(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2014
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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`
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
`
` Syllabus
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`DART CHEROKEE BASIN OPERATING CO., LLC,
`
`
`
` ET AL. v. OWENS
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE TENTH CIRCUIT
` No. 13–719. Argued October 7, 2014—Decided December 15, 2014
`
`A defendant seeking to remove a case from state to federal court must
`
`
` file in the federal forum a notice of removal “containing a short and
`plain statement of the grounds for removal.” 28 U. S. C. §1446(a).
`
`
` Respondent Owens filed a putative class action in Kansas state
`court, seeking compensation for damages class members allegedly
`sustained when petitioners (collectively, Dart) underpaid royalties
`
` due under certain oil and gas leases. Dart removed the case to the
`Federal District Court, invoking the Class Action Fairness Act of
`
`2005 (CAFA), which gives federal courts jurisdiction over class ac-
`
` tions if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, 28 U. S. C.
`§1332(d)(2). Dart’s notice of removal alleged that the purported un-
`derpayments totaled over $8.2 million. Owens moved to remand the
`
` case to state court, asserting that the removal notice was “deficient
`as a matter of law” because it included “no evidence” proving that the
`amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. In response, Dart sub-
`mitted an executive’s detailed declaration supporting an amount in
`controversy in excess of $11 million. The District Court granted Ow-
`ens’ remand motion, reading Tenth Circuit precedent to require proof
`of the amount in controversy in the notice of removal itself. Dart pe-
`titioned the Tenth Circuit for permission to appeal, see §1453(c)(1),
`
`
`but that court denied review and rehearing en banc.
`Held:
`
`1. As specified in §1446(a), a defendant’s notice of removal need in-
`clude only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy ex-
`ceeds the jurisdictional threshold; the notice need not contain eviden-
`
`tiary submissions.
`
`
`Section 1446(a) tracks the general pleading requirement stated in
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`

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`DART CHEROKEE BASIN OPERATING CO. v. OWENS
`
`
`Syllabus
`Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By borrowing Rule
`8(a)’s “short and plain statement” standard, corroborative history in-
`dicates, Congress intended to clarify that courts should “apply the
`same liberal rules [to removal allegations as] to other matters of
`
`pleading.” H. R. Rep. No. 100–889, p. 71. The amount-in-controversy
`allegation of a plaintiff invoking federal-court jurisdiction is accepted
`if made in good faith. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle,
`429 U. S. 274, 276. Similarly, the amount-in-controversy allegation
`of a defendant seeking federal-court adjudication should be accepted
`when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court. In the
`event that the plaintiff does contest the defendant’s allegations, both
`sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the
`evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been
`satisfied, see §1446(c)(2)(B).
`
`
`In remanding the case to state court, the District Court relied, in
`part, on a purported “presumption” against removal, but no antire-
`
`moval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, a statute Congress
`enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal
`
`court. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U. S. ___, ___.
`Pp. 4–7.
`
`
`2. The District Court erred in remanding this case for want of an
`evidentiary submission in the notice of removal, and the Tenth Cir-
`cuit abused its discretion in denying review of that decision. Pp. 7–
`
`14.
`
`
`(a) This Court concludes that no jurisdictional barrier impedes
`settlement of the question presented: whether evidence supporting
`
`the amount in controversy must be included in a notice of removal.
`The case was “in” the Tenth Circuit because of Dart’s application for
`leave to appeal, and the Court has jurisdiction to review what the
`Court of Appeals did with that application. See 28 U. S. C. §1254;
`Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236, 248. Pp. 7–8.
`
`
`(b) While appellate review of a remand order is discretionary, ex-
`
`ercise of that discretion is not rudderless, see Highmark Inc. v. All-
`
`care Health Management System, Inc., 572 U. S. ___, ___, and a court
`“would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an er-
`
`roneous view of the law,” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S.
`384, 405. The Tenth Circuit had previously stated considerations
`bearing on the intelligent exercise of discretion under §1453(c)(1).
