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**APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY,
SECOND EDITION**

PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE IN C

BRUCE SCHNEIER



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Contents in Brief

- Foreword by Whitfield Diffie
Preface
About the Author
- 1 Foundations
- Part I Cryptographic Protocols**
- 2 Protocol Building Blocks
 - 3 Basic Protocols
 - 4 Intermediate Protocols
 - 5 Advanced Protocols
 - 6 Esoteric Protocols
- Part II Cryptographic Techniques**
- 7 Key Length
 - 8 Key Management
 - 9 Algorithm Types and Modes
 - 10 Using Algorithms
- Part III Cryptographic Algorithms**
- 11 Mathematical Background
 - 12 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
 - 13 Other Block Ciphers
 - 14 Still Other Block Ciphers
 - 15 Combining Block Ciphers
 - 16 Pseudo-Random-Sequence Generators and Stream Ciphers
 - 17 Other Stream Ciphers and Real Random-Sequence Generators
 - 18 One-Way Hash Functions
 - 19 Public-Key Algorithms
 - 20 Public-Key Digital Signature Algorithms
 - 21 Identification Schemes
 - 22 Key-Exchange Algorithms
 - 23 Special Algorithms for Protocols
- Part IV The Real World**
- 24 Example Implementations
 - 25 Politics
- Afterword by Matt Blaze
- Part V Source Code**
- References

Contents

Foreword by Whitfield Diffie xv

Preface xix

HOW TO READ THIS BOOK xx

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xxii

About the Author xxiii

1 FOUNDATIONS 1

- 1.1 TERMINOLOGY 1
- 1.2 STEGANOGRAPHY 9
- 1.3 SUBSTITUTION CIPHERS AND TRANSPOSITION CIPHERS 10
- 1.4 SIMPLE XOR 13
- 1.5 ONE-TIME PADS 15
- 1.6 COMPUTER ALGORITHMS 17
- 1.7 LARGE NUMBERS 17

PART I CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS

2 PROTOCOL BUILDING BLOCKS 21

- 2.1 INTRODUCTION TO PROTOCOLS 21
- 2.2 COMMUNICATIONS USING SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY 28
- 2.3 ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS 29
- 2.4 ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTIONS 30
- 2.5 COMMUNICATIONS USING PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 31
- 2.6 DIGITAL SIGNATURES 34
- 2.7 DIGITAL SIGNATURES WITH ENCRYPTION 41
- 2.8 RANDOM AND PSEUDO-RANDOM-SEQUENCE GENERATION 44

3	BASIC PROTOCOLS	47
3.1	KEY EXCHANGE	47
3.2	AUTHENTICATION	52
3.3	AUTHENTICATION AND KEY EXCHANGE	56
3.4	FORMAL ANALYSIS OF AUTHENTICATION AND KEY-EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS	65
3.5	MULTIPLE-KEY PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY	68
3.6	SECRET SPLITTING	70
3.7	SECRET SHARING	71
3.8	CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION OF DATABASES	73
4	INTERMEDIATE PROTOCOLS	75
4.1	TIMESTAMPING SERVICES	75
4.2	SUBLIMINAL CHANNEL	79
4.3	UNDENIABLE DIGITAL SIGNATURES	81
4.4	DESIGNATED CONFIRMER SIGNATURES	82
4.5	PROXY SIGNATURES	83
4.6	GROUP SIGNATURES	84
4.7	FAIL-STOP DIGITAL SIGNATURES	85
4.8	COMPUTING WITH ENCRYPTED DATA	85
4.9	BIT COMMITMENT	86
4.10	FAIR COIN FLIPS	89
4.11	MENTAL POKER	92
4.12	ONE-WAY ACCUMULATORS	95
4.13	ALL-OR-NOTHING DISCLOSURE OF SECRETS	96
4.14	KEY ESCROW	97
5	ADVANCED PROTOCOLS	101
5.1	ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS	101
5.2	ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS OF IDENTITY	109
5.3	BLIND SIGNATURES	112
5.4	IDENTITY-BASED PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY	115
5.5	OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER	116
5.6	OBLIVIOUS SIGNATURES	117
5.7	SIMULTANEOUS CONTRACT SIGNING	118
5.8	DIGITAL CERTIFIED MAIL	122
5.9	SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE OF SECRETS	123
6	ESOTERIC PROTOCOLS	125
6.1	SECURE ELECTIONS	125
6.2	SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION	134
6.3	ANONYMOUS MESSAGE BROADCAST	137
6.4	DIGITAL CASH	139

PART II CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES**7 KEY LENGTH 151**

- 7.1 SYMMETRIC KEY LENGTH 151
- 7.2 PUBLIC-KEY KEY LENGTH 158
- 7.3 COMPARING SYMMETRIC AND PUBLIC-KEY KEY LENGTH 165
- 7.4 BIRTHDAY ATTACKS AGAINST ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTIONS 165
- 7.5 HOW LONG SHOULD A KEY BE? 166
- 7.6 CAVEAT EMPTOR 168

8 KEY MANAGEMENT 169

- 8.1 GENERATING KEYS 170
- 8.2 NONLINEAR KEYSACES 175
- 8.3 TRANSFERRING KEYS 176
- 8.4 VERIFYING KEYS 178
- 8.5 USING KEYS 179
- 8.6 UPDATING KEYS 180
- 8.7 STORING KEYS 180
- 8.8 BACKUP KEYS 181
- 8.9 COMPROMISED KEYS 182
- 8.10 LIFETIME OF KEYS 183
- 8.11 DESTROYING KEYS 184
- 8.12 PUBLIC-KEY KEY MANAGEMENT 185

9 ALGORITHM TYPES AND MODES 189

- 9.1 ELECTRONIC CODEBOOK MODE 189
- 9.2 BLOCK REPLAY 191
- 9.3 CIPHER BLOCK CHAINING MODE 193
- 9.4 STREAM CIPHERS 197
- 9.5 SELF-SYNCHRONIZING STREAM CIPHERS 198
- 9.6 CIPHER-FEEDBACK MODE 200
- 9.7 SYNCHRONOUS STREAM CIPHERS 202
- 9.8 OUTPUT-FEEDBACK MODE 203
- 9.9 COUNTER MODE 205
- 9.10 OTHER BLOCK-CIPHER MODES 206
- 9.11 CHOOSING A CIPHER MODE 208
- 9.12 INTERLEAVING 210
- 9.13 BLOCK CIPHERS VERSUS STREAM CIPHERS 210

10 USING ALGORITHMS 213

- 10.1 CHOOSING AN ALGORITHM 214
- 10.2 PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY VERSUS SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY 216
- 10.3 ENCRYPTING COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS 216
- 10.4 ENCRYPTING DATA FOR STORAGE 220
- 10.5 HARDWARE ENCRYPTION VERSUS SOFTWARE ENCRYPTION 223

- 10.6 COMPRESSION, ENCODING, AND ENCRYPTION 226
- 10.7 DETECTING ENCRYPTION 226
- 10.8 HIDING CIPHERTEXT IN CIPHERTEXT 227
- 10.9 DESTROYING INFORMATION 228

PART III CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS

11 MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND 233

- 11.1 INFORMATION THEORY 233
- 11.2 COMPLEXITY THEORY 237
- 11.3 NUMBER THEORY 242
- 11.4 FACTORING 255
- 11.5 PRIME NUMBER GENERATION 258
- 11.6 DISCRETE LOGARITHMS IN A FINITE FIELD 261

12 DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES) 265

- 12.1 BACKGROUND 265
- 12.2 DESCRIPTION OF DES 270
- 12.3 SECURITY OF DES 278
- 12.4 DIFFERENTIAL AND LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS 285
- 12.5 THE REAL DESIGN CRITERIA 293
- 12.6 DES VARIANTS 294
- 12.7 HOW SECURE IS DES TODAY? 300

13 OTHER BLOCK CIPHERS 303

- 13.1 LUCIFER 303
- 13.2 MADRYGA 304
- 13.3 NEWDES 306
- 13.4 FEAL 308
- 13.5 REDOC 311
- 13.6 LOKI 314
- 13.7 KHUFU AND KHAFRE 316
- 13.8 RC2 318
- 13.9 IDEA 319
- 13.10 MMB 325
- 13.11 CA-1.1 327
- 13.12 SKIPJACK 328

14 STILL OTHER BLOCK CIPHERS 331

- 14.1 GOST 331
- 14.2 CAST 334
- 14.3 BLOWFISH 336
- 14.4 SAFER 339
- 14.5 3-WAY 341

- 14.6 CRAB 342
- 14.7 SXAL8/MBAL 344
- 14.8 RC5 344
- 14.9 OTHER BLOCK ALGORITHMS 346
- 14.10 THEORY OF BLOCK CIPHER DESIGN 346
- 14.11 USING ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTIONS 351
- 14.12 CHOOSING A BLOCK ALGORITHM 354

- 15 COMBINING BLOCK CIPHERS 357**
 - 15.1 DOUBLE ENCRYPTION 357
 - 15.2 TRIPLE ENCRYPTION 358
 - 15.3 DOUBLING THE BLOCK LENGTH 363
 - 15.4 OTHER MULTIPLE ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 363
 - 15.5 CDMF KEY SHORTENING 366
 - 15.6 WHITENING 366
 - 15.7 CASCADING MULTIPLE BLOCK ALGORITHMS 367
 - 15.8 COMBINING MULTIPLE BLOCK ALGORITHMS 368

- 16 PSEUDO-RANDOM-SEQUENCE GENERATORS AND STREAM CIPHERS 369**
 - 16.1 LINEAR CONGRUENTIAL GENERATORS 369
 - 16.2 LINEAR FEEDBACK SHIFT REGISTERS 372
 - 16.3 DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF STREAM CIPHERS 379
 - 16.4 STREAM CIPHERS USING LFSRS 381
 - 16.5 A5 389
 - 16.6 HUGHES XPD/KPD 389
 - 16.7 NANOTEQ 390
 - 16.8 RAMBUTAN 390
 - 16.9 ADDITIVE GENERATORS 390
 - 16.10 GIFFORD 392
 - 16.11 ALGORITHM M 393
 - 16.12 PKZIP 394

- 17 OTHER STREAM CIPHERS AND REAL RANDOM-SEQUENCE GENERATORS 397**
 - 17.1 RC4 397
 - 17.2 SEAL 398
 - 17.3 WAKE 400
 - 17.4 FEEDBACK WITH CARRY SHIFT REGISTERS 402
 - 17.5 STREAM CIPHERS USING FCSRs 405
 - 17.6 NONLINEAR-FEEDBACK SHIFT REGISTERS 412
 - 17.7 OTHER STREAM CIPHERS 413
 - 17.8 SYSTEM-THEORETIC APPROACH TO STREAM-CIPHER DESIGN 415
 - 17.9 COMPLEXITY-THEMATIC APPROACH TO STREAM-CIPHER DESIGN 416
 - 17.10 OTHER APPROACHES TO STREAM-CIPHER DESIGN 418

17.11	CASCADING MULTIPLE STREAM CIPHERS	419
17.12	CHOOSING A STREAM CIPHER	420
17.13	GENERATING MULTIPLE STREAMS FROM A SINGLE PSEUDO-RANDOM-SEQUENCE GENERATOR	420
17.14	REAL RANDOM-SEQUENCE GENERATORS	421
18 ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTIONS		429
18.1	BACKGROUND	429
18.2	SNEFRU	431
18.3	N-HASH	432
18.4	MD4	435
18.5	MD5	436
18.6	MD2	441
18.7	SECURE HASH ALGORITHM (SHA)	441
18.8	RIPE-MD	445
18.9	HAVAL	445
18.10	OTHER ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTIONS	446
18.11	ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTIONS USING SYMMETRIC BLOCK ALGORITHMS	446
18.12	USING PUBLIC-KEY ALGORITHMS	455
18.13	CHOOSING A ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTION	455
18.14	MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES	455
19 PUBLIC-KEY ALGORITHMS		461
19.1	BACKGROUND	461
19.2	KNAPSACK ALGORITHMS	462
19.3	RSA	466
19.4	POHLIG-HELLMAN	474
19.5	RABIN	475
19.6	ELGAMAL	476
19.7	MCELIECE	479
19.8	ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEMS	480
19.9	LUC	481
19.10	FINITE AUTOMATON PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS	482
20 PUBLIC-KEY DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHMS		483
20.1	DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM (DSA)	483
20.2	DSA VARIANTS	494
20.3	GOST DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM	495
20.4	DISCRETE LOGARITHM SIGNATURE SCHEMES	496
20.5	ONG-SCHNORR-SHAMIR	498
20.6	ESIGN	499
20.7	CELLULAR AUTOMATA	500
20.8	OTHER PUBLIC-KEY ALGORITHMS	500
21 IDENTIFICATION SCHEMES		503
21.1	FEIGE-FIAT-SHAMIR	503

- 21.2 GUILLOU-QUISQUATER 508
- 21.3 SCHNORR 510
- 21.4 CONVERTING IDENTIFICATION SCHEMES TO SIGNATURE SCHEMES 512

22 KEY-EXCHANGE ALGORITHMS 513

- 22.1 DIFFIE-HELLMAN 513
- 22.2 STATION-TO-STATION PROTOCOL 516
- 22.3 SHAMIR'S THREE-PASS PROTOCOL 516
- 22.4 COMSET 517
- 22.5 ENCRYPTED KEY EXCHANGE 518
- 22.6 FORTIFIED KEY NEGOTIATION 522
- 22.7 CONFERENCE KEY DISTRIBUTION AND SECRET BROADCASTING 523

23 SPECIAL ALGORITHMS FOR PROTOCOLS 527

- 23.1 MULTIPLE-KEY PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 527
- 23.2 SECRET-SHARING ALGORITHMS 528
- 23.3 SUBLIMINAL CHANNEL 531
- 23.4 UNDENIABLE DIGITAL SIGNATURES 536
- 23.5 DESIGNATED CONFIRMER SIGNATURES 539
- 23.6 COMPUTING WITH ENCRYPTED DATA 540
- 23.7 FAIR COIN FLIPS 541
- 23.8 ONE-WAY ACCUMULATORS 543
- 23.9 ALL-OR-NOTHING DISCLOSURE OF SECRETS 543
- 23.10 FAIR AND FAILSAFE CRYPTOSYSTEMS 546
- 23.11 ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS OF KNOWLEDGE 548
- 23.12 BLIND SIGNATURES 549
- 23.13 OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER 550
- 23.14 SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION 551
- 23.15 PROBABILISTIC ENCRYPTION 552
- 23.16 QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 554

PART IV THE REAL WORLD

24 EXAMPLE IMPLEMENTATIONS 561

- 24.1 IBM SECRET-KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL 561
- 24.2 MITRENET 562
- 24.3 ISDN 563
- 24.4 STU-III 565
- 24.5 KERBEROS 566
- 24.6 KRYPTOKNIGHT 571
- 24.7 SESAME 572
- 24.8 IBM COMMON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ARCHITECTURE 573
- 24.9 ISO AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK 574
- 24.10 PRIVACY-ENHANCED MAIL (PEM) 577
- 24.11 MESSAGE SECURITY PROTOCOL (MSP) 584

- 24.12 PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY (PGP) 584
- 24.13 SMART CARDS 587
- 24.14 PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY STANDARDS (PKCS) 588
- 24.15 UNIVERSAL ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEM (UEPS) 589
- 24.16 CLIPPER 591
- 24.17 CAPSTONE 593
- 24.18 AT&T MODEL 3600 TELEPHONE SECURITY DEVICE (TSD) 594

25 POLITICS 597

- 25.1 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) 597
- 25.2 NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) 599
- 25.3 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST) 600
- 25.4 RSA DATA SECURITY, INC. 603
- 25.5 PUBLIC KEY PARTNERS 604
- 25.6 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC RESEARCH (IACR) 605
- 25.7 RACE INTEGRITY PRIMITIVES EVALUATION (RIPE) 605
- 25.8 CONDITIONAL ACCESS FOR EUROPE (CAFE) 606
- 25.9 ISO/IEC 9979 607
- 25.10 PROFESSIONAL, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND INDUSTRY GROUPS 608
- 25.11 SCI.CRYPT 608
- 25.12 CYPHERPUNKS 609
- 25.13 PATENTS 609
- 25.14 U.S. EXPORT RULES 610
- 25.15 FOREIGN IMPORT AND EXPORT OF CRYPTOGRAPHY 617
- 25.16 LEGAL ISSUES 618

Afterword by Matt Blaze 619

PART V SOURCE CODE

Source Code 623

References 675

Foreword

By Whitfield Diffie

The literature of cryptography has a curious history. Secrecy, of course, has always played a central role, but until the First World War, important developments appeared in print in a more or less timely fashion and the field moved forward in much the same way as other specialized disciplines. As late as 1918, one of the most influential cryptanalytic papers of the twentieth century, William F. Friedman's monograph *The Index of Coincidence and Its Applications in Cryptography*, appeared as a research report of the private Riverbank Laboratories [577]. And this, despite the fact that the work had been done as part of the war effort. In the same year Edward H. Hebern of Oakland, California filed the first patent for a rotor machine [710], the device destined to be a mainstay of military cryptography for nearly 50 years.

After the First World War, however, things began to change. U.S. Army and Navy organizations, working entirely in secret, began to make fundamental advances in cryptography. During the thirties and forties a few basic papers did appear in the open literature and several treatises on the subject were published, but the latter were farther and farther behind the state of the art. By the end of the war the transition was complete. With one notable exception, the public literature had died. That exception was Claude Shannon's paper "The Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems," which appeared in the *Bell System Technical Journal* in 1949 [1432]. It was similar to Friedman's 1918 paper, in that it grew out of wartime work of Shannon's. After the Second World War ended it was declassified, possibly by mistake.

From 1949 until 1967 the cryptographic literature was barren. In that year a different sort of contribution appeared: David Kahn's history, *The Codebreakers* [794]. It didn't contain any new technical ideas, but it did contain a remarkably complete history of what had gone before, including mention of some things that the government still considered secret. The significance of *The Codebreakers* lay not just in its remarkable scope, but also in the fact that it enjoyed good sales and made tens of thousands of people, who had never given the matter a moment's thought, aware of cryptography. A trickle of new cryptographic papers began to be written.

At about the same time, Horst Feistel, who had earlier worked on identification friend or foe devices for the Air Force, took his lifelong passion for cryptography to the IBM Watson Laboratory in Yorktown Heights, New York. There, he began development of what was to become the U.S. Data Encryption Standard; by the early 1970s several technical reports on this subject by Feistel and his colleagues had been made public by IBM [1482,1484,552].

This was the situation when I entered the field in late 1972. The cryptographic literature wasn't abundant, but what there was included some very shiny nuggets.

Cryptology presents a difficulty not found in normal academic disciplines: the need for the proper interaction of cryptography and cryptanalysis. This arises out of the fact that in the absence of real communications requirements, it is easy to propose a system that appears unbreakable. Many academic designs are so complex that the would-be cryptanalyst doesn't know where to start; exposing flaws in these designs is far harder than designing them in the first place. The result is that the competitive process, which is one strong motivation in academic research, cannot take hold.

