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Technical Specification

3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security architecture and procedures for 5G system (Release 15)



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Contents

Foreword.....	11
1 Scope.....	12
2 References.....	12
3 Definitions and abbreviations.....	14
3.1 Definitions.....	14
3.2 Abbreviations.....	18
4 Overview of security architecture.....	19
4.1 Security domains.....	19
4.2 Security entity at the perimeter of the 5G Core network.....	20
4.3 Security entities in the 5G Core network.....	20
5 Security requirements and features.....	20
5.1 General security requirements.....	20
5.1.1 Mitigation of bidding down attacks.....	20
5.1.2 Authentication and Authorization.....	20
5.1.3 Requirements on 5GC and NG-RAN related to keys.....	21
5.2 Requirements on the UE.....	21
5.2.1 General.....	21
5.2.2 User data and signalling data confidentiality.....	21
5.2.3 User data and signalling data integrity.....	22
5.2.4 Secure storage and processing of subscription credentials.....	22
5.2.5 Subscriber privacy.....	23
5.3 Requirements on the gNB.....	23
5.3.1 General.....	23
5.3.2 User data and signalling data confidentiality.....	23
5.3.3 User data and signalling data integrity.....	24
5.3.4 Requirements for the gNB setup and configuration.....	24
5.3.5 Requirements for key management inside the gNB.....	24
5.3.6 Requirements for handling user plane data for the gNB.....	25
5.3.7 Requirements for handling control plane data for the gNB.....	25
5.3.8 Requirements for secure environment of the gNB.....	25
5.3.9 Requirements for the gNB F1 interfaces.....	25
5.3.10 Requirements for the gNB E1 interfaces.....	25
5.4 Requirements on the ng-eNB.....	26
5.5 Requirements on the AMF.....	26
5.5.1 Signalling data confidentiality.....	26
5.5.2 Signalling data integrity.....	26
5.5.3 Subscriber privacy.....	26
5.6 Requirements on the SEAF.....	26
5.7 Void.....	27
5.8 Requirements on the UDM.....	27
5.8.1 Generic requirements.....	27
5.8.2 Subscriber privacy related requirements to UDM and SIDF.....	27
5.8a Requirements on AUSF.....	27
5.9 Core network security.....	27
5.9.1 Trust boundaries.....	27
5.9.2 Requirements on service-based architecture.....	27
5.9.2.1 Security Requirements for service registration, discovery and authorization.....	27
5.9.2.2 NRF security requirements.....	28
5.9.2.3 NEF security requirements.....	28
5.9.3 Requirements for e2e core network interconnection security.....	28
5.9.3.1 General.....	28
5.9.3.2 Requirements for Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP).....	29
5.9.3.3 Protection of attributes.....	29
5.10 Visibility and configurability.....	30

5.10.1	Security visibility	30
5.10.2	Security configurability	30
5.11	Requirements for algorithms, and algorithm selection	30
5.11.1	Algorithm identifier values	30
5.11.1.1	Ciphering algorithm identifier values	30
5.11.1.2	Integrity algorithm identifier values	30
5.11.2	Requirements for algorithm selection	31
6	Security procedures between UE and 5G network functions	32
6.1	Primary authentication and key agreement	32
6.1.1	Authentication framework	32
6.1.1.1	General	32
6.1.1.2	EAP framework	32
6.1.1.3	Granularity of anchor key binding to serving network	33
6.1.1.4	Construction of the serving network name	33
6.1.1.4.1	Serving network name	33
6.1.1.4.2	Construction of the serving network name by the UE	33
6.1.1.4.3	Construction of the serving network name by the SEAF	33
6.1.2	Initiation of authentication and selection of authentication method	34
6.1.3	Authentication procedures	35
6.1.3.1	Authentication procedure for EAP-AKA'	35
6.1.3.2	Authentication procedure for 5G AKA	37
6.1.3.2.0	5G AKA	37
6.1.3.2.1	Void	39
6.1.3.2.2	RES* verification failure in SEAF or AUSF or both	39
6.1.3.3	Synchronization failure or MAC failure	40
6.1.3.3.1	Synchronization failure or MAC failure in USIM	40
6.1.3.3.2	Synchronization failure recovery in Home Network	40
6.1.4	Linking increased home control to subsequent procedures	41
6.1.4.1	Introduction	41
6.1.4.1a	Linking authentication confirmation to Nudm_UECM_Registration procedure from AMF	41
6.1.4.2	Guidance on linking authentication confirmation to Nudm_UECM_Registration procedure from AMF	42
6.2	Key hierarchy, key derivation, and distribution scheme	43
6.2.1	Key hierarchy	43
6.2.2	Key derivation and distribution scheme	45
6.2.2.1	Keys in network entities	45
6.2.2.2	Keys in the UE	46
6.2.3	Handling of user-related keys	48
6.2.3.1	Key setting	48
6.2.3.2	Key identification	48
6.2.3.3	Key lifetimes	49
6.3	Security contexts	50
6.3.1	Distribution of security contexts	50
6.3.1.1	General	50
6.3.1.2	Distribution of subscriber identities and security data within one 5G serving network domain	50
6.3.1.3	Distribution of subscriber identities and security data between 5G serving network domains	50
6.3.1.4	Distribution of subscriber identities and security data between 5G and EPS serving network domains	50
6.3.2	Multiple registrations in same or different serving networks	51
6.3.2.0	General	51
6.3.2.1	Multiple registrations in different PLMNs	51
6.3.2.2	Multiple registrations in the same PLMN	51
6.4	NAS security mechanisms	51
6.4.1	General	51
6.4.2	Security for multiple NAS connections	51
6.4.2.1	Multiple active NAS connections with different PLMNs	51
6.4.2.2	Multiple active NAS connections in the same PLMN's serving network	52
6.4.3	NAS integrity mechanisms	52
6.4.3.0	General	52
6.4.3.1	NAS input parameters to integrity algorithm	52
6.4.3.2	NAS integrity activation	53

