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` Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`RAUL LOPEZ, WARDEN v. MARVIN VERNIS SMITH
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
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`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`No. 13–946 Decided October 6, 2014
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` PER CURIAM.
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`When a state prisoner seeks federal habeas relief on the
`ground that a state court, in adjudicating a claim on the
`merits, misapplied federal law, a federal court may grant
`relief only if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or
`involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
`lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
`of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). We have
`emphasized, time and again, that the Antiterrorism and
`Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat.
`1214, prohibits the federal courts of appeals from rely-
`ing on their own precedent to conclude that a particular
`constitutional principle is “clearly established.” See, e.g.,
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`Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U. S. __, __ (2013) (per curiam)
`(slip op. at 6). Because the Ninth Circuit failed to comply
`with this rule, we reverse its decision granting habeas
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`relief to respondent Marvin Smith.
`I
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`Respondent was arrested for the murder of his wife,
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`Minnie Smith. On December 15, 2005, Mrs. Smith was
`found dead in the home she shared with respondent, and
`it was determined that she was killed by a massive blow to
`the head from a fireplace log roller. The home appeared to
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`have been ransacked, and valuable jewelry was missing.
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`The State charged respondent with first-degree murder
`and offered substantial incriminating evidence at trial.
`The prosecution presented evidence that respondent “was
`unfaithful to his wife for many years, that his wife was
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`LOPEZ v. SMITH
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` Per Curiam
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`threatening to divorce him, and that he told one of his
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` former employees . . . that the ‘only way’ he or his wife
`would get out of their marriage was ‘to die,’ because he
`was ‘not going to give [Mrs. Smith] half of what [he] got so
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`some other man can live off of it.’” 731 F. 3d 859, 862–863
`(CA9 2013) (second alteration in original). Respondent’s
`DNA was also found on the murder weapon, pieces of duct
`tape found near the body, and a burned matchstick that
`was found in the bedroom and that may have been used to
`inflict burns on the body. See id., at 863; see also People v.
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`Smith, 2010 WL 4975500, *1–*2 (Cal. App., Dec. 8, 2010).
`The missing jewelry was discovered in the trunk of re-
`spondent’s car, wrapped in duct tape from the same roll
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`that had provided the pieces found near the body. See 731
`F. 3d, at 863. Respondent’s DNA was found on the duct
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`tape in his trunk. See Smith, 2010 WL 4975500, at *2. In
`addition, a criminologist testified that the ransacking of
`the Smiths’ home appeared to have been staged. See 731
`F. 3d, at 863.
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`Respondent defended in part on the basis that he could
`not have delivered the fatal blow due to rotator cuff sur-
`gery several weeks before the murder. See ibid.
`(He
`mounted this defense despite the fact that police had
`observed him wielding a 6-foot-long 2 by 4 to pry some-
`thing out of a concrete slab at a construction site the week
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`after the murder. See Smith, 2010 WL 4975500, at *1.)
`The defense also suggested that one of respondent’s former
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`employees had committed the crime to obtain money to
`pay a debt he owed respondent. See 731 F. 3d, at 863.
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`At the close of evidence, the prosecution requested an
`aiding-and-abetting instruction, and the trial court agreed
`to give such an instruction. During closing argument, the
`prosecutor contended that respondent was physically able
`to wield the log roller that had killed Mrs. Smith, but he
`also informed the jury that, even if respondent had not
`delivered the fatal blow, he could still be convicted on an
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` Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Per Curiam
`aiding-and-abetting theory. See id., at 864. The jury
`convicted respondent of first-degree murder without speci-
`fying which theory of guilt it adopted.
`After a series of state-court proceedings not relevant
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`here, the California Court of Appeal affirmed respondent’s
`conviction. The state court rejected respondent’s assertion
`that he had inadequate notice of the possibility of con-
`viction on an aiding-and-abetting theory. The court ex-
`plained that “‘an accusatory pleading charging a defend-
`ant with murder need not specify the theory of murder on
`which the prosecution intends to rely,’” and noted that the
`“information charged defendant with murder in compli-
`ance with the governing statutes.” Smith, 2010 WL
`4975500, at *6–*7. Furthermore, the court held that “even
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`if this case required greater specificity concerning the
`basis of defendant’s liability, the evidence presented at his
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`Id., at *7. The
`preliminary examination provided it.”
`upshot was that “the information and preliminary exami-
`nation testimony adequately notified defendant he could
`be prosecuted for murder as an aider and abettor.” Id., at
`*8. The California Supreme Court denied respondent’s
`petition for review.