When Martin Hellman and I proposed public-key cryptography in 1975 [496], one of the indirect aspects of our contribution was to introduce a problem that does not even appear easy to solve. Now an aspiring cryptosystem designer could produce something that would be recognized as clever—something that did more than just turn meaningful text into nonsense. The result has been a spectacular increase in the number of people working in cryptography, the number of meetings held, and the number of books and papers published.

In my acceptance speech for the Donald E. Fink award—given for the best expository paper to appear in an IEEE journal—which I received jointly with Hellman in 1980, I told the audience that in writing "Privacy and Authentication," I had an experience that I suspected was rare even among the prominent scholars who populate the IEEE awards ceremony: I had written the paper I had wanted to study, but could not find, when I first became seriously interested in cryptography. Had I been able to go to the Stanford bookstore and pick up a modern cryptography text, I would probably have learned about the field years earlier. But the only things available in the fall of 1972 were a few classic papers and some obscure technical reports.

The contemporary researcher has no such problem. The problem now is choosing where to start among the thousands of papers and dozens of books. The contemporary researcher, yes, but what about the contemporary programmer or engineer who merely wants to use cryptography? Where does that person turn? Until now, it has been necessary to spend long hours hunting out and then studying the research literature before being able to design the sort of cryptographic utilities glibly described in popular articles.

This is the gap that Bruce Schneier's *Applied Cryptography* has come to fill. Beginning with the objectives of communication security and elementary examples of programs used to achieve these objectives, Schneier gives us a panoramic view of the fruits of 20 years of public research. The title says it all; from the mundane objective of having a secure conversation the very first time you call someone to the possibilities of digital money and cryptographically secure elections, this is where you'll find it.

Not satisfied that the book was about the real world merely because it went all the way down to the code, Schneier has included an account of the world in which cryptography is developed and applied, and discusses entities ranging from the International Association for Cryptologic Research to the NSA.

When public interest in cryptography was just emerging in the late seventies and early eighties, the National Security Agency (NSA), America's official cryptographic organ, made several attempts to quash it. The first was a letter from a long-time NSA employee allegedly, avowedly, and apparently acting on his own. The letter was sent to the IEEE and warned that the publication of cryptographic material was a violation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). This viewpoint turned out not even to be supported by the regulations themselves—which contained an explicit exemption for published material—but gave both the public practice of cryptography and the 1977 Information Theory Workshop lots of unexpected publicity.

A more serious attempt occurred in 1980, when the NSA funded the American Council on Education to examine the issue with a view to persuading Congress to give it legal control of publications in the field of cryptography. The results fell far short of NSA's ambitions and resulted in a program of voluntary review of cryptographic papers; researchers were requested to ask the NSA's opinion on whether disclosure of results would adversely affect the national interest before publication.

As the eighties progressed, pressure focused more on the practice than the study of cryptography. Existing laws gave the NSA the power, through the Department of State, to regulate the export of cryptographic equipment. As business became more and more international and the American fraction of the world market declined, the pressure to have a single product in both domestic and offshore markets increased. Such single products were subject to export control and thus the NSA acquired substantial influence not only over what was exported, but also over what was sold in the United States.

As this is written, a new challenge confronts the public practice of cryptography. The government has augmented the widely published and available Data Encryption Standard, with a secret algorithm implemented in tamper-resistant chips. These chips will incorporate a codified mechanism of government monitoring. The negative aspects of this "key-escrow" program range from a potentially disastrous impact on personal privacy to the high cost of having to add hardware to products that had previously encrypted in software. So far key escrow products are enjoying less than stellar sales and the scheme has attracted widespread negative comment, especially from the independent cryptographers. Some people, however, see more future in programming than politicking and have redoubled their efforts to provide the world with strong cryptography that is accessible to public scrutiny.

A sharp step back from the notion that export control law could supersede the First Amendment seemed to have been taken in 1980 when the *Federal Register* announcement of a revision to ITAR included the statement: "... provision has been added to make it clear that the regulation of the export of technical data does not purport to interfere with the First Amendment rights of individuals." But the fact that tension between the First Amendment and the export control laws has not

gone away should be evident from statements at a conference held by RSA Data Security. NSA's representative from the export control office expressed the opinion that people who published cryptographic programs were "in a grey area" with respect to the law. If that is so, it is a grey area on which the first edition of this book has shed some light. Export applications for the book itself have been granted, with acknowledgement that published material lay beyond the authority of the Munitions Control Board. Applications to export the enclosed programs on disk, however, have been denied.

The shift in the NSA's strategy, from attempting to control cryptographic research to tightening its grip on the development and deployment of cryptographic products, is presumably due to its realization that all the great cryptographic papers in the world do not protect a single bit of traffic. Sitting on the shelf, this volume may be able to do no better than the books and papers that preceded it, but sitting next to a workstation, where a programmer is writing cryptographic code, it just may.

Whitfield Diffie
Mountain View, CA

Preface

There are two kinds of cryptography in this world: cryptography that will stop your kid sister from reading your files, and cryptography that will stop major governments from reading your files. This book is about the latter.

If I take a letter, lock it in a safe, hide the safe somewhere in New York, then tell you to read the letter, that's not security. That's obscurity. On the other hand, if I take a letter and lock it in a safe, and then give you the safe along with the design specifications of the safe and a hundred identical safes with their combinations so that you and the world's best safecrackers can study the locking mechanism—and you still can't open the safe and read the letter—that's security.

For many years, this sort of cryptography was the exclusive domain of the military. The United States' National Security Agency (NSA), and its counterparts in the former Soviet Union, England, France, Israel, and elsewhere, have spent billions of dollars in the very serious game of securing their own communications while trying to break everyone else's. Private individuals, with far less expertise and budget, have been powerless to protect their own privacy against these governments.

During the last 20 years, public academic research in cryptography has exploded. While classical cryptography has been long used by ordinary citizens, computer cryptography was the exclusive domain of the world's militaries since World War II. Today, state-of-the-art computer cryptography is practiced outside the secured walls of the military agencies. The layperson can now employ security practices that can protect against the most powerful of adversaries—security that may protect against military agencies for years to come.

Do average people really need this kind of security? Yes. They may be planning a political campaign, discussing taxes, or having an illicit affair. They may be designing a new product, discussing a marketing strategy, or planning a hostile business takeover. Or they may be living in a country that does not respect the rights of privacy of its citizens. They may be doing something that they feel shouldn't be illegal,

but is. For whatever reason, the data and communications are personal, private, and no one else's business.

This book is being published in a tumultuous time. In 1994, the Clinton administration approved the Escrowed Encryption Standard (including the Clipper chip and Fortezza card) and signed the Digital Telephony bill into law. Both of these initiatives try to ensure the government's ability to conduct electronic surveillance.

Some dangerously Orwellian assumptions are at work here: that the government has the right to listen to private communications, and that there is something wrong with a private citizen trying to keep a secret from the government. Law enforcement has always been able to conduct court-authorized surveillance if possible, but this is the first time that the people have been forced to take active measures to *make themselves available* for surveillance. These initiatives are not simply government proposals in some obscure area; they are preemptive and unilateral attempts to usurp powers that previously belonged to the people.

Clipper and Digital Telephony do not protect privacy; they force individuals to unconditionally trust that the government will respect their privacy. The same law enforcement authorities who illegally tapped Martin Luther King Jr.'s phones can easily tap a phone protected with Clipper. In the recent past, local police authorities have either been charged criminally or sued civilly in numerous jurisdictions—Maryland, Connecticut, Vermont, Georgia, Missouri, and Nevada—for conducting illegal wiretaps. It's a poor idea to deploy a technology that could some day facilitate a police state.

The lesson here is that it is insufficient to protect ourselves with laws; we need to protect ourselves with mathematics. Encryption is too important to be left solely to governments.

This book gives you the tools you need to protect your own privacy; cryptography products may be declared illegal, but the information will never be.

HOW TO READ THIS BOOK

I wrote *Applied Cryptography* to be both a lively introduction to the field of cryptography and a comprehensive reference. I have tried to keep the text readable without sacrificing accuracy. This book is not intended to be a mathematical text. Although I have not deliberately given any false information, I do play fast and loose with theory. For those interested in formalism, there are copious references to the academic literature.

Chapter 1 introduces cryptography, defines many terms, and briefly discusses pre-computer cryptography.

Chapters 2 through 6 (Part I) describe cryptographic protocols: what people can do with cryptography. The protocols range from the simple (sending encrypted messages from one person to another) to the complex (flipping a coin over the telephone) to the esoteric (secure and anonymous digital money exchange). Some of these protocols are obvious; others are almost amazing. Cryptography can solve a lot of problems that most people never realized it could.

Chapters 7 through 10 (Part II) discuss cryptographic techniques. All four chapters in this section are important for even the most basic uses of cryptography. Chapters 7 and 8 are about keys: how long a key should be in order to be secure, how to generate keys, how to store keys, how to dispose of keys, and so on. Key management is the hardest part of cryptography and often the Achilles' heel of an otherwise secure system. Chapter 9 discusses different ways of using cryptographic algorithms, and Chapter 10 gives the odds and ends of algorithms: how to choose, implement, and use algorithms.

Chapters 11 through 23 (Part III) list algorithms. Chapter 11 provides the mathematical background. This chapter is only required if you are interested in public-key algorithms. If you just want to implement DES (or something similar), you can skip ahead. Chapter 12 discusses DES: the algorithm, its history, its security, and some variants. Chapters 13, 14, and 15 discuss other block algorithms; if you want something more secure than DES, skip to the section on IDEA and triple-DES. If you want to read about a bunch of algorithms, some of which may be more secure than DES, read the whole chapter. Chapters 16 and 17 discuss stream algorithms. Chapter 18 focuses on one-way hash functions; MD5 and SHA are the most common, although I discuss many more. Chapter 19 discusses public-key encryption algorithms, Chapter 20 discusses public-key digital signature algorithms, Chapter 21 discusses public-key identification algorithms, and Chapter 22 discusses public-key key exchange algorithms. The important algorithms are RSA, DSA, Fiat-Shamir, and Diffie-Hellman, respectively. Chapter 23 has more esoteric public-key algorithms and protocols; the math in this chapter is quite complicated, so wear your seat belt.

Chapters 24 and 25 (Part IV) turn to the real world of cryptography. Chapter 24 discusses some of the current implementations of these algorithms and protocols, while Chapter 25 touches on some of the political issues surrounding cryptography. These chapters are by no means intended to be comprehensive.

Also included are source code listings for 10 algorithms discussed in Part III. I was unable to include all the code I wanted to due to space limitations, and cryptographic source code cannot otherwise be exported. (Amazingly enough, the State Department allowed export of the first edition of this book with source code, but denied export for a computer disk with the exact same source code on it. Go figure.) An associated source code disk set includes much more source code than I could fit in this book; it is probably the largest collection of cryptographic source code outside a military institution. I can only send source code disks to U.S. and Canadian citizens living in the U.S. and Canada, but hopefully that will change someday. If you are interested in implementing or playing with the cryptographic algorithms in this book, get the disk. See the last page of the book for details.

One criticism of this book is that its encyclopedic nature takes away from its readability. This is true, but I wanted to provide a single reference for those who might come across an algorithm in the academic literature or in a product. For those who are more interested in a tutorial, I apologize. A lot is being done in the field; this is the first time so much of it has been gathered between two covers. Even so, space considerations forced me to leave many things out. I covered topics that I felt were important, practical, or interesting. If I couldn't cover a topic in depth, I gave references to articles and papers that did.

I have done my best to hunt down and eradicate all errors in this book, but many have assured me that it is an impossible task. Certainly, the second edition has far fewer errors than the first. An errata listing is available from me and will be periodically posted to the Usenet newsgroup sci.crypt. If any reader finds an error, please let me know. I'll send the first person to find each error in the book a free copy of the source code disk.

Acknowledgments

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CHAPTER 1

Foundations

1.1 TERMINOLOGY

Sender and Receiver

Suppose a sender wants to send a message to a receiver. Moreover, this sender wants to send the message securely: She wants to make sure an eavesdropper cannot read the message.

Messages and Encryption

A message is **plaintext** (sometimes called cleartext). The process of disguising a message in such a way as to hide its substance is **encryption**. An encrypted message is **ciphertext**. The process of turning ciphertext back into plaintext is **decryption**. This is all shown in Figure 1.1.

(If you want to follow the ISO 7498-2 standard, use the terms “encipher” and “decipher.” It seems that some cultures find the terms “encrypt” and “decrypt” offensive, as they refer to dead bodies.)

The art and science of keeping messages secure is **cryptography**, and it is practiced by **cryptographers**. **Cryptanalysts** are practitioners of **cryptanalysis**, the art and science of breaking ciphertext; that is, seeing through the disguise. The branch of mathematics encompassing both cryptography and cryptanalysis is **cryptology** and its practitioners are **cryptologists**. Modern cryptologists are generally trained in theoretical mathematics—they have to be.




Figure 1.1 Encryption and Decryption.

Plaintext is denoted by M , for message, or P , for plaintext. It can be a stream of bits, a text file, a bitmap, a stream of digitized voice, a digital video image . . . whatever. As far as a computer is concerned, M is simply binary data. (After this chapter, this book concerns itself with binary data and computer cryptography.) The plaintext can be intended for either transmission or storage. In any case, M is the message to be encrypted.

Ciphertext is denoted by C . It is also binary data: sometimes the same size as M , sometimes larger. (By combining encryption with compression, C may be smaller than M . However, encryption does not accomplish this.) The encryption function E , operates on M to produce C . Or, in mathematical notation:

$$E(M) = C$$

In the reverse process, the decryption function D operates on C to produce M :

$$D(C) = M$$

Since the whole point of encrypting and then decrypting a message is to recover the original plaintext, the following identity must hold true:

$$D(E(M)) = M$$

Authentication, Integrity, and Nonrepudiation

In addition to providing confidentiality, cryptography is often asked to do other jobs:

- **Authentication.** It should be possible for the receiver of a message to ascertain its origin; an intruder should not be able to masquerade as someone else.
- **Integrity.** It should be possible for the receiver of a message to verify that it has not been modified in transit; an intruder should not be able to substitute a false message for a legitimate one.
- **Nonrepudiation.** A sender should not be able to falsely deny later that he sent a message.

These are vital requirements for social interaction on computers, and are analogous to face-to-face interactions. That someone is who he says he is . . . that someone's credentials—whether a driver's license, a medical degree, or a passport—are valid . . . that a document purporting to come from a person actually came from that person. . . . These are the things that authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation provide.

Algorithms and Keys

A **cryptographic algorithm**, also called a **cipher**, is the mathematical function used for encryption and decryption. (Generally, there are two related functions: one for encryption and the other for decryption.)

If the security of an algorithm is based on keeping the way that algorithm works a secret, it is a **restricted** algorithm. Restricted algorithms have historical interest, but are woefully inadequate by today's standards. A large or changing group of users cannot use them, because every time a user leaves the group everyone else must switch to a different algorithm. If someone accidentally reveals the secret, everyone must change their algorithm.

Even more damning, restricted algorithms allow no quality control or standardization. Every group of users must have their own unique algorithm. Such a group can't use off-the-shelf hardware or software products; an eavesdropper can buy the same product and learn the algorithm. They have to write their own algorithms and implementations. If no one in the group is a good cryptographer, then they won't know if they have a secure algorithm.

Despite these major drawbacks, restricted algorithms are enormously popular for low-security applications. Users either don't realize or don't care about the security problems inherent in their system.

Modern cryptography solves this problem with a **key**, denoted by K . This key might be any one of a large number of values. The range of possible values of the key is called the **keyspace**. Both the encryption and decryption operations use this key (i.e., they are dependent on the key and this fact is denoted by the K subscript), so the functions now become:

$$E_K(M) = C$$

$$D_K(C) = M$$

Those functions have the property that (see Figure 1.2):

$$D_K(E_K(M)) = M$$

Some algorithms use a different encryption key and decryption key (see Figure 1.3). That is, the encryption key, K_1 , is different from the corresponding decryption key, K_2 . In this case:

$$E_{K_1}(M) = C$$

$$D_{K_2}(C) = M$$

$$D_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(M)) = M$$

All of the security in these algorithms is based in the key (or keys); none is based in the details of the algorithm. This means that the algorithm can be published and analyzed. Products using the algorithm can be mass-produced. It doesn't matter if an




Figure 1.2 Encryption and decryption with a key.




Figure 1.3 Encryption and decryption with two different keys.

eavesdropper knows your algorithm; if she doesn't know your particular key, she can't read your messages.

A **cryptosystem** is an algorithm, plus all possible plaintexts, ciphertexts, and keys.

Symmetric Algorithms

There are two general types of key-based algorithms: symmetric and public-key. **Symmetric algorithms**, sometimes called conventional algorithms, are algorithms where the encryption key can be calculated from the decryption key and vice versa. In most symmetric algorithms, the encryption key and the decryption key are the same. These algorithms, also called secret-key algorithms, single-key algorithms, or one-key algorithms, require that the sender and receiver agree on a key before they can communicate securely. The security of a symmetric algorithm rests in the key; divulging the key means that anyone could encrypt and decrypt messages. As long as the communication needs to remain secret, the key must remain secret.

Encryption and decryption with a symmetric algorithm are denoted by:

$$E_k(M) = C$$

$$D_k(C) = M$$

Symmetric algorithms can be divided into two categories. Some operate on the plaintext a single bit (or sometimes byte) at a time; these are called **stream algorithms** or **stream ciphers**. Others operate on the plaintext in groups of bits. The groups of bits are called **blocks**, and the algorithms are called **block algorithms** or **block ciphers**. For modern computer algorithms, a typical block size is 64 bits—large enough to preclude analysis and small enough to be workable. (Before computers, algorithms generally operated on plaintext one character at a time. You can think of this as a stream algorithm operating on a stream of characters.)

Public-Key Algorithms

Public-key algorithms (also called asymmetric algorithms) are designed so that the key used for encryption is different from the key used for decryption. Furthermore, the decryption key cannot (at least in any reasonable amount of time) be calculated from the encryption key. The algorithms are called "public-key" because the encryption key can be made public: A complete stranger can use the encryption key to encrypt a message, but only a specific person with the corresponding decryp-

tion key can decrypt the message. In these systems, the encryption key is often called the **public key**, and the decryption key is often called the **private key**. The private key is sometimes also called the secret key, but to avoid confusion with symmetric algorithms, that tag won't be used here.

Encryption using public key K is denoted by:

$$E_K(M) = C$$

Even though the public key and private key are different, decryption with the corresponding private key is denoted by:

$$D_K(C) = M$$

Sometimes, messages will be encrypted with the private key and decrypted with the public key; this is used in digital signatures (see Section 2.6). Despite the possible confusion, these operations are denoted by, respectively:

$$E_K(M) = C$$

$$D_K(C) = M$$

Cryptanalysis

The whole point of cryptography is to keep the plaintext (or the key, or both) secret from eavesdroppers (also called adversaries, attackers, interceptors, interlopers, intruders, opponents, or simply the enemy). Eavesdroppers are assumed to have complete access to the communications between the sender and receiver.

Cryptanalysis is the science of recovering the plaintext of a message without access to the key. Successful cryptanalysis may recover the plaintext or the key. It also may find weaknesses in a cryptosystem that eventually lead to the previous results. (The loss of a key through noncryptanalytic means is called a **compromise**.)

