the claim is said to present
`a “political question” and to be nonjusticiable—outside the
`courts’ competence and therefore beyond the courts’ juris-
`
`diction. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962). Among
`
`the political question cases the Court has identified are
`those that lack “judicially discoverable and manageable
`
`standards for resolving [them].” Ibid.
`
`
`Last Term in Gill v. Whitford, we reviewed our partisan
`gerrymandering cases and concluded that those cases
`
`“leave unresolved whether such claims may be brought.”
`
`585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13). This Court’s authority to
`
`act, as we said in Gill, is “grounded in and limited by the
`necessity of resolving, according to legal principles, a
`
`
`plaintiff ’s particular claim of legal right.”
`Ibid. The
`question here is whether there is an “appropriate role for
`the Federal Judiciary” in remedying the problem of parti-
`san gerrymandering—whether such claims are claims of
`
`legal right, resolvable according to legal principles, or
`political questions that must find their resolution else-
`where. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8).
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`B
`
`Partisan gerrymandering is nothing new. Nor is frus-
`tration with it. The practice was known in the Colonies
`prior to Independence, and the Framers were familiar
`with it at the time of the drafting and ratification of the
`Constitution. See Vieth, 541 U. S., at 274 (plurality opin-
`ion). During the very first congressional elections, George
`
`Washington and his Federalist allies accused Patrick
`
`Henry of trying to gerrymander Virginia’s districts against
`
`their candidates—in particular James Madison, who
`ultimately prevailed over fellow future President James
`Monroe. Hunter, The First Gerrymander? 9 Early Am.
`
`Studies 792–794, 811 (2011). See 5 Writings of Thomas
`
`Jefferson 71 (P. Ford ed. 1895) (Letter to W. Short (Feb. 9,
`1789)) (“Henry has so modelled the districts for represent-
`atives as to tack Orange [county] to counties where he
`
`himself has great influence that Madison may not be
`elected into the lower federal house”).
`
`
`In 1812, Governor of Massachusetts and future Vice
`President Elbridge Gerry notoriously approved congres-
`sional districts that the legislature had drawn to aid the
`Democratic-Republican Party. The moniker “gerryman-
`
`der” was born when an outraged Federalist newspaper
`observed that one of the misshapen districts resembled a
`salamander. See Vieth, 541 U. S., at 274 (plurality opin-
`ion); E. Griffith, The Rise and Development of the Gerry-
`mander 17–19 (1907). “By 1840, the gerrymander was a
`recognized force in party politics and was generally at-
`tempted in all legislation enacted for the formation of
`
`It was generally conceded that each
`election districts.
`party would attempt to gain power which was not propor-
`
`tionate to its numerical strength.” Id., at 123.
`
`
`The Framers addressed the election of Representatives
`
`to Congress in the Elections Clause. Art. I, §4, cl. 1. That
`provision assigns to state legislatures the power to pre-
`scribe the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-
`
`

`

`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`tions” for Members of Congress, while giving Congress the
`
`
` power to “make or alter” any such regulations. Whether to
`give that supervisory authority to the National Govern-
`ment was debated at the Constitutional Convention.
`When those opposed to such congressional oversight
`moved to strike the relevant language, Madison came to
`
`its defense:
`
`“[T]he State Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse
`to consult the common interest at the expense of their
`local coveniency or prejudices. . . . Whenever the
`State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry,
`
`they would take care so to mould their regulations as
`to favor the candidates they wished to succeed.” 2
`Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 240–
`241.
`During the subsequent fight for ratification, the provi-
`
`
`sion remained a subject of debate. Antifederalists predicted
`that Congress’s power under the Elections Clause would
`allow Congress to make itself “omnipotent,” setting the
`“time” of elections as never or the “place” in difficult to
`
`reach corners of the State. Federalists responded that,
`
`among other justifications, the revisionary power was
`necessary to counter state legislatures set on undermining
`
`
`fair representation, including through malapportionment.
`M. Klarman, The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United
`
` States Constitution 340–342 (2016). The Federalists were,
`
`for example, concerned that newly developing population
`centers would be deprived of their proper electoral weight,
`as some cities had been in Great Britain. See 6 The Doc-
`umentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution:
`Massachusetts 1278–1279 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino
`eds. 2000).
`
`Congress has regularly exercised its Elections Clause
`
`power, including to address partisan gerrymandering.
`
`The Apportionment Act of 1842, which required single-
`
`
`
`

`

`10
`
`
`RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`member districts for the first time, specified that those
`
`districts be “composed of contiguous territory,” Act of June
`25, 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491, in “an attempt to forbid the
`practice of the gerrymander,” Griffith, supra, at 12. Later
`statutes added requirements of compactness and equality
`of population. Act of Jan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, §3, 31 Stat.
`
`733; Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, §2, 17 Stat. 28. (Only the
`single member district requirement remains in place
`
`today. 2 U. S. C. §2c.) See Vieth, 541 U. S., at 276 (plurality
`opinion). Congress also used its Elections Clause power in
`1870, enacting the first comprehensive federal statute
`
`dealing with elections as a way to enforce the Fifteenth
`Amendment. Force Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
`
`Starting in the 1950s, Congress enacted a series of laws to
`
`protect the right to vote through measures such as the
`
`suspension of literacy tests and the prohibition of English-
`
`only elections. See, e.g., 52 U. S. C. §10101 et seq.
`
`
`Appellants suggest that, through the Elections Clause,
`
`the Framers set aside electoral issues such as the one
`
`before us as questions that only Congress can resolve. See
`
`Baker, 369 U. S., at 217. We do not agree. In two areas—
`one-person, one-vote and racial gerrymandering—our
`cases have held that there is a role for the courts with
`
`respect to at least some issues that could arise from a
`State’s drawing of congressional districts. See Wesberry v.
`
`Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630
`(1993) (Shaw I).
`
`But the history is not irrelevant. The Framers were
`aware of electoral districting problems and considered
`
`what to do about them. They settled on a characteristic
`approach, assigning the issue to the state legislatures,
`
`expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress.
`As Alexander Hamilton explained, “it will . . . not be de-
`nied that a discretionary power over elections ought to
`exist somewhe

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