6.4.3.3	NAS integrity failure handling	53
6.4.4	NAS confidentiality mechanisms	53
6.4.4.0	General	53
6.4.4.1	NAS input parameters to confidentiality algorithm	53
6.4.4.2	NAS confidentiality activation	53
6.4.5	Handling of NAS COUNTs	53
6.4.6	Protection of initial NAS message	54
6.4.7	Security aspects of SMS over NAS	55
6.5	RRC security mechanisms	55
6.5.1	RRC integrity mechanisms	55
6.5.2	RRC confidentiality mechanisms	55
6.6	UP security mechanisms	56
6.6.1	UP security policy	56
6.6.2	UP security activation mechanism	57
6.6.3	UP confidentiality mechanisms	58
6.6.4	UP integrity mechanisms	58
6.7	Security algorithm selection, key establishment and security mode command procedure	58
6.7.1	Procedures for NAS algorithm selection	58
6.7.1.1	Initial NAS security context establishment	58
6.7.1.2	AMF change	58
6.7.2	NAS security mode command procedure	59
6.7.3	Procedures for AS algorithm selection	60
6.7.3.0	Initial AS security context establishment	60
6.7.3.1	Xn-handover	61
6.7.3.2	N2-handover	61
6.7.3.3	Intra-gNB-CU handover	61
6.7.3.4	Transitions from RRC-INACTIVE to RRC-CONNECTED states	61
6.7.3.5	RNA Update procedure	62
6.7.3.6	Algorithm negotiation for unauthenticated UEs in LSM	62
6.7.4	AS security mode command procedure	62
6.8	Security handling in state transitions	63
6.8.1	Key handling at connection and registration state transitions	63
6.8.1.1	Key handling at transitions between RM-DEREGISTERED and RM-REGISTERED states	63
6.8.1.1.0	General	63
6.8.1.1.1	Transition from RM-REGISTERED to RM-DEREGISTERED	64
6.8.1.1.2	Transition from RM-DEREGISTERED to RM-REGISTERED	65
6.8.1.1.2.1	General	65
6.8.1.1.2.2	Full native 5G NAS security context available	65
6.8.1.1.2.3	Full native 5G NAS security context not available	66
6.8.1.1.2.4	UE registration over a second access type to the same AMF	66
6.8.1.2	Key handling at transitions between CM-IDLE and CM-CONNECTED states	66
6.8.1.2.0	General	66
6.8.1.2.1	Transition from CM-IDLE to CM-CONNECTED	67
6.8.1.2.2	Establishment of keys for cryptographically protected radio bearers in 3GPP access	67
6.8.1.2.3	Establishment of keys for cryptographically protected traffic in non-3GPP access	68
6.8.1.2.4	Transition from CM-CONNECTED to CM-IDLE	68
6.8.1.3	Key handling for the Registration procedure when registered in NG-RAN	68
6.8.2	Security handling at RRC state transitions	69
6.8.2.1	Security handling at transitions between RRC_INACTIVE and RRC-CONNECTED states	69
6.8.2.1.1	General	69
6.8.2.1.3	State transition from RRCINACTIVE to RRCCONNECTED to a new gNB	69
6.8.2.1.4	State transition from RRCINACTIVE to RRCCONNECTED to the same gNB	71
6.8.2.2	Key handling during mobility in RRC-INACTIVE state	71
6.8.2.2.1	General	71
6.8.2.2.2	RAN-based notification area update to a new gNB	71
6.8.2.2.3	RAN-based notification area update to the same gNB	71
6.9	Security handling in mobility	71
6.9.1	General	71
6.9.2	Key handling in handover	72
6.9.2.1	General	72
6.9.2.1.1	Access stratum	72
6.9.2.1.2	Non access stratum	73

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