An attempted cryptanalysis is called an **attack**. A fundamental assumption in cryptanalysis, first enunciated by the Dutchman A. Kerckhoffs in the nineteenth century, is that the secrecy must reside entirely in the key [794]. Kerckhoffs assumes that the cryptanalyst has complete details of the cryptographic algorithm and implementation. (Of course, one would assume that the CIA does not make a habit of telling Mossad about its cryptographic algorithms, but Mossad probably finds out anyway.) While real-world cryptanalysts don't always have such detailed information, it's a good assumption to make. If others can't break an algorithm, even with knowledge of how it works, then they certainly won't be able to break it without that knowledge.

There are four general types of cryptanalytic attacks. Of course, each of them assumes that the cryptanalyst has complete knowledge of the encryption algorithm used:

1. **Ciphertext-only attack.** The cryptanalyst has the ciphertext of several messages, all of which have been encrypted using the same encryption algorithm. The cryptanalyst's job is to recover the plaintext of as many messages as possible, or better yet to deduce the key (or keys) used to

encrypt the messages, in order to decrypt other messages encrypted with the same keys.

Given: $C_1 = E_k(P_1), C_2 = E_k(P_2), \dots, C_i = E_k(P_i)$

Deduce: Either P_1, P_2, \dots, P_i, k , or an algorithm
to infer P_{i+1} from $C_{i+1} = E_k(P_{i+1})$

2. **Known-plaintext attack.** The cryptanalyst has access not only to the ciphertext of several messages, but also to the plaintext of those messages. His job is to deduce the key (or keys) used to encrypt the messages or an algorithm to decrypt any new messages encrypted with the same key (or keys).

Given: $P_1, C_1 = E_k(P_1), P_2, C_2 = E_k(P_2), \dots, P_i, C_i = E_k(P_i)$

Deduce: Either k , or an algorithm
to infer P_{i+1} from $C_{i+1} = E_k(P_{i+1})$

3. **Chosen-plaintext attack.** The cryptanalyst not only has access to the ciphertext and associated plaintext for several messages, but he also chooses the plaintext that gets encrypted. This is more powerful than a known-plaintext attack, because the cryptanalyst can choose specific plaintext blocks to encrypt, ones that might yield more information about the key. His job is to deduce the key (or keys) used to encrypt the messages or an algorithm to decrypt any new messages encrypted with the same key (or keys).

Given: $P_1, C_1 = E_k(P_1), P_2, C_2 = E_k(P_2), \dots, P_i, C_i = E_k(P_i)$,

where the cryptanalyst gets to choose P_1, P_2, \dots, P_i

Deduce: Either k , or an algorithm to infer P_{i+1} from $C_{i+1} = E_k(P_{i+1})$

4. **Adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack.** This is a special case of a chosen-plaintext attack. Not only can the cryptanalyst choose the plaintext that is encrypted, but he can also modify his choice based on the results of previous encryption. In a chosen-plaintext attack, a cryptanalyst might just be able to choose one large block of plaintext to be encrypted; in an adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack he can choose a smaller block of plaintext and then choose another based on the results of the first, and so forth.

There are at least three other types of cryptanalytic attack.

5. **Chosen-ciphertext attack.** The cryptanalyst can choose different ciphertexts to be decrypted and has access to the decrypted plaintext. For example, the cryptanalyst has access to a tamperproof box that does automatic decryption. His job is to deduce the key.

Given: $C_1, P_1 = D_k(C_1), C_2, P_2 = D_k(C_2), \dots, C_i, P_i = D_k(C_i)$

Deduce: k

This attack is primarily applicable to public-key algorithms and will be discussed in Section 19.3. A chosen-ciphertext attack is sometimes effective against a symmetric algorithm as well. (Sometimes a chosen-plaintext attack and a chosen-ciphertext attack are together known as a **chosen-text attack**.)

6. **Chosen-key attack.** This attack doesn't mean that the cryptanalyst can choose the key; it means that he has some knowledge about the relationship between different keys. It's strange and obscure, not very practical, and discussed in Section 12.4.
7. **Rubber-hose cryptanalysis.** The cryptanalyst threatens, blackmails, or tortures someone until they give him the key. Bribery is sometimes referred to as a **purchase-key attack**. These are all very powerful attacks and often the best way to break an algorithm.

Known-plaintext attacks and chosen-plaintext attacks are more common than you might think. It is not unheard-of for a cryptanalyst to get a plaintext message that has been encrypted or to bribe someone to encrypt a chosen message. You may not even have to bribe someone; if you give a message to an ambassador, you will probably find that it gets encrypted and sent back to his country for consideration. Many messages have standard beginnings and endings that might be known to the cryptanalyst. Encrypted source code is especially vulnerable because of the regular appearance of keywords: `#define`, `struct`, `else`, `return`. Encrypted executable code has the same kinds of problems: functions, loop structures, and so on. Known-plaintext attacks (and even chosen-plaintext attacks) were successfully used against both the Germans and the Japanese during World War II. David Kahn's books [794,795,796] have historical examples of these kinds of attacks.

And don't forget Kerckhoffs's assumption: If the strength of your new cryptosystem relies on the fact that the attacker does not know the algorithm's inner workings, you're sunk. If you believe that keeping the algorithm's insides secret improves the security of your cryptosystem more than letting the academic community analyze it, you're wrong. And if you think that someone won't disassemble your code and reverse-engineer your algorithm, you're naïve. (In 1994 this happened with the RC4 algorithm—see Section 17.1.) The best algorithms we have are the ones that have been made public, have been attacked by the world's best cryptographers for years, and are still unbreakable. (The National Security Agency keeps their algorithms secret from outsiders, but they have the best cryptographers in the world working within their walls—you don't. Additionally, they discuss their algorithms with one another, relying on peer review to uncover any weaknesses in their work.)

Cryptanalysts don't always have access to the algorithms, as when the United States broke the Japanese diplomatic code PURPLE during World War II [794]—but they often do. If the algorithm is being used in a commercial security program, it is simply a matter of time and money to disassemble the program and recover the algorithm. If the algorithm is being used in a military communications system, it is sim-

ply a matter of time and money to buy (or steal) the equipment and reverse-engineer the algorithm.

Those who claim to have an unbreakable cipher simply because they can't break it are either geniuses or fools. Unfortunately, there are more of the latter in the world. Beware of people who extol the virtues of their algorithms, but refuse to make them public; trusting their algorithms is like trusting snake oil.

Good cryptographers rely on peer review to separate the good algorithms from the bad.

Security of Algorithms

Different algorithms offer different degrees of security; it depends on how hard they are to break. If the cost required to break an algorithm is greater than the value of the encrypted data, then you're probably safe. If the time required to break an algorithm is longer than the time the encrypted data must remain secret, then you're probably safe. If the amount of data encrypted with a single key is less than the amount of data necessary to break the algorithm, then you're probably safe.

I say "probably" because there is always a chance of new breakthroughs in cryptanalysis. On the other hand, the value of most data decreases over time. It is important that the value of the data always remain less than the cost to break the security protecting it.

Lars Knudsen classified these different categories of breaking an algorithm. In decreasing order of severity [858]:

1. **Total break.** A cryptanalyst finds the key, K , such that $D_K(C) = P$.
2. **Global deduction.** A cryptanalyst finds an alternate algorithm, A , equivalent to $D_K(C)$, without knowing K .
3. **Instance (or local) deduction.** A cryptanalyst finds the plaintext of an intercepted ciphertext.
4. **Information deduction.** A cryptanalyst gains some information about the key or plaintext. This information could be a few bits of the key, some information about the form of the plaintext, and so forth.

An algorithm is **unconditionally secure** if, no matter how much ciphertext a cryptanalyst has, there is not enough information to recover the plaintext. In point of fact, only a one-time pad (see Section 1.5) is unbreakable given infinite resources. All other cryptosystems are breakable in a ciphertext-only attack, simply by trying every possible key one by one and checking whether the resulting plaintext is meaningful. This is called a **brute-force** attack (see Section 7.1).

Cryptography is more concerned with cryptosystems that are computationally infeasible to break. An algorithm is considered **computationally secure** (sometimes called strong) if it cannot be broken with available resources, either current or future. Exactly what constitutes "available resources" is open to interpretation.

You can measure the complexity (see Section 11.1) of an attack in different ways:

1. **Data complexity.** The amount of data needed as input to the attack.
2. **Processing complexity.** The time needed to perform the attack. This is often called the **work factor**.
3. **Storage requirements.** The amount of memory needed to do the attack.

As a rule of thumb, the complexity of an attack is taken to be the minimum of these three factors. Some attacks involve trading off the three complexities: A faster attack might be possible at the expense of a greater storage requirement.

Complexities are expressed as orders of magnitude. If an algorithm has a processing complexity of 2^{128} , then 2^{128} operations are required to break the algorithm. (These operations may be complex and time-consuming.) Still, if you assume that you have enough computing speed to perform a million operations every second and you set a million parallel processors against the task, it will still take over 10^{19} years to recover the key. That's a billion times the age of the universe.

While the complexity of an attack is constant (until some cryptanalyst finds a better attack, of course), computing power is anything but. There have been phenomenal advances in computing power during the last half-century and there is no reason to think this trend won't continue. Many cryptanalytic attacks are perfect for parallel machines: The task can be broken down into billions of tiny pieces and none of the processors need to interact with each other. Pronouncing an algorithm secure simply because it is infeasible to break, given current technology, is dicey at best. Good cryptosystems are designed to be infeasible to break with the computing power that is expected to evolve many years in the future.

Historical Terms

Historically, a **code** refers to a cryptosystem that deals with linguistic units: words, phrases, sentences, and so forth. For example, the word "OCELOT" might be the ciphertext for the entire phrase "TURN LEFT 90 DEGREES," the word "LOLLIPOP" might be the ciphertext for "TURN RIGHT 90 DEGREES," and the words "BENT EAR" might be the ciphertext for "HOWITZER." Codes of this type are not discussed in this book; see [794,795]. Codes are only useful for specialized circumstances. Ciphers are useful for any circumstance. If your code has no entry for "ANTEATERS," then you can't say it. You can say anything with a cipher.

1.2 STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganography serves to hide secret messages in other messages, such that the secret's very existence is concealed. Generally the sender writes an innocuous message and then conceals a secret message on the same piece of paper. Historical tricks include invisible inks, tiny pin punctures on selected characters, minute differences between handwritten characters, pencil marks on typewritten characters, grilles which cover most of the message except for a few characters, and so on.

More recently, people are hiding secret messages in graphic images. Replace the least significant bit of each byte of the image with the bits of the message. The graphical image won't change appreciably—most graphics standards specify more gradations of color than the human eye can notice—and the message can be stripped out at the receiving end. You can store a 64-kilobyte message in a 1024×1024 grey-scale picture this way. Several public-domain programs do this sort of thing.

Peter Wayner's **mimic functions** obfuscate messages. These functions modify a message so that its statistical profile resembles that of something else: the classifieds section of *The New York Times*, a play by Shakespeare, or a newsgroup on the Internet [1584,1585]. This type of steganography won't fool a person, but it might fool some big computers scanning the Internet for interesting messages.

1.3 SUBSTITUTION CIPHERS AND TRANSPOSITION CIPHERS

Before computers, cryptography consisted of character-based algorithms. Different cryptographic algorithms either substituted characters for one another or transposed characters with one another. The better algorithms did both, many times each.

Things are more complex these days, but the philosophy remains the same. The primary change is that algorithms work on bits instead of characters. This is actually just a change in the alphabet size: from 26 elements to two elements. Most good cryptographic algorithms still combine elements of substitution and transposition.

Substitution Ciphers

A **substitution cipher** is one in which each character in the plaintext is substituted for another character in the ciphertext. The receiver inverts the substitution on the ciphertext to recover the plaintext.

In classical cryptography, there are four types of substitution ciphers:

- A **simple substitution cipher**, or **monoalphabetic cipher**, is one in which each character of the plaintext is replaced with a corresponding character of ciphertext. The cryptograms in newspapers are simple substitution ciphers.
- A **homophonic substitution cipher** is like a simple substitution cryptosystem, except a single character of plaintext can map to one of several characters of ciphertext. For example, "A" could correspond to either 5, 13, 25, or 56, "B" could correspond to either 7, 19, 31, or 42, and so on.
- A **polygram substitution cipher** is one in which blocks of characters are encrypted in groups. For example, "ABA" could correspond to "RTQ," "ABB" could correspond to "SLL," and so on.
- A **polyalphabetic substitution cipher** is made up of multiple simple substitution ciphers. For example, there might be five different simple substitution ciphers used; the particular one used changes with the position of each character of the plaintext.

The famous **Caesar Cipher**, in which each plaintext character is replaced by the character three to the right modulo 26 ("A" is replaced by "D," "B" is replaced by "E," . . . , "W" is replaced by "Z," "X" is replaced by "A," "Y" is replaced by "B," and "Z" is replaced by "C") is a simple substitution cipher. It's actually even simpler, because the ciphertext alphabet is a rotation of the plaintext alphabet and not an arbitrary permutation.

ROT13 is a simple encryption program commonly found on UNIX systems; it is also a simple substitution cipher. In this cipher, "A" is replaced by "N," "B" is replaced by "O," and so on. Every letter is rotated 13 places.

Encrypting a file twice with ROT13 restores the original file.

$$P = \text{ROT13}(\text{ROT13}(P))$$

ROT13 is not intended for security; it is often used in Usenet posts to hide potentially offensive text, to avoid giving away the solution to a puzzle, and so forth.

Simple substitution ciphers can be easily broken because the cipher does not hide the underlying frequencies of the different letters of the plaintext. All it takes is about 25 English characters before a good cryptanalyst can reconstruct the plaintext [1434]. An algorithm for solving these sorts of ciphers can be found in [578,587,1600,78,1475,1236,880]. A good computer algorithm is [703].

Homophonic substitution ciphers were used as early as 1401 by the Duchy of Mantua [794]. They are much more complicated to break than simple substitution ciphers, but still do not obscure all of the statistical properties of the plaintext language. With a known-plaintext attack, the ciphers are trivial to break. A ciphertext-only attack is harder, but only takes a few seconds on a computer. Details are in [1261].

Polygram substitution ciphers are ciphers in which groups of letters are encrypted together. The Playfair cipher, invented in 1854, was used by the British during World War I [794]. It encrypts pairs of letters together. Its cryptanalysis is discussed in [587,1475,880]. The Hill cipher is another example of a polygram substitution cipher [732]. Sometimes you see Huffman coding used as a cipher; this is an insecure polygram substitution cipher.

Polyalphabetic substitution ciphers were invented by Leon Battista in 1568 [794]. They were used by the Union army during the American Civil War. Despite the fact that they can be broken easily [819,577,587,794] (especially with the help of computers), many commercial computer security products use ciphers of this form [1387,1390,1502]. (Details on how to break this encryption scheme, as used in WordPerfect, can be found in [135,139].) The Vigenère cipher, first published in 1586, and the Beaufort cipher are also examples of polyalphabetic substitution ciphers.

Polyalphabetic substitution ciphers have multiple one-letter keys, each of which is used to encrypt one letter of the plaintext. The first key encrypts the first letter of the plaintext, the second key encrypts the second letter of the plaintext, and so on. After all the keys are used, the keys are recycled. If there were 20 one-letter keys, then every twentieth letter would be encrypted with the same key. This is called the **period** of the cipher. In classical cryptography, ciphers with longer periods were significantly harder to break than ciphers with short periods. There are computer techniques that can easily break substitution ciphers with very long periods.

A **running-key cipher**—sometimes called a book cipher—in which one text is used to encrypt another text, is another example of this sort of cipher. Even though this cipher has a period the length of the text, it can also be broken easily [576,794].

Transposition Ciphers

In a **transposition cipher** the plaintext remains the same, but the order of characters is shuffled around. In a **simple columnar transposition cipher**, the plaintext is written horizontally onto a piece of graph paper of fixed width and the ciphertext is read off vertically (see Figure 1.4). Decryption is a matter of writing the ciphertext vertically onto a piece of graph paper of identical width and then reading the plaintext off horizontally.

Cryptanalysis of these ciphers is discussed in [587,1475]. Since the letters of the ciphertext are the same as those of the plaintext, a frequency analysis on the ciphertext would reveal that each letter has approximately the same likelihood as in English. This gives a very good clue to a cryptanalyst, who can then use a variety of techniques to determine the right ordering of the letters to obtain the plaintext. Putting the ciphertext through a second transposition cipher greatly enhances security. There are even more complicated transposition ciphers, but computers can break almost all of them.

The German ADFGVX cipher, used during World War I, is a transposition cipher combined with a simple substitution. It was a very complex algorithm for its day but was broken by Georges Painvin, a French cryptanalyst [794].

Although many modern algorithms use transposition, it is troublesome because it requires a lot of memory and sometimes requires messages to be only certain lengths. Substitution is far more common.

Rotor Machines

In the 1920s, various mechanical encryption devices were invented to automate the process of encryption. Most were based on the concept of a **rotor**, a mechanical wheel wired to perform a general substitution.

A **rotor machine** has a keyboard and a series of rotors, and implements a version of the Vigenère cipher. Each rotor is an arbitrary permutation of the alphabet, has 26 positions, and performs a simple substitution. For example, a rotor might be wired

<p>Plaintext: COMPUTER GRAPHICS MAY BE SLOW BUT AT LEAST IT'S EXPENSIVE.</p> <p>COMPUTERGR APHICSMAYB ESLOWBUTAT LEASTITSEX PENSIVE</p> <p>Ciphertext: CAELP OPSEE MHLAN PIOSS UCWTI TSBI VEMUTE RATS/G YAERB TX</p>
--

Figure 1.4 Columnar transposition cipher.

to substitute "F" for "A," "U" for "B," "L" for "C," and so on. And the output pins of one rotor are connected to the input pins of the next.

For example, in a 4-rotor machine the first rotor might substitute "F" for "A," the second might substitute "Y" for "F," the third might substitute "E" for "Y," and the fourth might substitute "C" for "E"; "C" would be the output ciphertext. Then some of the rotors shift, so next time the substitutions will be different.

It is the combination of several rotors and the gears moving them that makes the machine secure. Because the rotors all move at different rates, the period for an n -rotor machine is 26^n . Some rotor machines can also have a different number of positions on each rotor, further frustrating cryptanalysis.

The best-known rotor device is the Enigma. The Enigma was used by the Germans during World War II. The idea was invented by Arthur Scherbius and Arvid Gerhard Damm in Europe. It was patented in the United States by Arthur Scherbius [1383]. The Germans beefed up the basic design considerably for wartime use.

The German Enigma had three rotors, chosen from a set of five, a plugboard that slightly permuted the plaintext, and a reflecting rotor that caused each rotor to operate on each plaintext letter twice. As complicated as the Enigma was, it was broken during World War II. First, a team of Polish cryptographers broke the German Enigma and explained their attack to the British. The Germans modified their Enigma as the war progressed, and the British continued to cryptanalyze the new versions. For explanations of how rotor ciphers work and how they were broken, see [794,86,448,498,446,880,1315,1587,690]. Two fascinating accounts of how the Enigma was broken are [735,796].

Further Reading

This is not a book about classical cryptography, so I will not dwell further on these subjects. Two excellent precomputer cryptology books are [587,1475]; [448] presents some modern cryptanalysis of cipher machines. Dorothy Denning discusses many of these ciphers in [456] and [880] has some fairly complex mathematical analysis of the same ciphers. Another older cryptography text, which discusses analog cryptography, is [99]. An article that presents a good overview of the subject is [579]. David Kahn's historical cryptography books are also excellent [794,795,796].