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`Respondent filed a petition for habeas relief with the
`United States District Court for the Central District of
`California. The Magistrate Judge recommended granting
`relief, and the District Court summarily adopted the
`Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.
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`The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court acknowledged
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`that the “information charging [respondent] with first-
`degree murder was initially sufficient to put him on notice
`that he could be convicted either as a principal or as an
`aider-and-abettor,” because under California law “aiding
`and abetting a crime is the same substantive offense as
`perpetrating the crime.” 731 F. 3d, at 868. But the Ninth
`Circuit nevertheless concluded that respondent’s Sixth
`Amendment and due process right to notice had been
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`LOPEZ v. SMITH
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` Per Curiam
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`violated because it believed the prosecution (until it re-
`quested the aiding-and-abetting jury instruction) had tried
`the case only on the theory that respondent himself had
`delivered the fatal blow. See id., at 869.
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`The Ninth Circuit did not purport to identify any case in
`which we have found notice constitutionally inadequate
`because, although the defendant was initially adequately
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`apprised of the offense against him, the prosecutor focused
`at trial on one potential theory of liability at the expense
`of another. Rather, it found the instant case to be “indis-
`tinguishable from” the Ninth Circuit’s own decision in
`Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F. 2d 1234 (1989), which the court
`thought “faithfully applied the principles enunciated by
`the Supreme Court.” 731 F. 3d, at 868. The court also
`rejected, as an “unreasonable determination of the facts,”
`28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2), the California Court of Appeal’s
`conclusion that preliminary examination testimony and
`the jury instructions conference put respondent on notice
`of the possibility of conviction on an aiding-and-abetting
`theory. See id., at 871–872.
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`4
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`II
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`A
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`The Ninth Circuit held, and respondent does not dis-
`pute, that respondent initially received adequate notice of
`the possibility of conviction on an aiding-and-abetting
`theory. The question is therefore whether habeas relief is
`warranted because the State principally relied at trial on
`the theory that respondent himself delivered the fatal
`blow.
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`Assuming, arguendo, that a defendant is entitled to
`notice of the possibility of conviction on an aiding-and-
`abetting theory, the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief
`may be affirmed only if this Court’s cases clearly establish
`that a defendant, once adequately apprised of such a
`possibility, can nevertheless be deprived of adequate
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`Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Per Curiam
`notice by a prosecutorial decision to focus on another
`theory of liability at trial. The Ninth Circuit pointed to no
`case of ours holding as much. Instead, the Court of Ap-
`peals cited three older cases that stand for nothing more
`than the general proposition that a defendant must have
`adequate notice of the charges against him. See 731 F. 3d,
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`at 866–867 (citing Russell v. United States, 369 U. S. 749,
`763–764 (1962); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273–274
`(1948); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196, 201 (1948)).
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`This proposition is far too abstract to establish clearly
`the specific rule respondent needs. We have before cau-
`tioned the lower courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particu-
`lar—against “framing our precedents at such a high level
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`of generality.” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U. S. ___, ___
`(2013) (per curiam) (slip op., at 7). None of our decisions
`that the Ninth Circuit cited addresses, even remotely, the
`specific question presented by this case. See Russell,
`supra, at 752 (indictment for “refus[ing] to answer any
`question pertinent to [a] question under [congressional]
`inquiry,” 2 U. S. C. §192, failed to “identify the subject
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`under congressional subcommittee inquiry”); In re Oliver,
`supra, at 259 (instantaneous indictment, conviction, and
`sentence by judge acting as grand jury with no prior notice
`of charge to defendant); Cole, supra, at 197 (affirmance of
`criminal convictions “under a . . . statute for violation of
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`which [defendants] had not been charged”).1
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`Because our case law does not clearly establish the legal
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`1Respondent claims that our decision in Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U. S.
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`110 (1991), although not cited by the Ninth Circuit, clearly establishes
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` the legal principle he needs. But Lankford is of no help to respondent.
` That case addressed whether a defendant had adequate notice of the
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`possibility of imposition of the death penalty—a far different question
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`from whether respondent had adequate notice of the particular theory
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` of liability. See id., at 111. In Lankford, moreover, the trial court itself
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`made specific statements that encouraged the defendant to believe that
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` the death penalty was off the table. See id., at 116–117.