`One of those considerations is particularly relevant here: a court of
`appeals should inquire whether, if a district court’s remand order
`
`remains undisturbed, the case will “leave the ambit of the federal
`courts for good, precluding any other opportunity for [the defendant]
`to vindicate its claimed legal entitlement [under CAFA] . . . to have a
`federal tribunal adjudicate the merits.” BP America, Inc. v. Oklaho-
`
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`2
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`3
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` Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Syllabus
`ma ex rel. Edmondson, 613 F. 3d 1029, 1035. Thus the Tenth Cir-
`
`cuit’s own guide weighed heavily in favor of accepting Dart’s appeal.
`
`In practical effect, the Court of Appeals’ denial of review established
`the law—the requirement of proof of the amount in controversy in the
`removal notice—not simply for this case, but for future CAFA remov-
`
`als sought by defendants in the Tenth Circuit, leaving those defend-
`ants with no realistic opportunity to resist making the evidentiary
`submission.
`
`The District Court, driven by its conscientious endeavor to follow
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`
`Circuit precedent, erred in ruling that Dart’s amount-in-controversy
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`allegation failed for want of proof. It was an abuse of discretion for
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`the Tenth Circuit to deny Dart’s request for review, for that disposi-
`tion fastened on district courts within the Circuit an erroneous view
`of the law. Contrary to the law the District Court derived from Tenth
`Circuit precedent, a removal notice need only plausibly allege, not de-
`
`
`tail proof of, the amount in controversy.Pp. 8–14.
`Vacated and remanded.
`GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
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`C. J., and BREYER, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a
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`dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in
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`which THOMAS, J., joined as to all but the final sentence. THOMAS, J.,
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`filed a dissenting opinion.
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`

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` Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
`
`_________________
`
` No. 13–719
`_________________
`
` DART CHEROKEE BASIN OPERATING COMPANY,
`
`
`
` LLC, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
`
`BRANDON W. OWENS
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`[December 15, 2014]
`
` JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
`To remove a case from a state court to a federal court, a
`
`
`defendant must file in the federal forum a notice of re-
`moval “containing a short and plain statement of the
`grounds for removal.” 28 U. S. C. §1446(a). When re-
`moval is based on diversity of citizenship, an amount-in-
`controversy requirement must be met. Ordinarily, “the
`matter in controversy [must] excee[d] the sum or value of
`$75,000.” §1332(a). In class actions for which the re-
`quirement of diversity of citizenship is relaxed, §1332(d)
`(2)(A)–(C), “the matter in controversy [must] excee[d]
`the sum or value of $5,000,000,” §1332(d)(2).
`If the
`plaintiff ’s complaint, filed in state court, demands mon-
`etary relief of a stated sum, that sum, if asserted in
`good faith, is “deemed to be the amount in controversy.”
`§1446(c)(2). When the plaintiff ’s complaint does not state
`
`the amount in controversy, the defendant’s notice of re-
`moval may do so. §1446(c)(2)(A).
`
`To assert the amount in controversy adequately in the
`
`removal notice, does it suffice to allege the requisite
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`

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`2
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` DART CHEROKEE BASIN OPERATING CO. v. OWENS
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`Opinion of the Court
`amount plausibly, or must the defendant incorporate into
`
`the notice of removal evidence supporting the allegation?
`That is the single question argued here and below by the
`parties and the issue on which we granted review. The
`answer, we hold, is supplied by the removal statute itself.
`A statement “short and plain” need not contain eviden-
`tiary submissions.
`
`
`
`
`I
`Brandon W. Owens, plaintiff below and respondent
`
`here, filed a putative class action in Kansas state court
`alleging that defendants Dart Cherokee Basin Operating
`Company, LLC, and Cherokee Basin Pipeline, LLC (collec-
`tively, Dart), underpaid royalties owed to putative class
`members under certain oil and gas leases. The complaint
`sought “a fair and reasonable amount” to compensate
`putative class members for “damages” they sustained due
`to the alleged underpayments. App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a,
`35a.
`Invoking federal jurisdiction under the Class Action
`
`Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Dart removed the case to the
`U. S. District Court for the District of Kansas. CAFA
`gives federal courts jurisdiction over certain class actions,
`defined in §1332(d)(1), if the class has more than 100
`members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the
`amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. §1332(d)(2),
`(5)(B); see Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U. S.