1.4 SIMPLE XOR

XOR is exclusive-or operation: \wedge in C or \oplus in mathematical notation. It's a standard operation on bits:

$$0 \oplus 0 = 0$$

$$0 \oplus 1 = 1$$

$$1 \oplus 0 = 1$$

$$1 \oplus 1 = 0$$

Also note that:

$$a \oplus a = 0$$

$$a \oplus b \oplus b = a$$

The simple-XOR algorithm is really an embarrassment; it's nothing more than a Vigenère polyalphabetic cipher. It's here only because of its prevalence in commercial software packages, at least those in the MS-DOS and Macintosh worlds [1502,1387]. Unfortunately, if a software security program proclaims that it has a "proprietary" encryption algorithm—significantly faster than DES—the odds are that it is some variant of this.

```

/* Usage:  crypto key input_file output_file */

void main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
    FILE *fi, *fo;
    char *cp;
    int c;

    if ((cp = argv[1]) && *cp!='\0') {
        if ((fi = fopen(argv[2], "rb")) != NULL) {
            if ((fo = fopen(argv[3], "wb")) != NULL) {
                while ((c = getc(fi)) != EOF) {
                    if (!*cp) cp = argv[1];
                    c ^= *(cp++);
                    putc(c,fo);
                }
                fclose(fo);
            }
            fclose(fi);
        }
    }
}

```

This is a symmetric algorithm. The plaintext is being XORed with a keyword to generate the ciphertext. Since XORing the same value twice restores the original, encryption and decryption use exactly the same program:

$$P \oplus K = C$$

$$C \oplus K = P$$

There's no real security here. This kind of encryption is trivial to break, even without computers [587,1475]. It will only take a few seconds with a computer.

Assume the plaintext is English. Furthermore, assume the key length is any small number of bytes. Here's how to break it:

1. Discover the length of the key by a procedure known as **counting coincidences** [577]. XOR the ciphertext against itself shifted various numbers of bytes, and count those bytes that are equal. If the displacement is a multiple of the key length, then something over 6 percent of the bytes will be equal. If it is not, then less than 0.4 percent will be equal (assuming a random key encrypting normal ASCII text; other plaintext will have different numbers). This is called the **index of coincidence**. The smallest displacement that indicates a multiple of the key length is the length of the key.

2. Shift the ciphertext by that length and XOR it with itself. This removes the key and leaves you with plaintext XORed with the plaintext shifted the length of the key. Since English has 1.3 bits of real information per byte (see Section 11.1), there is plenty of redundancy for determining a unique decryption.

Despite this, the list of software vendors that tout this toy algorithm as being “almost as secure as DES” is staggering [1387]. It is the algorithm (with a 160-bit repeated “key”) that the NSA finally allowed the U.S. digital cellular phone industry to use for voice privacy. An XOR might keep your kid sister from reading your files, but it won’t stop a cryptanalyst for more than a few minutes.

1.5 ONE-TIME PADS

Believe it or not, there is a perfect encryption scheme. It’s called a **one-time pad**, and was invented in 1917 by Major Joseph Mauborgne and AT&T’s Gilbert Vernam [794]. (Actually, a one-time pad is a special case of a threshold scheme; see Section 3.7.) Classically, a one-time pad is nothing more than a large nonrepeating set of truly random key letters, written on sheets of paper, and glued together in a pad. In its original form, it was a one-time tape for teletypewriters. The sender uses each key letter on the pad to encrypt exactly one plaintext character. Encryption is the addition modulo 26 of the plaintext character and the one-time pad key character.

Each key letter is used exactly once, for only one message. The sender encrypts the message and then destroys the used pages of the pad or used section of the tape. The receiver has an identical pad and uses each key on the pad, in turn, to decrypt each letter of the ciphertext. The receiver destroys the same pad pages or tape section after decrypting the message. New message—new key letters. For example, if the message is:

ONETIMEPAD

and the key sequence from the pad is

TBFRGFARFM

then the ciphertext is

IPKLPSFHGQ

because

$O + T \bmod 26 = I$
 $N + B \bmod 26 = P$
 $E + F \bmod 26 = K$
 etc.

Assuming an eavesdropper can't get access to the one-time pad used to encrypt the message, this scheme is perfectly secure. A given ciphertext message is equally likely to correspond to any possible plaintext message of equal size.

Since every key sequence is equally likely (remember, the key letters are generated randomly), an adversary has no information with which to cryptanalyze the ciphertext. The key sequence could just as likely be:

POYYAEAAZX

which would decrypt to:

SALMONEGGS

or

BXFGBMTMXM

which would decrypt to:

GREENFLUID

This point bears repeating: Since every plaintext message is equally possible, there is no way for the cryptanalyst to determine which plaintext message is the correct one. A random key sequence added to a nonrandom plaintext message produces a completely random ciphertext message and no amount of computing power can change that.

The caveat, and this is a big one, is that the key letters have to be generated randomly. Any attacks against this scheme will be against the method used to generate the key letters. Using a pseudo-random number generator doesn't count; they always have nonrandom properties. If you use a real random source—this is much harder than it might first appear, see Section 17.14—it's secure.

The other important point is that you can never use the key sequence again, ever. Even if you use a multiple-gigabyte pad, if a cryptanalyst has multiple ciphertexts whose keys overlap, he can reconstruct the plaintext. He slides each pair of ciphertexts against each other and counts the number of matches at each position. If they are aligned right, the proportion of matches jumps suddenly—the exact percentages depend on the plaintext language. From this point cryptanalysis is easy. It's like the index of coincidence, but with just two "periods" to compare [904]. Don't do it.

The idea of a one-time pad can be easily extended to binary data. Instead of a one-time pad consisting of letters, use a one-time pad of bits. Instead of adding the plaintext to the one-time pad, use an XOR. To decrypt, XOR the ciphertext with the same one-time pad. Everything else remains the same and the security is just as perfect.

This all sounds good, but there are a few problems. Since the key bits must be random and can never be used again, the length of the key sequence must be equal to the length of the message. A one-time pad might be suitable for a few short messages, but it will never work for a 1.544 Mbps communications channel. You can store 650 megabytes worth of random bits on a CD-ROM, but there are problems. First, you want exactly two copies of the random bits, but CD-ROMs are economi-

cal only for large quantities. And second, you want to be able to destroy the bits already used. CD-ROM has no erase facilities except for physically destroying the entire disk. Digital tape is a much better medium for this sort of thing.

Even if you solve the key distribution and storage problem, you have to make sure the sender and receiver are perfectly synchronized. If the receiver is off by a bit (or if some bits are dropped during the transmission), the message won't make any sense. On the other hand, if some bits are altered during transmission (without any bits being added or removed—something far more likely to happen due to random noise), only those bits will be decrypted incorrectly. But on the other hand, a one-time pad provides no authenticity.

One-time pads have applications in today's world, primarily for ultra-secure low-bandwidth channels. The hotline between the United States and the former Soviet Union was (is it still active?) rumored to be encrypted with a one-time pad. Many Soviet spy messages to agents were encrypted using one-time pads. These messages are still secure today and will remain that way forever. It doesn't matter how long the supercomputers work on the problem. Even after the aliens from Andromeda land with their massive spaceships and undreamed-of computing power, they will not be able to read the Soviet spy messages encrypted with one-time pads (unless they can also go back in time and get the one-time pads).

1.6 COMPUTER ALGORITHMS

There are many cryptographic algorithms. These are three of the most common:

- DES (Data Encryption Standard) is the most popular computer encryption algorithm. DES is a U.S. and international standard. It is a symmetric algorithm; the same key is used for encryption and decryption.
- RSA (named for its creators—Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) is the most popular public-key algorithm. It can be used for both encryption and digital signatures.
- DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm, used as part of the Digital Signature Standard) is another public-key algorithm. It cannot be used for encryption, but only for digital signatures.

These are the kinds of stuff this book is about.

1.7 LARGE NUMBERS

Throughout this book, I use various large numbers to describe different things in cryptography. Because it is so easy to lose sight of these numbers and what they signify, Table 1.1 gives physical analogues for some of them.


These numbers are order-of-magnitude estimates, and have been culled from a variety of sources. Many of the astrophysics numbers are explained in Freeman

TABLE 1.1
Large Numbers

Physical Analogue	Number
Odds of being killed by lightning (per day)	1 in 9 billion (2^{33})
Odds of winning the top prize in a U.S. state lottery	1 in 4,000,000 (2^{22})
Odds of winning the top prize in a U.S. state lottery and being killed by lightning in the same day	1 in 2^{55}
Odds of drowning (in the U.S. per year)	1 in 59,000 (2^{16})
Odds of being killed in an automobile accident (in the U.S. in 1993)	1 in 6100 (2^{13})
Odds of being killed in an automobile accident (in the U.S. per lifetime)	1 in 88 (2^7)
Time until the next ice age	14,000 (2^{14}) years
Time until the sun goes nova	10^9 (2^{30}) years
Age of the planet	10^9 (2^{30}) years
Age of the Universe	10^{10} (2^{34}) years
Number of atoms in the planet	10^{51} (2^{170})
Number of atoms in the sun	10^{57} (2^{190})
Number of atoms in the galaxy	10^{67} (2^{223})
Number of atoms in the Universe (dark matter excluded)	10^{77} (2^{265})
Volume of the Universe	10^{84} (2^{280}) cm^3
If the Universe is Closed:	
Total lifetime of the Universe	10^{11} (2^{37}) years
	10^{18} (2^{61}) seconds
If the Universe is Open:	
Time until low-mass stars cool off	10^{14} (2^{47}) years
Time until planets detach from stars	10^{15} (2^{50}) years
Time until stars detach from galaxies	10^{19} (2^{64}) years
Time until orbits decay by gravitational radiation	10^{20} (2^{67}) years
Time until black holes decay by the Hawking process	10^{64} (2^{213}) years
Time until all matter is liquid at zero temperature	10^{65} (2^{216}) years
Time until all matter decays to iron	10^{1026} years
Time until all matter collapses to black holes	10^{1076} years

Dyson's paper, "Time Without End: Physics and Biology in an Open Universe," in *Reviews of Modern Physics*, v. 52, n. 3, July 1979, pp. 447–460. Automobile accident deaths are calculated from the Department of Transportation's statistic of 163 deaths per million people in 1993 and an average lifespan of 69.7 years.

PART I



CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS

CHAPTER 2

Protocol Building Blocks

2.1 INTRODUCTION TO PROTOCOLS

The whole point of cryptography is to solve problems. (Actually, that's the whole point of computers—something many people tend to forget.) Cryptography solves problems that involve secrecy, authentication, integrity, and dishonest people. You can learn all about cryptographic algorithms and techniques, but these are academic unless they can solve a problem. This is why we are going to look at protocols first.

A **protocol** is a series of steps, involving two or more parties; designed to accomplish a task. This is an important definition. A “series of steps” means that the protocol has a sequence, from start to finish. Every step must be executed in turn, and no step can be taken before the previous step is finished. “Involving two or more parties” means that at least two people are required to complete the protocol; one person alone does not make a protocol. A person alone can perform a series of steps to accomplish a task (like baking a cake), but this is not a protocol. (Someone else must eat the cake to make it a protocol.) Finally, “designed to accomplish a task” means that the protocol must achieve something. Something that looks like a protocol but does not accomplish a task is not a protocol—it's a waste of time.

Protocols have other characteristics as well:

- Everyone involved in the protocol must know the protocol and all of the steps to follow in advance.
- Everyone involved in the protocol must agree to follow it.
- The protocol must be unambiguous; each step must be well defined and there must be no chance of a misunderstanding.
- The protocol must be complete; there must be a specified action for every possible situation.

The protocols in this book are organized as a series of steps. Execution of the protocol proceeds linearly through the steps, unless there are instructions to branch to another step. Each step involves at least one of two things: computations by one or more of the parties, or messages sent among the parties.

A **cryptographic protocol** is a protocol that uses cryptography. The parties can be friends and trust each other implicitly or they can be adversaries and not trust one another to give the correct time of day. A cryptographic protocol involves some cryptographic algorithm, but generally the goal of the protocol is something beyond simple secrecy. The parties participating in the protocol might want to share parts of their secrets to compute a value, jointly generate a random sequence, convince one another of their identity, or simultaneously sign a contract. The whole point of using cryptography in a protocol is to prevent or detect eavesdropping and cheating. If you have never seen these protocols before, they will radically change your ideas of what mutually distrustful parties can accomplish over a computer network. In general, this can be stated as:

- It should not be possible to do more or learn more than what is specified in the protocol.

This is a lot harder than it looks. In the next few chapters I discuss a lot of protocols. In some of them it is possible for one of the participants to cheat the other. In others, it is possible for an eavesdropper to subvert the protocol or learn secret information. Some protocols fail because the designers weren't thorough enough in their requirements definitions. Others fail because their designers weren't thorough enough in their analysis. Like algorithms, it is much easier to prove insecurity than it is to prove security.

The Purpose of Protocols

In daily life, there are informal protocols for almost everything: ordering goods over the telephone, playing poker, voting in an election. No one thinks much about these protocols; they have evolved over time, everyone knows how to use them, and they work reasonably well.

These days, more and more human interaction takes place over computer networks instead of face-to-face. Computers need formal protocols to do the same things that people do without thinking. If you moved from one state to another and found a voting booth that looked completely different from the ones you were used to, you could easily adapt. Computers are not nearly so flexible.

Many face-to-face protocols rely on people's presence to ensure fairness and security. Would you send a stranger a pile of cash to buy groceries for you? Would you play poker with someone if you couldn't see him shuffle and deal? Would you mail the government your secret ballot without some assurance of anonymity?

It is naïve to assume that people on computer networks are honest. It is naïve to assume that the managers of computer networks are honest. It is even naïve to assume that the designers of computer networks are honest. Most are, but the dis-

honest few can do a lot of damage. By formalizing protocols, we can examine ways in which dishonest parties can subvert them. Then we can develop protocols that are immune to that subversion.

In addition to formalizing behavior, protocols abstract the process of accomplishing a task from the mechanism by which the task is accomplished. A communications protocol is the same whether implemented on PCs or VAXs. We can examine the protocol without getting bogged down in the implementation details. When we are convinced we have a good protocol, we can implement it in everything from computers to telephones to intelligent muffin toasters.

The Players

To help demonstrate protocols, I have enlisted the aid of several people (see Table 2.1). Alice and Bob are the first two. They will perform all general two-person protocols. As a rule, Alice will initiate all protocols and Bob will respond. If the protocol requires a third or fourth person, Carol and Dave will perform those roles. Other actors will play specialized supporting roles; they will be introduced later.

Arbitrated Protocols

An **arbitrator** is a disinterested third party trusted to complete a protocol (see Figure 2.1a). Disinterested means that the arbitrator has no vested interest in the protocol and no particular allegiance to any of the parties involved. Trusted means that all people involved in the protocol accept what he says as true, what he does as correct, and that he will complete his part of the protocol. Arbitrators can help complete protocols between two mutually distrustful parties.

In the real world, lawyers are often used as arbitrators. For example, Alice is selling a car to Bob, a stranger. Bob wants to pay by check, but Alice has no way of knowing if the check is good. Alice wants the check to clear before she turns the title over to Bob. Bob, who doesn't trust Alice any more than she trusts him, doesn't want to hand over a check without receiving a title.

TABLE 2.1
Dramatis Personae

Alice	First participant in all the protocols
Bob	Second participant in all the protocols
Carol	Participant in the three- and four-party protocols
Dave	Participant in the four-party protocols
Eve	Eavesdropper
Mallory	Malicious active attacker
Trent	Trusted arbitrator
Walter	Warden; he'll be guarding Alice and Bob in some protocols
Peggy	Prover
Victor	Verifier




Figure 2.1 Types of protocols.

Enter a lawyer trusted by both. With his help, Alice and Bob can use the following protocol to ensure that neither cheats the other:

- (1) Alice gives the title to the lawyer.
- (2) Bob gives the check to Alice.
- (3) Alice deposits the check.
- (4) After waiting a specified time period for the check to clear, the lawyer gives the title to Bob. If the check does not clear within the specified time period, Alice shows proof of this to the lawyer and the lawyer returns the title to Alice.

In this protocol, Alice trusts the lawyer not to give Bob the title unless the check has cleared, and to give it back to her if the check does not clear. Bob trusts the lawyer to hold the title until the check clears, and to give it to him once it does. The lawyer doesn't care if the check clears. He will do his part of the protocol in either case, because he will be paid in either case.

In the example, the lawyer is playing the part of an escrow agent. Lawyers also act as arbitrators for wills and sometimes for contract negotiations. The various stock exchanges act as arbitrators between buyers and sellers.

Bankers also arbitrate protocols. Bob can use a certified check to buy a car from Alice:

- (1) Bob writes a check and gives it to the bank.
- (2) After putting enough of Bob's money on hold to cover the check, the bank certifies the check and gives it back to Bob.
- (3) Alice gives the title to Bob and Bob gives the certified check to Alice.
- (4) Alice deposits the check.

This protocol works because Alice trusts the banker's certification. Alice trusts the bank to hold Bob's money for her, and not to use it to finance shaky real estate operations in mosquito-infested countries.

A notary public is another arbitrator. When Bob receives a notarized document from Alice, he is convinced that Alice signed the document voluntarily and with her own hand. The notary can, if necessary, stand up in court and attest to that fact.

The concept of an arbitrator is as old as society. There have always been people—rulers, priests, and so on—who have the authority to act fairly. Arbitrators have a certain social role and position in our society; betraying the public trust would jeopardize that. Lawyers who play games with escrow accounts face almost-certain disbarment, for example. This picture of trust doesn't always exist in the real world, but it's the ideal.

This ideal can translate to the computer world, but there are several problems with computer arbitrators:

- It is easier to find and trust a neutral third party if you know who the party is and can see his face. Two parties suspicious of each other are also likely to be suspicious of a faceless arbitrator somewhere else on the network.
- The computer network must bear the cost of maintaining an arbitrator. We all know what lawyers charge; who wants to bear that kind of network overhead?
- There is a delay inherent in any arbitrated protocol.
- The arbitrator must deal with every transaction; he is a bottleneck in large-scale implementations of any protocol. Increasing the number of arbitrators in the implementation can mitigate this problem, but that increases the cost.
- Since everyone on the network must trust the arbitrator, he represents a vulnerable point for anyone trying to subvert the network.

Even so, arbitrators still have a role to play. In protocols using a trusted arbitrator, the part will be played by Trent.

Adjudicated Protocols

Because of the high cost of hiring arbitrators, arbitrated protocols can be subdivided into two lower-level **subprotocols**. One is a nonarbitrated subprotocol, executed every time parties want to complete the protocol. The other is an arbitrated subprotocol, executed only in exceptional circumstances—when there is a dispute. This special type of arbitrator is called an **adjudicator** (see Figure 2.1b).

An adjudicator is also a disinterested and trusted third party. Unlike an arbitrator, he is not directly involved in every protocol. The adjudicator is called in only to determine whether a protocol was performed fairly.

Judges are professional adjudicators. Unlike a notary public, a judge is brought in only if there is a dispute. Alice and Bob can enter into a contract without a judge. A judge never sees the contract until one of them hauls the other into court.