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`LOPEZ v. SMITH
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` Per Curiam
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`proposition needed to grant respondent habeas relief, the
`Ninth Circuit was forced to rely heavily on its own deci-
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`sion in Sheppard, supra. Of course, AEDPA permits
`habeas relief only if a state court’s decision is “contrary to,
`or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
`lished Federal law” as determined by this Court, not by
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`the courts of appeals. 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). The Ninth
`Circuit attempted to evade this barrier by holding that
`Sheppard “faithfully applied the principles enunciated by
`the Supreme Court in Cole, Oliver, and Russell.” 731
`F. 3d, at 868. But Circuit precedent cannot “refine or
`sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurispru-
`dence into a specific legal rule that this Court has not
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`announced.” Marshall, 569 U. S., at __ (slip op., at 6).
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`Sheppard is irrelevant to the question presented by this
`case: whether our case law clearly establishes that a pros-
`ecutor’s focus on one theory of liability at trial can render
`earlier notice of another theory of liability inadequate.
`B
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`The Ninth Circuit also disagreed with what it termed
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`the state court’s “determination of the facts”—principally,
`the state court’s holding that preliminary examination
`testimony and the prosecutors’ request for an aiding-and-
`abetting jury instruction shortly before closing arguments
`adequately put respondent on notice of the prosecution’s
`aiding-and-abetting theory. 731 F. 3d, at 871 (internal
`quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit therefore
`granted relief under §2254(d)(2), which permits habeas
`relief where the state-court “decision . . . was based on an
`unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
`evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” That
`holding cannot be sustained.
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`In purporting to reject the state court’s “determination
`of the facts,” the Ninth Circuit focused on preliminary
`examination testimony by an investigator about conversa-
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` Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Per Curiam
`tions between respondent and his cellmate. According to
`the investigator, the cellmate stated that respondent told
`him that respondent “had to get rid of his wife because she
`was standing in the way of his future plans; that she was
`threatening to divorce him and he wasn’t going to give up
`half of his property”; that respondent made his house look
`like the site of a home invasion robbery; and that, when he
`left for work the morning of the murder, he left the win-
`dow open and did not set the alarm. Smith, 2010 WL
`4975500, at *7. The investigator also testified that the
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`cellmate did not “‘know any of the details of the homicide
`itself and how it was carried out,’” and that respondent
`“‘never told [the cellmate] specifically who’” committed the
`homicide. Ibid. The California Court of Appeal held that
`these statements, taken together, suggested that respond-
`ent was involved in planning and facilitating the crime but
`that the fatal blow might have been delivered by an ac-
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`complice. Ibid. Thus, the California court believed that
`even assuming that the information by itself was not
`sufficient, this testimony naturally lent itself to conviction
`on an aiding-and-abetting theory and so gave respondent
`even greater notice of such a possibility. Ibid.
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`The Ninth Circuit also focused on the jury instructions
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`conference, which occurred after the defense rested but
`before the parties’ closing arguments. During that confer-
`ence, prosecutors requested an aiding-and-abetting in-
`struction, which further provided notice to respondent.
`The California Court of Appeal concluded that this case is
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`distinguishable from Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F. 2d 1234,
`because, unlike that case, the conference here did not
`occur immediately before closing arguments. The Ninth
`Circuit disagreed, holding that because “defense counsel
`had only the lunch recess to formulate a response” to the
`aiding-and-abetting instruction, this case “is indistin-
`guishable from Sheppard,” where the prosecution also
`“requested the new instruction the same day as closing.”
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`LOPEZ v. SMITH
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`Per Curiam
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`731 F. 3d, at 868, 870.
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`Although the Ninth Circuit claimed its disagreement
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`with the state court was factual in nature, in reality its
`grant of relief was based on a legal conclusion about the
`adequacy of the notice provided. The Ninth Circuit be-
`lieved that the events detailed above, even when taken
`together with the information filed against respondent,
`failed to measure up to the standard of notice applicable in
`cases like this. That ranked as a legal determination
`governed by §2254(d)(1), not one of fact governed by
`§2254(d)(2). But, as we have explained, the Ninth Circuit
`cited only its own precedent for establishing the appropri-
`ate standard. Absent a decision of ours clearly establish-
`ing the relevant standard, the Ninth Circuit had nothing
`against which it could assess, and deem lacking, the notice
`afforded respondent by the information and proceedings.
`It therefore had no basis to reject the state court’s assess-
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`ment that respondent was adequately apprised of the pos-
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`sibility of conviction on an aiding-and-abetting theory.2
`The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The
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`judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
`Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for
`further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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`It is so ordered.
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`——————
`2Because we reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the foregoing
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`grounds, we need not opine on the correctness of that court’s discussion
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`of Griffin v. United States, 502 U. S. 46 (1991), or Brecht v. Abraham-
`son, 507 U. S. 619 (1993).