`___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 3). Dart’s notice of removal
`alleged that all three requirements were satisfied. With
`respect to the amount in controversy, Dart stated that the
`purported underpayments to putative class members
`
`totaled more than $8.2 million.
`
`Owens moved to remand the case to state court. The
`notice of removal was “deficient as a matter of law,”
`Owens asserted, because it included “no evidence” proving
`that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. App.
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`

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`3
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` Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
`to Pet. for Cert. 46a, 53a. In response, Dart submitted a
`declaration by one of its executive officers. The declara-
`tion included a detailed damages calculation indicating
`that the amount in controversy, sans interest, exceeded
`
`$11 million. Without challenging Dart’s calculation,
`Owens urged that Dart’s amount-in-controversy submission
`came too late. “[The] legally deficient [notice of removal],”
`Owens maintained, could not be cured by “post-removal
`evidence about the amount in controversy.” Id., at 100a.
`Reading Tenth Circuit precedent to require proof of
`
`the amount in controversy in the notice of removal itself,
`the District Court granted Owens’ remand motion. Dart’s
`declaration, the District Court held, could not serve to
`keep the case in federal court. The Tenth Circuit, as the
`District Court read Circuit precedent, “has consistently
`held that reference to factual allegations or evidence out-
`side of the petition and notice of removal is not permitted
`to determine the amount in controversy.” App. to Pet.
`for Cert. 26a, and n. 37 (citing Laughlin v. Kmart Corp.,
`
`50 F. 3d 871, 873 (1995); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.,
`
`
`251 F. 3d 1284, 1291, n. 4 (2001); Oklahoma Farm Bureau
`Mut. Ins. Co. v. JSSJ Corp., 149 Fed. Appx. 775 (2005)).
`Ordinarily, remand orders “[are] not reviewable on
`
`appeal or otherwise.” §1447(d). There is an exception,
`however, for cases invoking CAFA. §1453(c)(1). In such
`cases, “a court of appeals may accept an appeal from an
`order of a district court granting or denying a motion to
`remand.” Ibid. Citing this exception, Dart petitioned the
`Tenth Circuit for permission to appeal. “Upon careful
`consideration of the parties’ submissions, as well as the
`applicable law,” the Tenth Circuit panel, dividing two-to-
`one, denied review. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a–14a.
`An evenly divided court denied Dart’s petition for en
`
`banc review. Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
`banc, Judge Hartz observed that the Tenth Circuit “[had]
`let stand a district-court decision that will in effect impose
`
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`

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`4
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` DART CHEROKEE BASIN OPERATING CO. v. OWENS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`in this circuit requirements for notices of removal that are
`even more onerous than the code pleading requirements
`that . . . federal courts abandoned long ago.” 730 F. 3d
`1234 (2013). The Tenth Circuit was duty-bound to grant
`Dart’s petition for rehearing en banc, Judge Hartz urged,
`because the opportunity “to correct the law in our circuit”
`likely would not arise again. Id., at 1235. Henceforth,
`Judge Hartz explained, “any diligent attorney . . . would
`submit to the evidentiary burden rather than take a
`chance on remand to state court.” Ibid.
`
`Dart filed a petition for certiorari in this Court request-
`
`ing resolution of the following question: “Whether a de-
`fendant seeking removal to federal court is required to
`include evidence supporting federal jurisdiction in the
`notice of removal, or is alleging the required ‘short and
`plain statement of the grounds for removal’ enough?” Pet.
`for Cert. i. Owens’ brief in opposition raised no impedi-
`ment to this Court’s review. (Nor, later, did Owens’ merits
`brief suggest any barrier to our consideration of Dart’s
`petition.) We granted certiorari to resolve a division
`among the Circuits on the question presented. 572 U. S.
`
` ___ (2014). Compare Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chas-
`sis, Inc., 519 F. 3d 192, 200 (CA4 2008) (a removing party’s
`notice of removal need not “meet a higher pleading stand-
`ard than the one imposed on a plaintiff in drafting an
`initial complaint”), and Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F. 3d
`982, 986 (CA7 2008) (similar), with Laughlin, 50 F. 3d, at
`873 (“the requisite amount in controversy . . . must be
`affirmatively established on the face of either the petition
`or the removal notice”).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`II
`
`As noted above, a defendant seeking to remove a case to
`
`a federal court must file in the federal forum a notice of
`removal “containing a short and plain statement of the
`grounds for removal.”