This contract-signing protocol can be formalized in this way:

Nonarbitrated subprotocol (executed every time):

- (1) Alice and Bob negotiate the terms of the contract.
- (2) Alice signs the contract.
- (3) Bob signs the contract.

Adjudicated subprotocol (executed only in case of a dispute):

- (4) Alice and Bob appear before a judge.
- (5) Alice presents her evidence.
- (6) Bob presents his evidence.
- (7) The judge rules on the evidence.

The difference between an adjudicator and an arbitrator (as used in this book) is that the adjudicator is not always necessary. In a dispute, a judge is called in to adjudicate. If there is no dispute, using a judge is unnecessary.

There are adjudicated computer protocols. These protocols rely on the parties to be honest; but if someone suspects cheating, a body of data exists so that a trusted third party could determine if someone cheated. In a good adjudicated protocol, the adjudicator could also determine the cheater's identity. Instead of preventing cheating, adjudicated protocols detect cheating. The inevitability of detection acts as a preventive and discourages cheating.

Self-Enforcing Protocols

A **self-enforcing protocol** is the best type of protocol. The protocol itself guarantees fairness (see Figure 2.1c). No arbitrator is required to complete the protocol. No adjudicator is required to resolve disputes. The protocol is constructed so that there

cannot be any disputes. If one of the parties tries to cheat, the other party immediately detects the cheating and the protocol stops. Whatever the cheating party hoped would happen by cheating, doesn't happen.

In the best of all possible worlds, every protocol would be self-enforcing. Unfortunately, there is not a self-enforcing protocol for every situation.

Attacks against Protocols

Cryptographic attacks can be directed against the cryptographic algorithms used in protocols, against the cryptographic techniques used to implement the algorithms and protocols, or against the protocols themselves. Since this section of the book discusses protocols, I will assume that the cryptographic algorithms and techniques are secure. I will only examine attacks against the protocols.

People can try various ways to attack a protocol. Someone not involved in the protocol can eavesdrop on some or all of the protocol. This is called a **passive attack**, because the attacker does not affect the protocol. All he can do is observe the protocol and attempt to gain information. This kind of attack corresponds to a ciphertext-only attack, as discussed in Section 1.1. Since passive attacks are difficult to detect, protocols try to prevent passive attacks rather than detect them. In these protocols, the part of the eavesdropper will be played by Eve.

Alternatively, an attacker could try to alter the protocol to his own advantage. He could pretend to be someone else, introduce new messages in the protocol, delete existing messages, substitute one message for another, replay old messages, interrupt a communications channel, or alter stored information in a computer. These are called **active attacks**, because they require active intervention. The form of these attacks depends on the network.

Passive attackers try to gain information about the parties involved in the protocol. They collect messages passing among various parties and attempt to cryptanalyze them. Active attacks, on the other hand, can have much more diverse objectives. The attacker could be interested in obtaining information, degrading system performance, corrupting existing information, or gaining unauthorized access to resources.

Active attacks are much more serious, especially in protocols in which the different parties don't necessarily trust one another. The attacker does not have to be a complete outsider. He could be a legitimate system user. He could be the system administrator. There could even be many active attackers working together. Here, the part of the malicious active attacker will be played by Mallory.

It is also possible that the attacker could be one of the parties involved in the protocol. He may lie during the protocol or not follow the protocol at all. This type of attacker is called a **cheater**. **Passive cheaters** follow the protocol, but try to obtain more information than the protocol intends them to. **Active cheaters** disrupt the protocol in progress in an attempt to cheat.

It is very difficult to maintain a protocol's security if most of the parties involved are active cheaters, but sometimes it is possible for legitimate parties to detect that active cheating is going on. Certainly, protocols should be secure against passive cheating.

2.2 COMMUNICATIONS USING SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY

How do two parties communicate securely? They encrypt their communications, of course. The complete protocol is more complicated than that. Let's look at what must happen for Alice to send an encrypted message to Bob.

- (1) Alice and Bob agree on a cryptosystem.
- (2) Alice and Bob agree on a key.
- (3) Alice takes her plaintext message and encrypts it using the encryption algorithm and the key. This creates a ciphertext message.
- (4) Alice sends the ciphertext message to Bob.
- (5) Bob decrypts the ciphertext message with the same algorithm and key and reads it.

What can Eve, sitting between Alice and Bob, learn from listening in on this protocol? If all she hears is the transmission in step (4), she must try to cryptanalyze the ciphertext. This passive attack is a ciphertext-only attack; we have algorithms that are resistant (as far as we know) to whatever computing power Eve could realistically bring to bear on the problem.

Eve isn't stupid, though. She also wants to listen in on steps (1) and (2). Then, she would know the algorithm and the key—just as well as Bob. When the message comes across the communications channel in step (4), all she has to do is decrypt it herself.

A good cryptosystem is one in which all the security is inherent in knowledge of the key and none is inherent in knowledge of the algorithm. This is why key management is so important in cryptography. With a symmetric algorithm, Alice and Bob can perform step (1) in public, but they must perform step (2) in secret. The key must remain secret before, during, and after the protocol—as long as the message must remain secret—otherwise the message will no longer be secure. (Public-key cryptography solves this problem another way, and will be discussed in Section 2.5.)

Mallory, an active attacker, could do a few other things. He could attempt to break the communications path in step (4), ensuring that Alice could not talk to Bob at all. Mallory could also intercept Alice's messages and substitute his own. If he knew the key (by intercepting the communication in step (2), or by breaking the cryptosystem), he could encrypt his own message and send it to Bob in place of the intercepted message. Bob would have no way of knowing that the message had not come from Alice. If Mallory didn't know the key, he could only create a replacement message that would decrypt to gibberish. Bob, thinking the message came from Alice, might conclude that either the network or Alice had some serious problems.

What about Alice? What can she do to disrupt the protocol? She can give a copy of the key to Eve. Now Eve can read whatever Bob says. She can reprint his words in *The New York Times*. Although serious, this is not a problem with the protocol. There is nothing to stop Alice from giving Eve a copy of the plaintext at any point

during the protocol. Of course, Bob could also do anything that Alice could. This protocol assumes that Alice and Bob trust each other.

In summary, symmetric cryptosystems have the following problems:

- Keys must be distributed in secret. They are as valuable as all the messages they encrypt, since knowledge of the key gives knowledge of all the messages. For encryption systems that span the world, this can be a daunting task. Often couriers hand-carry keys to their destinations.
- If a key is compromised (stolen, guessed, extorted, bribed, etc.), then Eve can decrypt all message traffic encrypted with that key. She can also pretend to be one of the parties and produce false messages to fool the other party.
- Assuming a separate key is used for each pair of users in a network, the total number of keys increases rapidly as the number of users increases. A network of n users requires $n(n-1)/2$ keys. For example, 10 users require 45 different keys to talk with one another and 100 users require 4950 keys. This problem can be minimized by keeping the number of users small, but that is not always possible.

2.3 ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS

The notion of a **one-way function** is central to public-key cryptography. While not protocols in themselves, one-way functions are a fundamental building block for most of the protocols discussed in this book.

One-way functions are relatively easy to compute, but significantly harder to reverse. That is, given x it is easy to compute $f(x)$, but given $f(x)$ it is hard to compute x . In this context, “hard” is defined as something like: It would take millions of years to compute x from $f(x)$, even if all the computers in the world were assigned to the problem.

Breaking a plate is a good example of a one-way function. It is easy to smash a plate into a thousand tiny pieces. However, it’s not easy to put all of those tiny pieces back together into a plate.

This sounds good, but it’s a lot of smoke and mirrors. If we are being strictly mathematical, we have no proof that one-way functions exist, nor any real evidence that they can be constructed [230,530,600,661]. Even so, many functions look and smell one-way: We can compute them efficiently and, as of yet, know of no easy way to reverse them. For example, in a finite field x^2 is easy to compute, but $x^{1/2}$ is much harder. For the rest of this section, I’m going to pretend that there are one-way functions. I’ll talk more about this in Section 11.2.

So, what good are one-way functions? We can’t use them for encryption as is. A message encrypted with the one-way function isn’t useful; no one could decrypt it. (Exercise: Write a message on a plate, smash the plate into tiny bits, and then give the bits to a friend. Ask your friend to read the message. Observe how impressed

he is with the one-way function.) For public-key cryptography, we need something else (although there are cryptographic applications for one-way functions—see Section 3.2).

A **trapdoor one-way function** is a special type of one-way function, one with a secret trapdoor. It is easy to compute in one direction and hard to compute in the other direction. But, if you know the secret, you can easily compute the function in the other direction. That is, it is easy to compute $f(x)$ given x , and hard to compute x given $f(x)$. However, there is some secret information, y , such that given $f(x)$ and y it is easy to compute x .

Taking a watch apart is a good example of a trap-door one-way function. It is easy to disassemble a watch into hundreds of minuscule pieces. It is very difficult to put those tiny pieces back together into a working watch. However, with the secret information—the assembly instructions of the watch—it is much easier to put the watch back together.

2.4 ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTIONS

A **one-way hash function** has many names: compression function, contraction function, message digest, fingerprint, cryptographic checksum, message integrity check (MIC), and manipulation detection code (MDC). Whatever you call it, it is central to modern cryptography. One-way hash functions are another building block for many protocols.

Hash functions have been used in computer science for a long time. A hash function is a function, mathematical or otherwise, that takes a variable-length input string (called a **pre-image**) and converts it to a fixed-length (generally smaller) output string (called a **hash value**). A simple hash function would be a function that takes pre-image and returns a byte consisting of the XOR of all the input bytes.

The point here is to fingerprint the pre-image: to produce a value that indicates whether a candidate pre-image is likely to be the same as the real pre-image. Because hash functions are typically many-to-one, we cannot use them to determine with certainty that the two strings are equal, but we can use them to get a reasonable assurance of accuracy.

A one-way hash function is a hash function that works in one direction: It is easy to compute a hash value from pre-image, but it is hard to generate a pre-image that hashes to a particular value. The hash function previously mentioned is not one-way: Given a particular byte value, it is trivial to generate a string of bytes whose XOR is that value. You can't do that with a one-way hash function. A good one-way hash function is also **collision-free**: It is hard to generate two pre-images with the same hash value.

The hash function is public; there's no secrecy to the process. The security of a one-way hash function is its one-wayness. The output is not dependent on the input in any discernible way. A single bit change in the pre-image changes, on the average, half of the bits in the hash value. Given a hash value, it is computationally unfeasible to find a pre-image that hashes to that value.

Think of it as a way of fingerprinting files. If you want to verify that someone has a particular file (that you also have), but you don't want him to send it to you, then ask him for the hash value. If he sends you the correct hash value, then it is almost certain that he has that file. This is particularly useful in financial transactions, where you don't want a withdrawal of \$100 to turn into a withdrawal of \$1000 somewhere in the network. Normally, you would use a one-way hash function without a key, so that anyone can verify the hash. If you want only the recipient to be able to verify the hash, then read the next section.

Message Authentication Codes

A **message authentication code** (MAC), also known as a data authentication code (DAC), is a one-way hash function with the addition of a secret key (see Section 18.14). The hash value is a function of both the pre-image and the key. The theory is exactly the same as hash functions, except only someone with the key can verify the hash value. You can create a MAC out of a hash function or a block encryption algorithm; there are also dedicated MACs.

2.5 COMMUNICATIONS USING PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY

Think of a symmetric algorithm as a safe. The key is the combination. Someone with the combination can open the safe, put a document inside, and close it again. Someone else with the combination can open the safe and take the document out. Anyone without the combination is forced to learn safecracking.

In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman changed that paradigm of cryptography forever [496]. (The NSA has claimed knowledge of the concept as early as 1966, but has offered no proof.) They described **public-key cryptography**. They used two different keys—one public and the other private. It is computationally hard to deduce the private key from the public key. Anyone with the public key can encrypt a message but not decrypt it. Only the person with the private key can decrypt the message. It is as if someone turned the cryptographic safe into a mailbox. Putting mail in the mailbox is analogous to encrypting with the public key; anyone can do it. Just open the slot and drop it in. Getting mail out of a mailbox is analogous to decrypting with the private key. Generally it's hard; you need welding torches. However, if you have the secret (the physical key to the mailbox), it's easy to get mail out of a mailbox.

Mathematically, the process is based on the trap-door one-way functions previously discussed. Encryption is the easy direction. Instructions for encryption are the public key; anyone can encrypt a message. Decryption is the hard direction. It's made hard enough that people with Cray computers and thousands (even millions) of years couldn't decrypt the message without the secret. The secret, or trapdoor, is the private key. With that secret, decryption is as easy as encryption.

This is how Alice can send a message to Bob using public-key cryptography:

- (1) Alice and Bob agree on a public-key cryptosystem.

- (2) Bob sends Alice his public key.
- (3) Alice encrypts her message using Bob's public key and sends it to Bob.
- (4) Bob decrypts Alice's message using his private key.

Notice how public-key cryptography solves the key-management problem with symmetric cryptosystems. Before, Alice and Bob had to agree on a key in secret. Alice could choose one at random, but she still had to get it to Bob. She could hand it to him sometime beforehand, but that requires foresight. She could send it to him by secure courier, but that takes time. Public-key cryptography makes it easy. With no prior arrangements, Alice can send a secure message to Bob. Eve, listening in on the entire exchange, has Bob's public key and a message encrypted in that key, but cannot recover either Bob's private key or the message.

More commonly, a network of users agrees on a public-key cryptosystem. Every user has his or her own public key and private key, and the public keys are all published in a database somewhere. Now the protocol is even easier:

- (1) Alice gets Bob's public key from the database.
- (2) Alice encrypts her message using Bob's public key and sends it to Bob.
- (3) Bob then decrypts Alice's message using his private key.

In the first protocol, Bob had to send Alice his public key before she could send him a message. The second protocol is more like traditional mail. Bob is not involved in the protocol until he wants to read his message.

Hybrid Cryptosystems

The first public-key algorithms became public at the same time that DES was being discussed as a proposed standard. This resulted in some partisan politics in the cryptographic community. As Diffie described it [494]:

The excitement public key cryptosystems provoked in the popular and scientific press was not matched by corresponding acceptance in the cryptographic establishment, however. In the same year that public key cryptography was discovered, the National Security Agency (NSA), proposed a conventional cryptographic system, designed by International Business Machines (IBM), as a federal *Data Encryption Standard* (DES). Marty Hellman and I criticized the proposal on the ground that its key was too small, but manufacturers were gearing up to support the proposed standard and our criticism was seen by many as an attempt to disrupt the standards-making process to the advantage of our own work. Public key cryptography in its turn was attacked, in sales literature [1125] and technical papers [849,1159] alike, more as though it were a competing product than a recent research discovery. This, however, did not deter the NSA from claiming its share of the credit. Its director, in the words of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* [1461], pointed out that "two-key cryptography had been discovered at the agency a decade earlier," although no evidence for this claim was ever offered publicly.

In the real world, public-key algorithms are not a substitute for symmetric algorithms. They are not used to encrypt messages; they are used to encrypt keys. There are two reasons for this:

1. Public-key algorithms are slow. Symmetric algorithms are generally at least 1000 times faster than public-key algorithms. Yes, computers are getting faster and faster, and in 15 years computers will be able to do public-key cryptography at speeds comparable to symmetric cryptography today. But bandwidth requirements are also increasing, and there will always be the need to encrypt data faster than public-key cryptography can manage.
2. Public-key cryptosystems are vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attacks. If $C = E(P)$, when P is one plaintext out of a set of n possible plaintexts, then a cryptanalyst only has to encrypt all n possible plaintexts and compare the results with C (remember, the encryption key is public). He won't be able to recover the decryption key this way, but he will be able to determine P .

A chosen-plaintext attack can be particularly effective if there are relatively few possible encrypted messages. For example, if P were a dollar amount less than \$1,000,000, this attack would work; the cryptanalyst tries all million possible dollar amounts. (Probabilistic encryption solves the problem; see Section 23.15.) Even if P is not as well-defined, this attack can be very effective. Simply knowing that a ciphertext does not correspond to a particular plaintext can be useful information. Symmetric cryptosystems are not vulnerable to this attack because a cryptanalyst cannot perform trial encryptions with an unknown key.

In most practical implementations public-key cryptography is used to secure and distribute **session keys**; those session keys are used with symmetric algorithms to secure message traffic [879]. This is sometimes called a **hybrid cryptosystem**.

- (1) Bob sends Alice his public key.
- (2) Alice generates a random session key, K , encrypts it using Bob's public key, and sends it to Bob.

$$E_B(K)$$

- (3) Bob decrypts Alice's message using his private key to recover the session key.

$$D_B(E_B(K)) = K$$

- (4) Both of them encrypt their communications using the same session key.

Using public-key cryptography for key distribution solves a very important key-management problem. With symmetric cryptography, the data encryption key sits around until it is used. If Eve ever gets her hands on it, she can decrypt messages encrypted with it. With the previous protocol, the session key is created when it is needed to encrypt communications and destroyed when it is no longer needed. This drastically reduces the risk of compromising the session key. Of course, the private

key is vulnerable to compromise, but it is at less risk because it is only used once per communication to encrypt a session key. This is further discussed in Section 3.1.

Merkle's Puzzles

Ralph Merkle invented the first construction of public-key cryptography. In 1974 he registered for a course in computer security at the University of California, Berkeley, taught by Lance Hoffman. His term paper topic, submitted early in the term, addressed the problem of "Secure Communication over Insecure Channels" [1064]. Hoffman could not understand Merkle's proposal and eventually Merkle dropped the course. He continued to work on the problem, despite continuing failure to make his results understood.

Merkle's technique was based on "puzzles" that were easier to solve for the sender and receiver than for an eavesdropper. Here's how Alice sends an encrypted message to Bob without first having to exchange a key with him.

- (1) Bob generates 2^{20} , or about a million, messages of the form: "This is puzzle number x . This is the secret key number y ," where x is a random number and y is a random secret key. Both x and y are different for each message. Using a symmetric algorithm, he encrypts each message with a different 20-bit key and sends them all to Alice.
- (2) Alice chooses one message at random and performs a brute-force attack to recover the plaintext. This is a large, but not impossible, amount of work.
- (3) Alice encrypts her secret message with the key she recovered and some symmetric algorithm, and sends it to Bob along with x .
- (4) Bob knows which secret key y he encrypts in message x , so he can decrypt the message.

Eve can break this system, but she has to do far more work than either Alice or Bob. To recover the message in step (3), she has to perform a brute-force attack against each of Bob's 2^{20} messages in step (1); this attack has a complexity of 2^{40} . The x values won't help Eve either; they were assigned randomly in step (1). In general, Eve has to expend approximately the square of the effort that Alice expends.

This n to n^2 advantage is small by cryptographic standards, but in some circumstances it may be enough. If Alice and Bob can try ten thousand keys per second, it will take them a minute each to perform their steps and another minute to communicate the puzzles from Bob to Alice on a 1.544 MB link. If Eve had comparable computing facilities, it would take her about a year to break the system. Other algorithms are even harder to break.

2.6 DIGITAL SIGNATURES

Handwritten signatures have long been used as proof of authorship of, or at least agreement with, the contents of a document. What is it about a signature that is so compelling [1392]?

