

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

NICHIA CORPORATION,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	C.A. No. 16-681 (RGA)
	)	
TCL MULTIMEDIA TECHNOLOGY	)	
HOLDINGS, LTD. and	)	
TTE TECHNOLOGY, INC.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

**JOINT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF**

MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP  
 Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)  
 Brian P. Egan (#6227)  
 1201 North Market Street  
 P.O. Box 1347  
 Wilmington, DE 19899  
 (302) 658-9200  
 jblumenfeld@mnat.com  
 began@mnat.com

*Attorneys for Plaintiff*

OF COUNSEL:

Kenneth A. Gallo  
 David Cole  
 PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON  
 & GARRISON LLP  
 2001 K Street, NW  
 Washington, DC 20006-1047  
 (202) 223-7300

Catherine Nyarady  
 Daniel J. Klein  
 PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON  
 & GARRISON LLP  
 1285 Avenue of the Americas  
 New York, New York 10019-6064  
 (212) 373-3000

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CONNOLLY GALLAGHER LLP  
 Arthur G. Connolly III (#2667)  
 Ryan P. Newell (#4744)  
 Mary Akhimien (#5448)  
 The Brandywine Building  
 1000 West Street, Suite 1400  
 Wilmington, DE 19801  
 (302) 757-7300  
 aconnolly@connollygallagher.com  
 rnewell@connollygallagher.com  
 makhimien@connollygallagher.com

*Attorneys for Defendants*

OF COUNSEL:

Raymond N. Nimrod  
 James M. Glass  
 Gregory C. Wyckoff  
 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART  
 & SULLIVAN, LLP  
 51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor  
 New York, NY 10010  
 (212) 849-7000

The defendants criticize Nichia for relying on one of two listed dictionary definitions, one which mentions only reflection and one which refers to scattering generally via a translucent material. *Supra* at 40-41; Hansen Decl. ¶¶ 55-56 (JA Ex. 9). The latter, they argue, is “refraction” not “reflection.” This argument, too, misses the point. As Dr. Wetzel has explained (Wetzel Reply Decl. ¶¶ 28-29 (JA Ex. 25)), the meaning of “diffuses” depends on context, and it may well mean one mechanism to the exclusion of others in a given case. The fact that there are multiple definitions in no way contradicts Nichia’s argument that in this case a POSITA would understand the reference in the patent to refer to reflections off of the phosphor particles.<sup>23</sup> In fact, the existence of these dictionary definitions supports Nichia’s position. Either of the definitions cited by the defendants may be appropriate in some contexts and are common usages of the term, but, here, in the context of the specification, “diffusion” means the former and not the latter. Wetzel Reply Decl. ¶ 29 (JA Ex. 25). The dictionary definitions corroborate that the distinction being made by Dr. Wetzel is well supported and recognized.

Although the defendants urge that the specification describes the process of diffusing light in only one sentence, imposes no restriction on possible methods of diffusion, and makes no mention of “reflection,” Dr. Wetzel explains that a *POSITA* would have understood that the claim limitation requiring that the phosphor “diffuses” light from the LED chip refers to the bouncing of light off the phosphor particles. Wetzel Reply Decl. ¶ 30 (JA Ex. 25). The defendants erroneously assert that the intrinsic evidence cited by Nichia is completely irrelevant

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<sup>23</sup> The defendants also cite several additional dictionary definitions: “to spread out, pour out, scatter”; “scattering of a beam of light”; “reflection at a rough surface”; “transmission through a translucent . . . medium.” *Supra* at 40-41; Hansen Decl. ¶ 57. Again, as Dr. Wetzel has explained, “diffuses” may mean different things in different contexts. A POSITA would understand that the specific “diffuses” limitation in the relevant claims is not referring to all of them. As noted above, the scattering caused by absorption and reemission of light by the phosphor is wholly insufficient.

dispersive material.” *Supra* at 75. Nichia offers similar structure for the phrase “reflective member.” However, Nichia’s constructions are purely functional and provide no, specific structure, of their own. Hansen R. Decl. ¶¶50-53 (JA Ex. 28). Indeed, Nichia’s non-exhaustive laundry list of “any” structures that perform the claimed functions is precisely why 112, ¶ 6 should apply here. *Williamson v. Citrix*, 792 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015)

Should the Court decide that these terms are governed by Section 112, ¶6 (as it should), Nichia does not dispute the functions and corresponding structures proposed by TCL. Thus, the Court should adopt TCL’s proposals, which remain uncontested.

MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP

*/s/ Brian P. Egan*

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Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)  
Brian P. Egan (#6227)  
1201 North Market Street  
P.O. Box 1347  
Wilmington, DE 19899  
(302) 658-9200  
jblumenfeld@mnat.com  
began@mnat.com  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff*

OF COUNSEL:

Kenneth A. Gallo  
David Cole  
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON  
& GARRISON LLP  
2001 K Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20006-1047  
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Daniel J. Klein  
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Arthur G. Connolly III (#2667)  
Ryan P. Newell (#4744)  
Mary Akhimien (#5448)  
The Brandywine Building  
1000 West Street, Suite 1400  
Wilmington, DE 19801  
(302) 757-7300  
aconnolly@connollygallagher.com  
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Raymond N. Nimrod  
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Gregory C. Wyckoff  
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART  
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New York, NY 10010  
(212) 849-7000