`§1446(a).
` By design, §1446(a)
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`

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` Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`tracks the general pleading requirement stated in Rule
`
`8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 14C C.
`
`Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, & J. Steinman, Federal
`Practice and Procedure §3733, pp. 639–641 (4th ed. 2009)
`(“Section 1446(a) requires only that the grounds for re-
`
`moval be stated in ‘a short and plain statement’—terms
`borrowed from the pleading requirement set forth in Fed-
`eral Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).”). The legislative history
`of §1446(a) is corroborative. Congress, by borrowing the
`
`familiar “short and plain statement” standard from Rule
`8(a), intended to “simplify the ‘pleading’ requirements for
`removal” and to clarify that courts should “apply the same
`liberal rules [to removal allegations] that are applied to
`other matters of pleading.” H. R. Rep. No. 100–889, p. 71
`(1988). See also ibid. (disapproving decisions requiring
`“detailed pleading”).
`
`When a plaintiff invokes federal-court jurisdiction, the
`plaintiff ’s amount-in-controversy allegation is accepted if
`made in good faith. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed.
`v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 276 (1977) (“‘[T]he sum claimed by
`
`the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in
`good faith.’”) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v.
`Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283, 288 (1938); alteration in origi-
`nal). Similarly, when a defendant seeks federal-court
`adjudication, the defendant’s amount-in-controversy alle-
`gation should be accepted when not contested by the
`plaintiff or questioned by the court. Indeed, the Tenth
`Circuit, although not disturbing prior decisions demand-
`
`ing proof together with the removal notice, recognized that
`it was anomalous to treat commencing plaintiffs and
`removing defendants differently with regard to the
`amount in controversy. See McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529
`F. 3d 947, 953 (2008) (requiring proof by defendant but not
`
`by plaintiff “bears no evident logical relationship either to
`the purpose of diversity jurisdiction, or to the principle
`that those who seek to invoke federal jurisdiction must
`
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`5
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`6
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`DART CHEROKEE BASIN OPERATING CO. v. OWENS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`establish its prerequisites”).
`
`If the plaintiff contests the defendant’s allegation,
`§1446(c)(2)(B) instructs: “[R]emoval . . . is proper on the
`basis of an amount in controversy asserted” by the defend-
`ant “if the district court finds, by the preponderance of the
`evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds” the
`jurisdictional threshold.1 This provision, added to §1446
`
`as part of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
`Clarification Act of 2011 (JVCA), clarifies the procedure in
`order when a defendant’s assertion of the amount in con-
`troversy is challenged. In such a case, both sides submit
`proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the
`evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement
`has been satisfied. As the House Judiciary Committee
`Report on the JVCA observed:
`“[D]efendants do not need to prove to a legal certainty
`
`that the amount in controversy requirement has been
`met. Rather, defendants may simply allege or assert
`that the jurisdictional threshold has been met. Dis-
`covery may be taken with regard to that question. In
`case of a dispute, the district court must make find-
`ings of jurisdictional fact to which the preponderance
`standard applies.” H. R. Rep. No. 112–10, p. 16
`(2011).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`1Section 1446(c)(2) applies to removals “sought on the basis of the
`
`
` jurisdiction conferred by section 1332(a),” and §1446(c)(2)(B) provides
`that “removal of the action is proper . . . [if] the amount in controversy
`
` exceeds the [in excess of $75,000] amount specified in section 1332(a)”
`(emphasis added). We assume, without deciding, a point the parties do
`not dispute: Sections 1446(c)(2) and 1446(c)(2)(B) apply to cases re-
`moved under §1332(d)(2), and removal is proper if the amount in
`controversy exceeds $5 million, the amount specified in §1332(d)(2).