1. The signature is authentic. The signature convinces the document's recipient that the signer deliberately signed the document.
2. The signature is unforgeable. The signature is proof that the signer, and no one else, deliberately signed the document.
3. The signature is not reusable. The signature is part of the document; an unscrupulous person cannot move the signature to a different document.
4. The signed document is unalterable. After the document is signed, it cannot be altered.
5. The signature cannot be repudiated. The signature and the document are physical things. The signer cannot later claim that he or she didn't sign it.

In reality, none of these statements about signatures is completely true. Signatures can be forged, signatures can be lifted from one piece of paper and moved to another, and documents can be altered after signing. However, we are willing to live with these problems because of the difficulty in cheating and the risk of detection.

We would like to do this sort of thing on computers, but there are problems. First, computer files are trivial to copy. Even if a person's signature were difficult to forge (a graphical image of a written signature, for example), it would be easy to cut and paste a valid signature from one document to another document. The mere presence of such a signature means nothing. Second, computer files are easy to modify after they are signed, without leaving any evidence of modification.

Signing Documents with Symmetric Cryptosystems and an Arbitrator

Alice wants to sign a digital message and send it to Bob. With the help of Trent and a symmetric cryptosystem, she can.

Trent is a powerful, trusted arbitrator. He can communicate with both Alice and Bob (and everyone else who may want to sign a digital document). He shares a secret key, K_A , with Alice, and a different secret key, K_B , with Bob. These keys have been established long before the protocol begins and can be reused multiple times for multiple signings.

- (1) Alice encrypts her message to Bob with K_A and sends it to Trent.
- (2) Trent decrypts the message with K_A .
- (3) Trent takes the decrypted message and a statement that he has received this message from Alice, and encrypts the whole bundle with K_B .
- (4) Trent sends the encrypted bundle to Bob.
- (5) Bob decrypts the bundle with K_B . He can now read both the message and Trent's certification that Alice sent it.

How does Trent know that the message is from Alice and not from some imposter? He infers it from the message's encryption. Since only he and Alice share their secret key, only Alice could encrypt a message using it.

Is this as good as a paper signature? Let's look at the characteristics we want:

1. This signature is authentic. Trent is a trusted arbitrator and Trent knows that the message came from Alice. Trent's certification serves as proof to Bob.
2. This signature is unforgeable. Only Alice (and Trent, but everyone trusts him) knows K_A , so only Alice could have sent Trent a message encrypted with K_A . If someone tried to impersonate Alice, Trent would have immediately realized this in step (2) and would not certify its authenticity.
3. This signature is not reusable. If Bob tried to take Trent's certification and attach it to another message, Alice would cry foul. An arbitrator (it could be Trent or it could be a completely different arbitrator with access to the same information) would ask Bob to produce both the message and Alice's encrypted message. The arbitrator would then encrypt the message with K_A and see that it did not match the encrypted message that Bob gave him. Bob, of course, could not produce an encrypted message that matches because he does not know K_A .
4. The signed document is unalterable. Were Bob to try to alter the document after receipt, Trent could prove foul play in exactly the same manner just described.
5. The signature cannot be repudiated. Even if Alice later claims that she never sent the message, Trent's certification says otherwise. Remember, Trent is trusted by everyone; what he says is true.

If Bob wants to show Carol a document signed by Alice, he can't reveal his secret key to her. He has to go through Trent again:

- (1) Bob takes the message and Trent's statement that the message came from Alice, encrypts them with K_B , and sends them back to Trent.
- (2) Trent decrypts the bundle with K_B .
- (3) Trent checks his database and confirms that the original message came from Alice.
- (4) Trent re-encrypts the bundle with the secret key he shares with Carol, K_C , and sends it to Carol.
- (5) Carol decrypts the bundle with K_C . She can now read both the message and Trent's certification that Alice sent it.

These protocols work, but they're time-consuming for Trent. He must spend his days decrypting and encrypting messages, acting as the intermediary between every pair of people who want to send signed documents to one another. He must keep a database of messages (although this can be avoided by sending the recipient a copy of the sender's encrypted message). He is a bottleneck in any communications system, even if he's a mindless software program.

Harder still is creating and maintaining someone like Trent, someone that everyone on the network trusts. Trent has to be infallible; if he makes even one mistake in a million signatures, no one is going to trust him. Trent has to be completely secure. If his database of secret keys ever got out or if someone managed to modify his programming, everyone's signatures would be completely useless. False documents purported to be signed years ago could appear. Chaos would result. Governments would collapse. Anarchy would reign. This might work in theory, but it doesn't work very well in practice.

Digital Signature Trees

Ralph Merkle proposed a digital signature scheme based on secret-key cryptography, producing an infinite number of one-time signatures using a tree structure [1067,1068]. The basic idea of this scheme is to place the root of the tree in some public file, thereby authenticating it. The root signs one message and authenticates its sub-nodes in the tree. Each of these nodes signs one message and authenticates its sub-nodes, and so on.

Signing Documents with Public-Key Cryptography

There are public-key algorithms that can be used for digital signatures. In some algorithms—RSA is an example (see Section 19.3)—either the public key or the private key can be used for encryption. Encrypt a document using your private key, and you have a secure digital signature. In other cases—DSA is an example (see Section 20.1)—there is a separate algorithm for digital signatures that cannot be used for encryption. This idea was first invented by Diffie and Hellman [496] and further expanded and elaborated on in other texts [1282,1328,1024,1283,426]. See [1099] for a good survey of the field.

The basic protocol is simple:

- (1) Alice encrypts the document with her private key, thereby signing the document.
- (2) Alice sends the signed document to Bob.
- (3) Bob decrypts the document with Alice's public key, thereby verifying the signature.

This protocol is far better than the previous one. Trent is not needed to either sign or verify signatures. (He is needed to certify that Alice's public key is indeed her public key.) The parties do not even need Trent to resolve disputes: If Bob cannot perform step (3), then he knows the signature is not valid.

This protocol also satisfies the characteristics we're looking for:

1. The signature is authentic; when Bob verifies the message with Alice's public key, he knows that she signed it.
2. The signature is unforgeable; only Alice knows her private key.
3. The signature is not reusable; the signature is a function of the document and cannot be transferred to any other document.

4. The signed document is unalterable; if there is any alteration to the document, the signature can no longer be verified with Alice's public key.
5. The signature cannot be repudiated. Bob doesn't need Alice's help to verify her signature.

Signing Documents and Timestamps

Actually, Bob can cheat Alice in certain circumstances. He can reuse the document and signature together. This is no problem if Alice signed a contract (what's another copy of the same contract, more or less?), but it can be very exciting if Alice signed a digital check.

Let's say Alice sends Bob a signed digital check for \$100. Bob takes the check to the bank, which verifies the signature and moves the money from one account to the other. Bob, who is an unscrupulous character, saves a copy of the digital check. The following week, he again takes it to the bank (or maybe to a different bank). The bank verifies the signature and moves the money from one account to the other. If Alice never balances her checkbook, Bob can keep this up for years.

Consequently, digital signatures often include timestamps. The date and time of the signature are attached to the message and signed along with the rest of the message. The bank stores this timestamp in a database. Now, when Bob tries to cash Alice's check a second time, the bank checks the timestamp against its database. Since the bank already cashed a check from Alice with the same timestamp, the bank calls the police. Bob then spends 15 years in Leavenworth prison reading up on cryptographic protocols.

Signing Documents with Public-Key Cryptography and One-Way Hash Functions

In practical implementations, public-key algorithms are often too inefficient to sign long documents. To save time, digital signature protocols are often implemented with one-way hash functions [432,433]. Instead of signing a document, Alice signs the hash of the document. In this protocol, both the one-way hash function and the digital signature algorithm are agreed upon beforehand.

- (1) Alice produces a one-way hash of a document.
- (2) Alice encrypts the hash with her private key, thereby signing the document.
- (3) Alice sends the document and the signed hash to Bob.
- (4) Bob produces a one-way hash of the document that Alice sent. He then, using the digital signature algorithm, decrypts the signed hash with Alice's public key. If the signed hash matches the hash he generated, the signature is valid.

Speed increases drastically and, since the chances of two different documents having the same 160-bit hash are only one in 2^{160} , anyone can safely equate a signature of the hash with a signature of the document. If a non-one-way hash function were

used, it would be an easy matter to create multiple documents that hashed to the same value, so that anyone signing a particular document would be duped into signing a multitude of documents.

This protocol has other benefits. First, the signature can be kept separate from the document. Second, the recipient's storage requirements for the document and signature are much smaller. An archival system can use this type of protocol to verify the existence of documents without storing their contents. The central database could just store the hashes of files. It doesn't have to see the files at all; users submit their hashes to the database, and the database timestamps the submissions and stores them. If there is any disagreement in the future about who created a document and when, the database could resolve it by finding the hash in its files. This system has vast implications concerning privacy: Alice could copyright a document but still keep the document secret. Only if she wished to prove her copyright would she have to make the document public. (See Section 4.1).

Algorithms and Terminology

There are many digital signature algorithms. All of them are public-key algorithms with secret information to sign documents and public information to verify signatures. Sometimes the signing process is called **encrypting with a private key** and the verification process is called **decrypting with a public key**. This is misleading and is only true for one algorithm, RSA. And different algorithms have different implementations. For example, one-way hash functions and timestamps sometimes add extra steps to the process of signing and verifying. Many algorithms can be used for digital signatures, but not for encryption.

In general, I will refer to the signing and verifying processes without any details of the algorithms involved. Signing a message with private key K is:

$$S_K(M)$$

and verifying a signature with the corresponding public key is:

$$V_K(M)$$

The bit string attached to the document when signed (in the previous example, the one-way hash of the document encrypted with the private key) will be called the **digital signature**, or just the **signature**. The entire protocol, by which the receiver of a message is convinced of the identity of the sender and the integrity of the message, is called authentication. Further details on these protocols are in Section 3.2.

Multiple Signatures

How could Alice and Bob sign the same digital document? Without one-way hash functions, there are two options. One is that Alice and Bob sign separate copies of the document itself. The resultant message would be over twice the size of the original document. The second is that Alice signs the document first and then Bob signs Alice's signature. This works, but it is impossible to verify Alice's signature without also verifying Bob's.

With one-way hash functions, multiple signatures are easy:

- (1) Alice signs the hash of the document.
- (2) Bob signs the hash of the document.
- (3) Bob sends his signature to Alice.
- (4) Alice sends the document, her signature, and Bob's signature to Carol.
- (5) Carol verifies both Alice's signature and Bob's signature.

Alice and Bob can do steps (1) and (2) either in parallel or in series. In step (5), Carol can verify one signature without having to verify the other.

Nonrepudiation and Digital Signatures

Alice can cheat with digital signatures and there's nothing that can be done about it. She can sign a document and then later claim that she did not. First, she signs the document normally. Then, she anonymously publishes her private key, conveniently loses it in a public place, or just pretends to do either one. Alice then claims that her signature has been compromised and that others are using it, pretending to be her. She disavows signing the document and any others that she signed using that private key. This is called repudiation.

Timestamps can limit the effects of this kind of cheating, but Alice can always claim that her key was compromised earlier. If Alice times things well, she can sign a document and then successfully claim that she didn't. This is why there is so much talk about private keys buried in tamper-resistant modules—so that Alice can't get at hers and abuse it.

Although nothing can be done about this possible abuse, one can take steps to guarantee that old signatures are not invalidated by actions taken in disputing new ones. (For example, Alice could "lose" her key to keep from paying Bob for the junk car he sold her yesterday and, in the process, invalidate her bank account.) The solution is for the receiver of a signed document to have it timestamped [453].

The general protocol is given in [28]:

- (1) Alice signs a message.
- (2) Alice generates a header containing some identifying information. She concatenates the header with the signed message, signs that, and sends it to Trent.
- (3) Trent verifies the outside signature and confirms the identifying information. He adds a timestamp to Alice's signed message and the identifying information. Then he signs it all and sends it to both Alice and Bob.
- (4) Bob verifies Trent's signature, the identifying information, and Alice's signature.
- (5) Alice verifies the message Trent sent to Bob. If she did not originate the message, she speaks up quickly.

Another scheme uses Trent after the fact [209]. After receiving a signed message, Bob can send a copy to Trent for verification. Trent can attest to the validity of Alice's signature.

Applications of Digital Signatures

One of the earliest proposed applications of digital signatures was to facilitate the verification of nuclear test ban treaties [1454,1467]. The United States and the Soviet Union (anyone remember the Soviet Union?) permitted each other to put seismometers on the other's soil to monitor nuclear tests. The problem was that each country needed to assure itself that the host nation was not tampering with the data from the monitoring nation's seismometers. Simultaneously, the host nation needed to assure itself that the monitor was sending only the specific information needed for monitoring.

Conventional authentication techniques can solve the first problem, but only digital signatures can solve both problems. The host nation can read, but not alter, data from the seismometer, and the monitoring nation knows that the data has not been tampered with.

2.7 DIGITAL SIGNATURES WITH ENCRYPTION

By combining digital signatures with public-key cryptography, we develop a protocol that combines the security of encryption with the authenticity of digital signatures. Think of a letter from your mother: The signature provides proof of authorship and the envelope provides privacy.

- (1) Alice signs the message with her private key.

$$S_A(M)$$

- (2) Alice encrypts the signed message with Bob's public key and sends it to Bob.

$$E_B(S_A(M))$$

- (3) Bob decrypts the message with his private key.

$$D_B(E_B(S_A(M))) = S_A(M)$$

- (4) Bob verifies with Alice's public key and recovers the message.

$$V_A(S_A(M)) = M$$

Signing before encrypting seems natural. When Alice writes a letter, she signs it and then puts it in an envelope. If she put the letter in the envelope unsigned and then signed the envelope, then Bob might worry if the letter hadn't been covertly replaced. If Bob showed to Carol Alice's letter and envelope, Carol might accuse Bob of lying about which letter arrived in which envelope.

In electronic correspondence as well, signing before encrypting is a prudent practice [48]. Not only is it more secure—an adversary can't remove a signature from an encrypted message and add his own—but there are legal considerations: If the text

to be signed is not visible to the signer when he affixes his signature, then the signature may have little legal force [1312]. And there are some cryptanalytic attacks against this technique with RSA signatures (see Section 19.3).

There's no reason Alice has to use the same public-key/private-key key pair for encrypting and signing. She can have two key pairs: one for encryption and the other for signatures. Separation has its advantages: she can surrender her encryption key to the police without compromising her signature, one key can be escrowed (see Section 4.13) without affecting the other, and the keys can have different sizes and can expire at different times.

Of course, timestamps should be used with this protocol to prevent reuse of messages. Timestamps can also protect against other potential pitfalls, such as the one described below.

Resending the Message as a Receipt

Consider an implementation of this protocol, with the additional feature of confirmation messages. Whenever Bob receives a message, he returns it as a confirmation of receipt.

- (1) Alice signs a message with her private key, encrypts it with Bob's public key, and sends it to Bob.

$$E_B(S_A(M))$$

- (2) Bob decrypts the message with his private key and verifies the signature with Alice's public key, thereby verifying that Alice signed the message and recovering the message.

$$V_A(D_B(E_B(S_A(M)))) = M$$

- (3) Bob signs the message with his private key, encrypts it with Alice's public key, and sends it back to Alice.

$$E_A(S_B(M))$$

- (4) Alice decrypts the message with her private key and verifies the signature with Bob's public key. If the resultant message is the same one she sent to Bob, she knows that Bob received the message accurately.

If the same algorithm is used for both encryption and digital-signature verification there is a possible attack [506]. In these cases, the digital signature operation is the inverse of the encryption operation: $V_X = E_X$ and $S_X = D_X$.

Assume that Mallory is a legitimate system user with his own public and private key. Now, let's watch as he reads Bob's mail. First, he records Alice's message to Bob in step (1). Then, at some later time, he sends that message to Bob, claiming that it came from him (Mallory). Bob thinks that it is a legitimate message from Mallory, so he decrypts the message with his private key and then tries to verify Mallory's signature by decrypting it with Mallory's public key. The resultant message, which is pure gibberish, is:

$$E_M(D_B(E_B(D_A(M)))) = E_M(D_A(M))$$

Even so, Bob goes on with the protocol and sends Mallory a receipt:

$$E_M(D_B(E_M(D_A(M))))$$

Now, all Mallory has to do is decrypt the message with his private key, encrypt it with Bob's public key, decrypt it again with his private key, and encrypt it with Alice's public key. *Voilà!* Mallory has M .

It is not unreasonable to imagine that Bob may automatically send Mallory a receipt. This protocol may be embedded in his communications software, for example, and send receipts automatically. It is this willingness to acknowledge the receipt of gibberish that creates the insecurity. If Bob checked the message for comprehensibility before sending a receipt, he could avoid this security problem.

There are enhancements to this attack that allow Mallory to send Bob a different message from the one he eavesdropped on. Never sign arbitrary messages from other people or decrypt arbitrary messages and give the results to other people.

Foiling the Resend Attack

The attack just described works because the encrypting operation is the same as the signature-verifying operation and the decryption operation is the same as the signature operation. A secure protocol would use even a slightly different operation for encryption and digital signatures. Using different keys for each operation solves the problem, as does using different algorithms for each operation; as do time-stamps, which make the incoming message and the outgoing message different; as do digital signatures with one-way hash functions (see Section 2.6).

In general, then, the following protocol is secure as the public-key algorithm used:

- (1) Alice signs a message.
- (2) Alice encrypts the message and signature with Bob's public key (using a different encryption algorithm than for the signature) and sends it to Bob.
- (3) Bob decrypts the message with his private key.
- (4) Bob verifies Alice's signature.

Attacks against Public-Key Cryptography

In all these public-key cryptography protocols, I glossed over how Alice gets Bob's public key. Section 3.1 discusses this in detail, but it is worth mentioning here.

The easiest way to get someone's public key is from a secure database somewhere. The database has to be public, so that anyone can get anyone else's public key. The database also has to be protected from write-access by anyone except Trent; otherwise Mallory could substitute any public key for Bob's. After he did that, Bob couldn't read messages addressed to him, but Mallory could.

Even if the public keys are stored in a secure database, Mallory could still substitute one for another during transmission. To prevent this, Trent can sign each public key with his own private key. Trent, when used in this manner, is often known as a **Key Certification Authority** or **Key Distribution Center (KDC)**. In practical implementations, the KDC signs a compound message consisting of the user's

name, his public key, and any other important information about the user. This signed compound message is stored in the KDC's database. When Alice gets Bob's key, she verifies the KDC's signature to assure herself of the key's validity.

In the final analysis, this is not making things impossible for Mallory, only more difficult. Alice still has the KDC's public key stored somewhere. Mallory would have to substitute his own public key for that key, corrupt the database, and substitute his own keys for the valid keys (all signed with his private key as if he were the KDC), and then he's in business. But, even paper-based signatures can be forged if Mallory goes to enough trouble. Key exchange will be discussed in minute detail in Section 3.1.

2.8 RANDOM AND PSEUDO-RANDOM-SEQUENCE GENERATION

Why even bother with random-number generation in a book on cryptography? There's already a random-number generator built into most every compiler, a mere function call away. Why not use that? Unfortunately, those random-number generators are almost definitely not secure enough for cryptography, and probably not even very random. Most of them are embarrassingly bad.

Random-number generators are not random because they don't have to be. Most simple applications, like computer games, need so few random numbers that they hardly notice. However, cryptography is extremely sensitive to the properties of random-number generators. Use a poor random-number generator and you start getting weird correlations and strange results [1231,1238]. If you are depending on your random-number generator for security, weird correlations and strange results are the last things you want.