`
` See Frederick v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 683 F. 3d 1242, 1247
`(CA10 2012) (“[T]here is no logical reason why we should demand more
`from a CAFA defendant than other parties invoking federal jurisdic-
`
` tion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
`
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`

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` Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Of course, a dispute about a defendant’s jurisdictional
`allegations cannot arise until after the defendant files a
`notice of removal containing those allegations. Brief for
`
` Dart 14.
`In remanding the case to state court, the District Court
`
`relied, in part, on a purported “presumption” against
`removal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. See, e.g., Laughlin, 50
`F. 3d, at 873 (“[T]here is a presumption against removal
`jurisdiction.”). We need not here decide whether such a
`presumption is proper in mine-run diversity cases.
`It
`suffices to point out that no antiremoval presumption
`attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to
`
` facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal
`court. See Standard Fire Ins. Co., 568 U. S., at ___ (slip
`op., at 6) (“CAFA’s primary objective” is to “ensur[e] ‘Fed-
`eral court consideration of interstate cases of national
`importance.’” (quoting §2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 5)); S. Rep. No.
`109–14, p. 43 (2005) (CAFA’s “provisions should be read
`broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class
`actions should be heard in a federal court if properly re-
`
`moved by any defendant.”).
`
`
`In sum, as specified in §1446(a), a defendant’s notice of
`removal need include only a plausible allegation that the
`amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional thresh-
`old. Evidence establishing the amount is required by
`§1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests, or the
`court questions, the defendant’s allegation.
`
`III
` As in Standard Fire Ins. Co., 568 U. S., at ___–___ (slip
`op., at 2–3), we granted review in this case after the Court
`of Appeals declined to hear an appeal from a remand
`order. Neither party in that case or in this one questioned
`our review authority under 28 U. S. C. §1254(1) (“Cases in
`the courts of appeals may be reviewed . . . [b]y writ of
`certiorari upon the petition of any party . . . before or after
`
`7
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`

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` DART CHEROKEE BASIN OPERATING CO. v. OWENS
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`8
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`Opinion of the Court
`rendition of judgment.”).2 An amicus brief filed in support
`of Owens by Public Citizen, Inc., however, raised a juris-
`dictional impediment.
`Section 1453(c)(1), Public Citizen noted, provides that “a
`
`court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of
`a district court granting or denying a motion to remand a
`class action to the State court from which it was re-
`moved[.]”
`(Emphasis added.) Because court of appeals
`review of a remand order is discretionary, see supra, at 3,
`and the Tenth Circuit exercised its discretion to deny
`review, Public Citizen urged, “[b]oth parties ask this Court
`to decide an issue that is not properly before it.” Brief for
`Public Citizen 6. “Absent grounds for reversing the court
`of appeals’ decision to deny permission to appeal,” Public
`Citizen asserted, “the merits of the district court’s decision
`are not before any appellate court, including this one.”
`
`Ibid.
`Satisfied that there are indeed “grounds for reversing
`
`the [Tenth Circuit’s] decision to deny permission to ap-
`peal,” we find no jurisdictional barrier to our settlement of
`the question presented. The case was “in” the Court of
`Appeals because of Dart’s leave-to-appeal application, and
`we have jurisdiction to review what the Court of Appeals
`did with that application. See 28 U. S. C. §1254; Hohn v.
`
`
`United States, 524 U. S. 236, 248 (1998). Owens, we reit-
`erate, did not contest the scope of our review.
`Discretion to review a remand order is not rudderless.
`
`
`See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System,
`
`Inc., 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 4) (“matters of
`discretion are reviewable for abuse of discretion” (internal
`
`quotation marks omitted)). A court “would necessarily
`abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous
`——————
`2Today’s dissenters joined the opinion in Standard Fire Ins. Co. v.
`Knowles, 568 U. S. ___ (2013), without suggesting any lack of jurisdic-
`tion to reach the merits.
`
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`

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`9
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`Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` view of the law.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
`
` U. S. 384, 405 (1990). This case fits that bill.3
`There are many signals that the Tenth Circuit relied on
`
`the legally erroneous premise that the District Court’s
`decision was correct. In an earlier case, the Tenth Circuit,
`following the First Circuit’s lead, stated considerations
`that it regards as relevant to the intelligent exercise of
`discretion under §1453(c)(1). BP America, Inc. v. Okla-
`homa ex rel. Edmondson, 613 F. 3d 1029, 1034–1035 (2010)
`(adopting factors set out in College of Dental Surgeons of
`Puerto Rico v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 585 F. 3d 33,
`
`38–39 (CA1 2009)).4 When the CAFA-related question
`
`presented in an appeal from a remand order is “important,
`unsettled, and recurrent,” the First Circuit instructed, a
`court of appeals should inquire: “Absent an interlocutory
`appeal, [will the question] in all probability escape mean-
`ingful appellate review.” Id., at 39. Or, as phrased by the
`Tenth Circuit, if a district court’s remand order remains
`undisturbed, will the case “leave the ambit of the federal
`courts for good, precluding any other opportunity for [the
`defendant] to vindicate its claimed legal entitlement [un-
`der CAFA] . . . to have a federal tribunal adjudicate the
`merits.” BP America, 613 F. 3d, at 1035. See also Coffey
`v. Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold, 581 F. 3d 1240, 1247
`(CA10 2009) (noting that “the purpose of §1453(c)(1) is
`
`to develop a body of appellate law interpreting CAFA”
`(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus,
`——————
`3 JUSTICE SCALIA’s dissent (hereafter dissent) faults Dart for assert-
`
`ing, late in the day, that the Tenth Circuit abused its discretion, observ-
`ing that Dart did so only in its reply brief. Post, at 6. But Public
`Citizen teed up that issue after the parties filed their merits briefs. In
`view of this Court’s decision in Standard Fire Ins. Co., 568 U. S. ___,
`see supra, at 7–8, the parties had no cause to address the matter
`earlier.
`
` 4Neither court stated the listed considerations as an inflexible test.
`
` We have no occasion in this case to review each of the factors identified
`
`
`by the First and Tenth Circuits.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`10
`
`
`
`DART CHEROKEE BASIN OPERATING CO. v. OWENS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the Tenth Circuit’s own guide weighed heavily in favor of
`accepting Dart’s appeal. That the Court of Appeals, in-
`stead, rejected Dart’s appeal strongly suggests that the
`panel thought the District Court got it right in requiring
`proof of the amount in controversy in the removal notice.
`In practical effect, the Court of Appeals’ denial of review
`
`established the law not simply for this case, but for future
`CAFA removals sought by defendants in the Tenth Cir-
`cuit. The likelihood is slim that a later case will arise in
`which the Tenth Circuit will face a plea to retract the rule
`that both Owens and the District Court ascribed to deci-
`sions of the Court of Appeals: Defendants seeking to re-
`move under CAFA must be sent back to state court unless
`they submit with the notice of removal evidence proving
`
`the alleged amount in controversy. See supra, at 3. On
`
`this point, Judge Hartz’s observation, dissenting from the
`Tenth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, see supra, at
`4, bears recounting in full:
`
`“After today’s decision any diligent attorney (and one
`can assume that an attorney representing a defendant
`in a case involving at least $5 million—the threshold
`for removal under CAFA—would have substantial in-
`centive to be diligent) would submit to the evidentiary
`burden rather than take a chance on remand to state
`court.” 730 F. 3d, at 1235.
`With no responsible attorney likely to renew the fray,
`
`Judge Hartz anticipated, “the issue will not arise again.”
`
` Consequently, the law applied by the District
`Ibid.
`Court—demanding that the notice of removal contain
`evidence documenting the amount in controversy—will be
`frozen in place for all venues within the Tenth Circuit.5
`
`——————
`5The dissent suggests that the Tenth Circuit may have another op-
`portunity to set Circuit precedent straight: A lawyer may be irresponsi-
`
` ble or fail to learn from Dart’s experience; or perhaps a lawyer will put
`in evidence the district court deems insufficient, and then have a go at
`
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`
`

`
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`
`
`11
`
`
`Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Recall that the Court of Appeals denied Dart’s petition
`
`for review “[u]pon careful consideration of the parties’
`submissions, as well as the applicable law.” App. to Pet.