The problem is that a random-number generator doesn't produce a random sequence. It probably doesn't produce anything that looks even remotely like a random sequence. Of course, it is impossible to produce something truly random on a computer. Donald Knuth quotes John von Neumann as saying: "Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin" [863]. Computers are deterministic beasts: Stuff goes in one end, completely predictable operations occur inside, and different stuff comes out the other end. Put the same stuff in on two separate occasions and the same stuff comes out both times. Put the same stuff into two identical computers, and the same stuff comes out of both of them. A computer can only be in a finite number of states (a large finite number, but a finite number nonetheless), and the stuff that comes out will always be a deterministic function of the stuff that went in and the computer's current state. That means that any random-number generator on a computer (at least, on a finite-state machine) is, by definition, periodic. Anything that is periodic is, by definition, predictable. And if something is predictable, it can't be random. A true random-number generator requires some random input; a computer can't provide that.

Pseudo-Random Sequences

The best a computer can produce is a **pseudo-random-sequence generator**. What's that? Many people have taken a stab at defining this formally, but I'll hand-wave here. A pseudo-random sequence is one that looks random. The sequence's period

should be long enough so that a finite sequence of reasonable length—that is, one that is actually used—is not periodic. If you need a billion random bits, don't choose a sequence generator that repeats after only sixteen thousand bits. These relatively short nonperiodic subsequences should be as indistinguishable as possible from random sequences. For example, they should have about the same number of ones and zeros, about half the runs (sequences of the same bit) should be of length one, one quarter of length two, one eighth of length three, and so on. They should not be compressible. The distribution of run lengths for zeros and ones should be the same [643,863,99,1357]. These properties can be empirically measured and then compared to statistical expectations using a chi-square test.

For our purposes, a sequence generator is pseudo-random if it has this property:

1. It looks random. This means that it passes all the statistical tests of randomness that we can find. (Start with the ones in [863].)

A lot of effort has gone into producing good pseudo-random sequences on computer. Discussions of generators abound in the academic literature, along with various tests of randomness. All of these generators are periodic (there's no escaping that); but with potential periods of 2^{256} bits and higher, they can be used for the largest applications.

The problem is still those weird correlations and strange results. Every pseudo-random-sequence generator is going to produce them if you use them in a certain way. And that's what a cryptanalyst will use to attack the system.

Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Sequences

Cryptographic applications demand much more of a pseudo-random-sequence generator than do most other applications. Cryptographic randomness doesn't mean just statistical randomness, although that's part of it. For a sequence to be **cryptographically secure pseudo-random**, it must also have this property:

2. It is unpredictable. It must be computationally infeasible to predict what the next random bit will be, given complete knowledge of the algorithm or hardware generating the sequence and all of the previous bits in the stream.

Cryptographically secure pseudo-random sequences should not be compressible . . . unless you know the key. The key is generally the seed used to set the initial state of the generator.

Like any cryptographic algorithm, cryptographically secure pseudo-random-sequence generators are subject to attack. Just as it is possible to break an encryption algorithm, it is possible to break a cryptographically secure pseudo-random-sequence generator. Making generators resistant to attack is what cryptography is all about.

Real Random Sequences

Now we're drifting into the domain of philosophers. Is there such a thing as randomness? What is a random sequence? How do you know if a sequence is random? Is "101110100" more random than "101010101"? Quantum mechanics tells us that

there is honest-to-goodness randomness in the real world. But can we preserve that randomness in the deterministic world of computer chips and finite-state machines?

Philosophy aside, from our point of view a sequence generator is **real random** if it has this additional third property:

3. It cannot be reliably reproduced. If you run the sequence generator twice with the exact same input (at least as exact as humanly possible), you will get two completely unrelated random sequences.

The output of a generator satisfying these three properties will be good enough for a one-time pad, key generation, and any other cryptographic applications that require a truly random sequence generator. The difficulty is in determining whether a sequence is really random. If I repeatedly encrypt a string with DES and a given key, I will get a nice, random-looking output; you won't be able to tell that it's non-random unless you rent time on the NSA's DES cracker.

CHAPTER 8

Key Management

Alice and Bob have a secure communications system. They play mental poker, simultaneously sign contracts, even exchange digital cash. Their protocols are secure. Their algorithms are top-notch. Unfortunately, they buy their keys from Eve's "Keys-R-Us," whose slogan is "You can trust us: Security is the middle name of someone our ex-mother-in-law's travel agent met at the Kwik-E-Mart."

Eve doesn't have to break the algorithms. She doesn't have to rely on subtle flaws in the protocols. She can use their keys to read all of Alice's and Bob's message traffic without lifting a cryptanalytic finger.

In the real world, key management is the hardest part of cryptography. Designing secure cryptographic algorithms and protocols isn't easy, but you can rely on a large body of academic research. Keeping the keys secret is much harder.

Cryptanalysts often attack both symmetric and public-key cryptosystems through their key management. Why should Eve bother going through all the trouble of trying to break the cryptographic algorithm if she can recover the key because of sloppy key storage procedures? Why should she spend \$10 million building a cryptanalysis machine if she can spend \$1000 bribing a clerk? Spending a million dollars to buy a well-placed communications clerk in a diplomatic embassy can be a bargain. The Walkers sold U.S. Navy encryption keys to the Soviets for years. The CIA's director of counterintelligence went for less than \$2 million, wife included. That's far cheaper than building massive cracking machines and hiring brilliant cryptanalysts. Eve can steal the keys. She can arrest or abduct someone who knows the keys. She can seduce someone and get the keys that way. (The Marines who guarded the U.S. Embassy in Moscow were not immune to that attack.) It's a whole lot easier to find flaws in people than it is to find them in cryptosystems.

Alice and Bob must protect their key to the same degree as all the data it encrypts. If a key isn't changed regularly, this can be an enormous amount of data. Unfortunately, many commercial products simply proclaim "We use DES" and forget about everything else. The results are not very impressive.

For example, the DiskLock program for Macintosh (version 2.1), sold at most software stores, claims the security of DES encryption. It encrypts files using DES. Its implementation of the DES algorithm is correct. However, DiskLock stores the DES key with the encrypted file. If you know where to look for the key, and want to read a file encrypted with DiskLock's DES, recover the key from the encrypted file and then decrypt the file. It doesn't matter that this program uses DES encryption—the implementation is completely insecure.

Further information on key management can be found in [457,98,1273,1225,775,357]. The following sections discuss some of the issues and solutions.

8.1 GENERATING KEYS

The security of an algorithm rests in the key. If you're using a cryptographically weak process to generate keys, then your whole system is weak. Eve need not cryptanalyze your encryption algorithm; she can cryptanalyze your key generation algorithm.

Reduced Keyspaces

DES has a 56-bit key. Implemented properly, any 56-bit string can be the key; there are 2^{56} (10^{16}) possible keys. Norton Discreet for MS-DOS (versions 8.0 and earlier) only allows ASCII keys, forcing the high-order bit of each byte to be zero. The program also converts lowercase letters to uppercase (so the fifth bit of each byte is always the opposite of the sixth bit) and ignores the low-order bit of each byte, resulting in only 2^{40} possible keys. These poor key generation procedures have made its DES ten thousand times easier to break than a proper implementation.

Table 8.1 gives the number of possible keys with various constraints on the input strings. Table 8.2 gives the time required for an exhaustive search through all of those keys, given a million attempts per second. Remember, there is very little time differential between an exhaustive search for 8-byte keys and an exhaustive search of 4-, 5-, 6-, 7-, and 8-byte keys.

All specialized brute-force hardware and parallel implementations will work here. Testing a million keys per second (either with one machine or with multiple machines in parallel), it is feasible to crack lowercase-letter and lowercase-letter-

Table 8.1
Number of Possible Keys of Various Keyspaces

	4-Byte	5-Byte	6-Byte	7-Byte	8-Byte
Lowercase letters (26):	460,000	$1.2 \cdot 10^7$	$3.1 \cdot 10^8$	$8.0 \cdot 10^9$	$2.1 \cdot 10^{11}$
Lowercase letters and digits (36):	1,700,000	$6.0 \cdot 10^7$	$2.2 \cdot 10^9$	$7.8 \cdot 10^{10}$	$2.8 \cdot 10^{12}$
Alphanumeric characters (62):	$1.5 \cdot 10^7$	$9.2 \cdot 10^8$	$5.7 \cdot 10^{10}$	$3.5 \cdot 10^{12}$	$2.2 \cdot 10^{14}$
Printable characters (95):	$8.1 \cdot 10^7$	$7.7 \cdot 10^9$	$7.4 \cdot 10^{11}$	$7.0 \cdot 10^{13}$	$6.6 \cdot 10^{15}$
ASCII characters (128):	$2.7 \cdot 10^8$	$3.4 \cdot 10^{10}$	$4.4 \cdot 10^{12}$	$5.6 \cdot 10^{14}$	$7.2 \cdot 10^{16}$
8-bit ASCII characters (256):	$4.3 \cdot 10^9$	$1.1 \cdot 10^{12}$	$2.8 \cdot 10^{14}$	$7.2 \cdot 10^{16}$	$1.8 \cdot 10^{19}$

Table 8.2
Exhaustive Search of Various Keyspaces (assume one million attempts per second)

	4-Byte	5-Byte	6-Byte	7-Byte	8-Byte
Lowercase letters (26):	.5 seconds	12 seconds	5 minutes	2.2 hours	2.4 days
Lowercase letters and digits (36):	1.7 seconds	1 minute	36 minutes	22 hours	33 days
Alphanumeric characters (62):	15 seconds	15 minutes	16 hours	41 days	6.9 years
Printable characters (95):	1.4 minutes	2.1 hours	8.5 days	2.2 years	210 years
ASCII characters (128):	4.5 minutes	9.5 hours	51 days	18 years	2300 years
8-bit ASCII characters (256):	1.2 hours	13 days	8.9 years	2300 years	580,000 years

and-number keys up to 8 bytes long, alphanumeric-character keys up to 7 bytes long, printable character and ASCII-character keys up to 6 bytes long, and 8-bit-ASCII-character keys up to 5 bytes long.

And remember, computing power doubles every 18 months. If you expect your keys to stand up against brute-force attacks for 10 years, you'd better plan accordingly.

Poor Key Choices

When people choose their own keys, they generally choose poor ones. They're far more likely to choose "Barney" than "*9 (hH/A." This is not always due to poor security practices; "Barney" is easier to remember than "*9 (hH/A." The world's most secure algorithm won't help much if the users habitually choose their spouse's names for keys or write their keys on little pieces of paper in their wallets. A smart brute-force attack doesn't try all possible keys in numerical order; it tries the obvious keys first.

This is called a **dictionary attack**, because the attacker uses a dictionary of common keys. Daniel Klein was able to crack 40 percent of the passwords on the average computer using this system [847,848]. No, he didn't try one password after another, trying to login. He copied the encrypted password file and mounted the attack offline. Here's what he tried:

1. The user's name, initials, account name, and other relevant personal information as a possible password. All in all, up to 130 different passwords were tried based on this information. For an account name **klone** with a user named "Daniel V. Klein," some of the passwords that would be tried were: klone, klone0, klone1, klone123, dvk, dvkdvk, dklein, DKlein, leinad, nielk, dvklein, danielk, DvkkvD, DANIEL-KLEIN, (klone), KleinD, and so on.
2. Words from various databases. These included lists of men's and women's names (some 16,000 in all); places (including variations so that "spain," "spanish," and "spaniard" would all be considered); names of famous people; cartoons and cartoon characters; titles, characters, and locations from films and science fiction stories; mythical creatures (garnered from *Bullfinch's Mythology* and dictionaries of mythical beasts); sports (includ-

ing team names, nicknames, and specialized terms); numbers (both as numerals—"2001," and written out—"twelve"); strings of letters and numbers ("a," "aa," "aaa," "aaaa," etc.); Chinese syllables (from the Pinyin Romanization of Chinese, an international standard system of writing Chinese on an English keyboard); the King James Bible; biological terms; colloquial and vulgar phrases (such as "fuckyou," "ibmsux," and "deadhead"); keyboard patterns (such as "qwerty," "asdf," and "zxcvbn"); abbreviations (such as "roygbiv"—the colors in the rainbow, and "ooottafagvah"—a mnemonic for remembering the 12 cranial nerves); machine names (acquired from */etc/hosts*); characters, plays, and locations from Shakespeare; common Yiddish words; the names of asteroids; and a collection of words from various technical papers Klein previously published. All told, more than 60,000 separate words were considered per user (with any inter- and intra-dictionary duplicates being discarded).

3. Variations on the words from step 2. This included making the first letter uppercase or a control character, making the entire word uppercase, reversing the word (with and without the aforementioned capitalization), changing the letter 'o' to the digit '0' (so that the word "scholar" would also be checked as "sch0lar"), changing the letter 'l' to the digit '1' (so that the word "scholar" would also be checked as "scholar"), and performing similar manipulation to change the letter 'z' into the digit '2', and the letter 's' into the digit '5'. Another test was to make the word into a plural (irrespective of whether the word was actually a noun), with enough intelligence built in so that "dress" became "dresses," "house" became "houses," and "daisy" became "daisies." Klein did not consider pluralization rules exclusively, though, so that "datum" forgivably became "datums" (not "data"), while "sphinx" became "sphinxs" (and not "sphynges"). Similarly, the suffixes "-ed," "-er," and "-ing" were added to transform words like "phase" into "phased," "phaser," and "phasing." These additional tests added another 1,000,000 words to the list of possible passwords that were tested for each user.
4. Various capitalization variations on the words from step 2 that were not considered in step 3. This included all single-letter capitalization variations (so that "michael" would also be checked as "mIChael," "miChael," "micHael," "michAel," etc.), double-letter capitalization variations ("MIChael," "MiChael," "MicHael," . . . , "mIChael," "mIcHael," etc.), triple-letter variations, etc. The single-letter variations added roughly another 400,000 words to be checked per user, while the double-letter variations added another 1,500,000 words. Three-letter variations would have added at least another 3,000,000 words per user had there been enough time to complete the tests. Tests of four-, five-, and six-letter variations were deemed to be impracticable without much more computational horsepower to carry them out.
5. Foreign language words on foreign users. The specific test that was performed was to try Chinese language passwords on users with Chinese

names. The Pinyin Romanization of Chinese syllables was used, combining syllables together into one-, two-, and three-syllable words. Because no tests were done to determine whether the words actually made sense, an exhaustive search was initiated. Since there are 298 Chinese syllables in the Pinyin system, there are 158,404 two-syllable words, and slightly more than 16,000,000 three-syllable words. A similar mode of attack could as easily be used with English, using rules for building pronounceable non-sense words.

6. Word pairs. The magnitude of an exhaustive test of this nature is staggering. To simplify the test, only words of three or four characters in length from */usr/dict/words* were used. Even so, the number of word pairs is about ten million.

A dictionary attack is much more powerful when it is used against a file of keys and not a single key. A single user may be smart enough to choose good keys. If a thousand people each choose their own key as a password to a computer system, the odds are excellent that at least one person will choose a key in the attacker's dictionary.

Random Keys

Good keys are random-bit strings generated by some automatic process. If the key is 64 bits long, every possible 64-bit key must be equally likely. Generate the key bits from either a reliably random source (see Section 17.14) or a cryptographically secure pseudo-random-bit generator (see Chapters 16 and 17.) If these automatic processes are unavailable, flip a coin or roll a die.

This is important, but don't get too caught up in arguing about whether random noise from audio sources is more random than random noise from radioactive decay. None of these random-noise sources will be perfect, but they will probably be good enough. It is important to use a good random-number generator for key generation, but it is far more important to use good encryption algorithms and key management procedures. If you are worried about the randomness of your keys, use the key-crunching technique described below.

Some encryption algorithms have weak keys: specific keys that are less secure than the other keys. I advise testing for these weak keys and generating a new one if you discover one. DES has only 16 weak keys out of 2^{56} , so the odds of generating any of these keys are incredibly small. It has been argued that a cryptanalyst would have no idea that a weak key is being used and therefore gains no advantage from their accidental use. It has also been argued that not using weak keys gives a cryptanalyst information. However, testing for the few weak keys is so easy that it seems imprudent not to do so.

Generating keys for public-key cryptography systems is harder, because often the keys must have certain mathematical properties (they may have to be prime, be a quadratic residue, etc.). Techniques for generating large random prime numbers are discussed in Section 11.5. The important thing to remember from a key management point of view is that the random seeds for those generators must be just that: random.

Generating a random key isn't always possible. Sometimes you need to remember your key. (See how long it takes you to remember 25e8 56f2 e8ba c820). If you have to generate an easy-to-remember key, make it obscure. The ideal would be something easy to remember, but difficult to guess. Here are some suggestions:

- Word pairs separated by a punctuation character, for example "turtle*moose" or "zorch!splat"
- Strings of letters that are an acronym of a longer phrase; for example, "Mein Luftkissenfahrzeug ist voller Aale!" generates the key "MLivA!"

Pass Phrases

A better solution is to use an entire phrase instead of a word, and to convert that phrase into a key. These phrases are called **pass phrases**. A technique called **key crunching** converts the easy-to-remember phrases into random keys. Use a one-way hash function to transform an arbitrary-length text string into a pseudo-random-bit string.

For example, the easy-to-remember text string:

My name is Ozymandias, king of kings. Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair.

might crunch into this 64-bit key:

e6c1 4398 5ae9 0a9b

Of course, it can be difficult to type an entire phrase into a computer with the echo turned off. Clever suggestions to solve this problem would be appreciated.

If the phrase is long enough, the resulting key will be random. Exactly what "long enough" means is open to interpretation. Information theory tells us that standard English has about 1.3 bits of information per character (see Section 11.1). For a 64-bit key, a pass phrase of about 49 characters, or 10 normal English words, should be sufficient. As a rule of thumb, figure that you need five words for each 4 bytes of key. That's a conservative assumption, since it doesn't take into account case, spacing, and punctuation.

This technique can even be used to generate private keys for public-key cryptography systems: The text string could be crunched into a random seed, and that seed could be fed into a deterministic system that generates public-key/private-key key pairs.

If you are choosing a pass phrase, choose something unique and easy-to-remember. Don't choose phrases from literature—the example from "Ozymandias" is a bad one. Both the complete works of Shakespeare and the dialogue from *Star Wars* are available on-line and can be used in a dictionary attack. Choose something obscure, but personal. Include punctuation and capitalization; if you can, include numbers and non-alphanumeric symbols. Poor or improper English, or even a foreign language, makes the pass phrase less susceptible to a dictionary attack. One suggestion is to use a phrase that is "shocking nonsense": something offensive enough that you are likely to remember and unlikely to write down.

Despite everything written here, obscurity is no substitute for true randomness. The best keys are random keys, difficult as they are to remember.

X9.17 Key Generation

The ANSI X9.17 standard specifies a method of key generation [see Figure 8.1] [55]. This does not generate easy-to-remember keys; it is more suitable for generating session keys or pseudo-random numbers within a system. The cryptographic algorithm used to generate keys is triple-DES, but it could just as easily be any algorithm.