`for Cert. 13a. What did the parties submit to the Tenth
`Circuit? Their presentations urged conflicting views on
`whether a removing defendant must tender prima facie
`proof of the amount in controversy as part of the removal
`notice. And what was “the applicable law” other than the
`
`rule recited by the Tenth Circuit in Laughlin and follow-on
`
`
`decisions, i.e., to remove successfully, a defendant must
`present with the notice of removal evidence proving the
`amount in controversy.6
`
`From all signals one can discern then, the Tenth Cir-
`
`cuit’s denial of Dart’s request for review of the remand
`order was infected by legal error. The District Court erred
`in ruling that Dart’s amount-in-controversy allegation
`failed for want of proof, but that error was driven by the
`District Court’s conscientious endeavor to follow Circuit
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`arguing that the evidence was sufficient and, in any event, “no evidence
`is required at all.” Post, at 5–6. That such a case will occur, and that
`
`the Tenth Circuit would then seize the very opportunity it passed up in
`Dart’s case, is hardly probable.
`6The dissent posits that “the applicable law” might have been some-
`
`thing other than the law governing the parties’ submissions. Post, at 3,
`4. That is a strained reading of the Tenth Circuit’s expression. Per-
`
`
`haps the Tenth Circuit found this case a “poor vehicle,” the dissent
`
`
`suggests, post, at 2, but no potential vehicle concerns were urged by
`Owens, and the dissent identifies none. Or the Tenth Circuit might
`have doubted its “ability to quickly resolve the issue” within the 60-day
`time limit provided in §1453(c)(2)–(3). Ibid.; see also post, at 4. Section
`
`1453(c)’s timing provision, however, was designed to promote expedi-
`
`tion, not to discourage Courts of Appeals from acting on petitions for
`appeal. As a third “maybe,” the dissent observes that proof of the
`
`
`
`amount in controversy in removal notices is not “a question unique to
`
`[CAFA].” Post, at 3. True, the Tenth Circuit demands such proof in
`
`ordinary diversity cases. See Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F. 3d 871,
`873 (1995). But that does not make the imposition one whit less in
`CAFA cases.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` DART CHEROKEE BASIN OPERATING CO. v. OWENS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`precedent. The parties trained their arguments in the
`
`Tenth Circuit, as they did here, on the question whether
`Dart could successfully remove without detailing in the
`removal notice evidence of the amount in controversy. See
`Tr. of Oral Arg. 47 (acknowledgment by Owens’ counsel
`that “the issues . . . provided to . . . the Tenth Circuit were
`very similar to what you see in this Court, with the excep-
`tion of [the question raised by Public Citizen] whether this
`Court has jurisdiction”). Dissenting from the denial of
`rehearing en banc, Judge Hartz explained at length why
`the Tenth Circuit “owe[d] a duty to the bench and bar” to
`correct the District Court’s misperception and to state as
`the Circuit’s law: “[A] defendant seeking removal under
`CAFA need only allege the jurisdictional amount in its
`notice of removal and must prove that amount only if the
`plaintiff challenges the allegation.” 730 F. 3d, at 1234,
`
`1238. In this regard, we note, the Tenth Circuit has cau-
`tioned against casual rulings on applications like Dart’s.
`“The decision whether to grant leave to appeal” under
`§1453(c), the Tenth Circuit stressed, calls for the exercise
`
` of the reviewing court’s correctly “informed discretion.”
`BP America, 613 F. 3d, at 1035 (emphasis added); see
`supra, at 8–9.
`Recall, moreover, that Owens never suggested in his
`
`
`written submissions to this Court that anything other
`than the question presented accounts for the Court of
`
`Appeals’ disposition. If Owens believed that the Tenth
`Circuit’s denial of leave to appeal rested on some other
`ground, he might have said so in his brief in opposition or,
`at least, in his merits brief. See this Court’s Rule 15.2;
`
`Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 306 (2010).
`He said nothing of that order, for he, like Dart, antici-
`pated that the question presented was ripe for this Court’s
`resolution.
`
`
`In the above-described circumstances, we find it an
`abuse of discretion for the Tenth Circuit to deny Dart’s
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 12
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`request for review. Doing so froze the governing rule in
`
`
` the Circuit for this case and future CAFA removal notices,
`with no opportunity for defendants in Dart’s position
`re