Let $E_K(X)$ be triple-DES encryption of X with key K . This is a special key reserved for secret key generation. V_0 is a secret 64-bit seed. T is a timestamp. To generate the random key R_i , calculate:

$$R_i = E_K(E_K(T_i) \oplus V_i)$$

To generate V_{i+1} , calculate:

$$V_{i+1} = E_K(E_K(T_i) \oplus R_i)$$

To turn R_i into a DES key, simply adjust every eighth bit for parity. If you need a 64-bit key, use it as is. If you need a 128-bit key, generate a pair of keys and concatenate them together.

DoD Key Generation

The U.S. Department of Defense recommends using DES in OFB mode (see Section 9.8) to generate random keys [1144]. Generate a DES key from system interrupt vectors, system status registers, and system counters. Generate an initialization vector from the system clock, system ID, and date and time. For the plaintext, use an externally generated 64-bit quantity: eight characters typed in by a system administrator, for example. Use the output as your key.

8.2 NONLINEAR KEYSACES

Imagine that you are a military cryptography organization, building a piece of cryptography equipment for your troops. You want to use a secure algorithm, but you are




Figure 8.1 ANSI X9.17 key generation.

worried about the equipment falling into enemy hands. The last thing you want is for your enemy to be able to use the equipment to protect *their* secrets.

If you can put your algorithm in a tamperproof module, here's what you can do. You can require keys of a special and secret form; all other keys will cause the module to encrypt and decrypt using a severely weakened algorithm. You can make it so that the odds of someone, not knowing this special form but accidentally stumbling on a correct key, are vanishingly small.

This is called a **nonlinear keyspace**, because all the keys are not equally strong. (The opposite is a linear, or **flat**, keyspace.) An easy way to do this is to create the key as two parts: the key itself and some fixed string encrypted with that key. The module decrypts the string with the key; if it gets the fixed string it uses the key normally, if not it uses a different, weak algorithm. If the algorithm has a 128-bit key and a 64-bit block size, the overall key is 192 bits; this gives the algorithm an effective key of 2^{128} , but makes the odds of randomly choosing a good key one in 2^{64} .

You can be even subtler. You can design an algorithm such that certain keys are stronger than others. An algorithm can have no weak keys—keys that are obviously very poor—and can still have a nonlinear keyspace.

This only works if the algorithm is secret and the enemy can't reverse-engineer it, or if the difference in key strength is subtle enough that the enemy can't figure it out. The NSA did this with the secret algorithms in their Overtake modules (see Section 25.1). Did they do the same thing with Skipjack (see Section 13.12)? No one knows.

8.3 TRANSFERRING KEYS

Alice and Bob are going to use a symmetric cryptographic algorithm to communicate securely; they need the same key. Alice generates a key using a random-key generator. Now she has to give it to Bob—securely. If Alice can meet Bob somewhere (a back alley, a windowless room, or one of Jupiter's moons), she can give him a copy of the key. Otherwise, they have a problem. Public-key cryptography solves the problem nicely and with a minimum of prearrangement, but these techniques are not always available (see Section 3.1). Some systems use alternate channels known to be secure. Alice could send Bob the key with a trusted messenger. She could send it by certified mail or via an overnight delivery service. She could set up another communications channel with Bob and hope no one is eavesdropping on that one.

Alice could send Bob the symmetric key over their communications channel—the one they are going to encrypt. This is foolish; if the channel warrants encryption, sending the encryption key in the clear over the same channel guarantees that anyone eavesdropping on the channel can decrypt all communications.

The X9.17 standard [55] specifies two types of keys: key-encryption keys and data keys. **Key-Encryption Keys** encrypt other keys for distribution. **Data Keys** encrypt message traffic. These key-encrypting keys have to be distributed manually (although they can be secured in a tamperproof device, like a smart card), but only seldomly. Data keys are distributed more often. More details are in [75]. This two-tiered key concept is used a lot in key distribution.

Another solution to the distribution problem splits the key into several different parts (see Section 3.6) and sends each of those parts over a different channel. One part could be sent over the telephone, one by mail, one by overnight delivery service, one by carrier pigeon, and so on. (see Figure 8.2). Since an adversary could collect all but one of the parts and still have no idea what the key is, this method will work in all but extreme cases. Section 3.6 discusses schemes for splitting a key into several parts. Alice could even use a secret sharing scheme (see Section 3.7), allowing Bob to reconstruct the key if some of the shares are lost in transmission.

Alice sends Bob the key-encryption key securely, either by a face-to-face meeting or the splitting technique just discussed. Once Alice and Bob both have the key-encryption key, Alice can send Bob daily data keys over the same communications channel. Alice encrypts each data key with the key-encryption key. Since the amount of traffic being encrypted with the key-encryption key is low, it does not have to be changed as often. However, since compromise of the key-encryption key could compromise every message encrypted with every key that was encrypted with the key-encryption key, it must be stored securely.

Key Distribution in Large Networks

Key-encryption keys shared by pairs of users work well in small networks, but can quickly get cumbersome if the networks become large. Since every pair of users must exchange keys, the total number of key exchanges required in an n -person network is $n(n - 1)/2$.

In a six-person network, 15 key exchanges are required. In a 1000-person network, nearly 500,000 key exchanges are required. In these cases, creating a central key server (or servers) makes the operation much more efficient.

Alternatively, any of the symmetric-cryptography or public-key-cryptography protocols in Section 3.1 provides for secure key distribution.




Figure 8.2 Key distribution via parallel channels.

8.4 VERIFYING KEYS

When Bob receives a key, how does he know it came from Alice and not from someone pretending to be Alice? If Alice gives it to him when they are face-to-face, it's easy. If Alice sends her key via a trusted courier, then Bob has to trust the courier. If the key is encrypted with a key-encryption key, then Bob has to trust the fact that only Alice has that key. If Alice uses a digital signature protocol to sign the key, Bob has to trust the public-key database when he verifies that signature. (He also has to trust that Alice has kept her key secure.) If a Key Distribution Center (KDC) signs Alice's public key, Bob has to trust that his copy of the KDC's public key has not been tampered with.

In the end, someone who controls the entire network around Bob can make him think whatever he likes. Mallory could send an encrypted and signed message purporting to be from Alice. When Bob tried to access the public-key database to verify Alice's signature, Mallory could substitute his own public key. Mallory could invent his own false KDC and exchange the real KDC's public key for his own creation. Bob wouldn't be the wiser.

Some people have used this argument to claim that public-key cryptography is useless. Since the only way for Alice and Bob to ensure that their keys have not been tampered with is to meet face-to-face, public-key cryptography doesn't enhance security at all.

This view is naïve. It is theoretically true, but reality is far more complicated. Public-key cryptography, used with digital signatures and trusted KDCs, makes it much more difficult to substitute one key for another. Bob can never be absolutely certain that Mallory isn't controlling his entire reality, but Bob can be confident that doing so requires more resources than most real-world Mallorys have access to.

Bob could also verify Alice's key over the telephone, where he can hear her voice. Voice recognition is a really good authentication scheme. If it's a public key, he can safely recite it in public. If it's a secret key, he can use a one-way hash function to verify the key. Both PGP (see Section 24.12) and the AT&T TSD (see Section 24.18) use this kind of key verification.

Sometimes, it may not even be important to verify exactly whom a public key belongs to. It may be necessary to verify that it belongs to the same person to whom it belonged last year. If someone sends a signed withdrawal message to a bank, the bank does not have to be concerned with who withdraws the money, only whether it is the same person who deposited the money in the first place.

Error Detection during Key Transmission

Sometimes keys get garbled in transmission. Since a garbled key can mean megabytes of undecryptable ciphertext, this is a problem. All keys should be transmitted with some kind of error detection and correction bits. This way errors in transmission can be easily detected and, if required, the key can be resent.

One of the most widely used methods is to encrypt a constant value with the key, and to send the first 2 to 4 bytes of that ciphertext along with the key. At the receiving end, do the same thing. If the encrypted constants match, then the key has been transmitted without error. The chance of an undetected error ranges from one in 2^{16} to one in 2^{32} .

Key-error Detection during Decryption

Sometimes the receiver wants to check if a particular key he has is the correct symmetric decryption key. If the plaintext message is something like ASCII, he can try to decrypt and read the message. If the plaintext is random, there are other tricks.

The naive approach is to attach a **verification block**: a known header to the plaintext message before encryption. At the receiving end, Bob decrypts the header and verifies that it is correct. This works, but it gives Eve a known plaintext to help cryptanalyze the system. It also makes attacks against short-key ciphers like DES and all exportable ciphers easy. Precalculate the checksum once for each key, then use that checksum to determine the key in any message you intercept after that. This is a feature of *any* key checksum that doesn't include random or at least different data in each checksum. It's very similar in concept to using salt when generating keys from passphrases.

Here's a better way to do this [821]:

- (1) Generate an IV (not the one used for the message).
- (2) Use that IV to generate a large block of bits: say, 512.
- (3) Hash the result.
- (4) Use the same fixed bits of the hash, say 32, for the key checksum.

This gives Eve some information, but very little. If she tries to use the low 32 bits of the final hash value to mount a brute-force attack, she has to do multiple encryptions plus a hash per candidate key; brute-force on the key itself would be quicker.

She also gets no known-plaintext values to try out, and even if she manages to choose our random value for us, she never gets a chosen-plaintext out of us, since it goes through the hash function before she sees it.

8.5 USING KEYS

Software encryption is scary. Gone are the days of simple microcomputers under the control of single programs. Now there's Macintosh System 7, Windows NT, and UNIX. You can't tell when the operating system will suspend the encryption application in progress, write everything to disk, and take care of some pressing task. When the operating system finally gets back to encrypting whatever is being encrypted, everything will look just fine. No one will ever realize that the operating system wrote the encryption application to disk, and that it wrote the key along with it. The key will sit on the disk, unencrypted, until the computer writes over that area of memory again. It could be minutes or it could be months. It could even be never; the key could still be sitting there when an adversary goes over the hard drive with a fine-tooth comb. In a preemptive, multitasking environment, you can set your encryption operation to a high enough priority so it will not be interrupted. This would mitigate the risk. Even so, the whole thing is dicey at best.

Hardware implementations are safer. Many encryption devices are designed to erase the key if tampered with. For example, the IBM PS/2 encryption card has an

epoxy unit containing the DES chip, battery, and memory. Of course, you have to trust the hardware manufacturer to implement the feature properly.

Some communications applications, such as telephone encryptors, can use **session keys**. A session key is a key that is just used for one communications session—a single telephone conversation—and then discarded. There is no reason to store the key after it has been used. And if you use some key-exchange protocol to transfer the key from one conversant to the other, the key doesn't have to be stored before it is used either. This makes it far less likely that the key might be compromised.

Controlling Key Usage

In some applications it may be desirable to control how a session key is used. Some users may need session keys only for encryption or only for decryption. Session keys might only be authorized for use on a certain machine or at a certain time. One scheme to handle these sorts of restrictions attaches a **Control Vector (CV)** to the key; the control vector specifies the uses and restrictions for that key (see Section 24.1) [1025,1026]. This CV is hashed and XORed with a master key; the result is used as an encryption key to encrypt the session key. The resultant encrypted session key is then stored with the CV. To recover the session key, hash the CV and XOR it with the master key, and use the result to decrypt the encrypted session key.

The advantages of this scheme are that the CV can be of arbitrary length and that it is always stored in the clear with the encrypted key. This scheme assumes quite a bit about tamperproof hardware and the inability of users to get at the keys directly. This system is discussed further in Sections 24.1 and 24.8.

8.6 UPDATING KEYS

Imagine an encrypted data link where you want to change keys daily. Sometimes it's a pain to distribute a new key every day. An easier solution is to generate a new key from the old key; this is sometimes called **key updating**.

All it takes is a one-way function. If Alice and Bob share the same key and they both operate on it using the same one-way function, they will get the same result. Then they can take the bits they need from the results to create the new key.

Key updating works, but remember that the new key is only as secure as the old key was. If Eve managed to get her hands on the old key, she can perform the key updating function herself. However, if Eve doesn't have the old key and is trying a ciphertext-only attack on the encrypted traffic, this is a good way for Alice and Bob to protect themselves.

8.7 STORING KEYS

The least complex key storage problem is that of a single user, Alice, encrypting files for later use. Since she is the only person involved, she is the only person responsible for the key. Some systems take the easy approach: The key is stored in Alice's brain and never on the system. Alice is responsible for remembering the key and entering it every time she needs a file encrypted or decrypted.

An example of this system is IPS [881]. Users can either directly enter the 64-bit key or enter the key as a longer character string. The system then generates a 64-bit key from the character string using a key-crunching technique.

Another solution is to store the key in a magnetic stripe card, plastic key with an embedded ROM chip (called a **ROM key**), or smart card [556,557,455]. A user could then enter his key into the system by inserting the physical token into a special reader in his encryption box or attached to his computer terminal. While the user can use the key, he does not know it and cannot compromise it. He can use it only in the way and for the purposes indicated by the control vector.

A ROM key is a very clever idea. People understand physical keys, what they signify and how to protect them. Putting a cryptographic key in the same physical form makes storing and protecting that key more intuitive.

This technique is made more secure by splitting the key into two halves, storing one half in the terminal and the other half in the ROM key. The U.S. government's STU-III secure telephone works this way. Losing the ROM key does not compromise the cryptographic key—change that key and everything is back to normal. The same is true with the loss of the terminal. This way, compromising either the ROM key or the system does not compromise the cryptographic key—an adversary must have both parts.

Hard-to-remember keys can be stored in encrypted form, using something similar to a key-encryption key. For example, an RSA private key could be encrypted with a DES key and stored on disk. To recover the RSA key, the user has to type in the DES key to a decryption program.

If the keys are generated deterministically (with a cryptographically secure pseudo-random-sequence generator), it might be easier to regenerate the keys from an easy-to-remember password every time they are required.

Ideally, a key should never appear unencrypted outside the encryption device. This isn't always possible, but it is a worthy goal.

8.8 BACKUP KEYS

Alice is the chief financial officer at Secrets, Ltd.—“We don't tell you our motto.” Like any good corporate officer, she follows the company's security guidelines and encrypts all her data. Unfortunately, she ignores the company's street-crossing guidelines and gets hit by a truck. What does the company's president, Bob, do?

Unless Alice left a copy of her key, he's in deep trouble. The whole point of encryption is to make files unrecoverable without the key. Unless Alice was a moron and used lousy encryption software, her files are gone forever.

Bob can avoid this in several ways. The simplest is sometimes called **key escrow** (see Section 4.14): He requires all employees to write their keys on paper and give them to the company's security officer, who will lock them in a safe somewhere (or encrypt them all with a master key). Now, when Alice is bowled over on the Interstate, Bob can ask his security officer for her key. Bob should make sure to have the combination to the safe himself as well; otherwise, if the security officer is run over by another truck, Bob will be out of luck again.

The problem with this key management system is that Bob has to trust his security officer not to misuse everyone's keys. Even more significantly, all the employees have to trust the security officer not to misuse their keys. A far better solution is to use a secret-sharing protocol (see Section 3.7).

When Alice generates a key, she also divides up that key into some number of pieces. She then sends each piece—encrypted, of course—to a different company officer. None of those pieces alone is the key, but someone can gather all the pieces together and reconstruct the key. Now Alice is protected against any one malicious person, and Bob is protected against losing all of Alice's data after her run-in with the truck. Or, she could just store the different pieces, encrypted with each of the officer's different public keys, on her own hard disk. That way, no one gets involved with key management until it becomes necessary.

Another backup scheme [188] uses smart cards (see Section 24.13) for the temporary escrow of keys. Alice can put the key to secure her hard drive onto the smart card and give it to Bob while she is away. Bob can use the card to get into Alice's hard drive, but because the key is stored in the card Bob cannot learn it. And the system is bilaterally auditable: Bob can verify that the key will open Alice's drive, and when Alice returns she can verify if Bob has used the key and how many times.

Such a scheme makes no sense for data transmission. On a secure telephone, the key should exist for the length of the call and no longer. For data storage, as just described, key escrow can be a good idea. I've lost about one key every five years, and my memory is better than most. If 200 million people were using cryptography, that same rate would equal 40 million lost keys per year. I keep copies of my house keys with a neighbor because I may lose mine. If house keys were like cryptographic keys, and I lost them, I could never get inside and recover my possessions, ever again. Just as I keep off-site backups of my data, it makes sense to keep backups of my data-encryption keys.

8.9 COMPROMISED KEYS

All of the protocols, techniques, and algorithms in this book are secure only if the key (the private key in a public-key system) remains secret. If Alice's key is lost, stolen, printed in the newspaper, or otherwise compromised, then all her security is gone.

If the compromised key was for a symmetric cryptosystem, Alice has to change her key and hope the actual damage was minimal. If it was a private key, she has bigger problems; her public key is probably on servers all over the network. And if Eve gets access to Alice's private key, she can impersonate her on the network: reading encrypted mail, signing correspondence, entering into contracts, and so forth. Eve can, effectively, become Alice.

It is vital that news of a private key's compromise propagate quickly throughout the network. Any databases of public keys must immediately be notified that a particular private key has been compromised, lest some unsuspecting person encrypt a message in that compromised key.

One hopes Alice knows when her key was compromised. If a KDC is managing the keys, Alice should notify it that her key has been compromised. If there is no KDC, then she should notify all correspondents who might receive messages from her. Someone should publicize the fact that any message received after her key was lost is suspect, and that no one should send messages to Alice with the associated public key. The application should be using some sort of timestamp, and then users can determine which messages are legitimate and which are suspect.

If Alice doesn't know exactly when her key was compromised, things are more difficult. Alice may want to back out of a contract because the person who stole the key signed it instead of her. If the system allows this, then anyone can back out of a contract by claiming that his key was compromised before it was signed. It has to be a matter for an adjudicator to decide.

This is a serious problem and brings to light the dangers of Alice tying all of her identity to a single key. It would be better for Alice to have different keys for different applications—just as she has different physical keys in her pocket for different locks. Other solutions to this problem involve biometrics, limits on what can be done with a key, time delays, and countersigning.

These procedures and tips are hardly optimal, but are the best we can do. The moral of the story is to protect keys, and protect private keys above all else.

8.10 LIFETIME OF KEYS

No encryption key should be used for an indefinite period. It should expire automatically like passports and licenses. There are several reasons for this:

- The longer a key is used, the greater the chance that it will be compromised. People write keys down; people lose them. Accidents happen. If you use the same key for a year, there's a far greater chance of compromise than if you use it for a day.
- The longer a key is used, the greater the loss if the key is compromised. If a key is used only to encrypt a single budgetary document on a file server, then the loss of the key means only the compromise of that document. If the same key is used to encrypt all the budgetary information on the file server, then its loss is much more devastating.
- The longer a key is used, the greater the temptation for someone to spend the effort necessary to break it—even if that effort is a brute-force attack. Breaking a key shared between two military units for a day would enable someone to read and fabricate messages between those units for that day. Breaking a key shared by an entire military command structure for a year would enable that same person to read and fabricate messages throughout the world for a year. In our budget-conscious, post-Cold War world, which key would you choose to attack?

- It is generally easier to do cryptanalysis with more ciphertext encrypted with the same key.

For any cryptographic application, there must be a policy that determines the permitted lifetime of a key. Different keys may have different lifetimes. For a connection-based system, like a telephone, it makes sense to use a key for the length of the telephone call and to use a new one with each call.

Systems on dedicated communications channels are not as obvious. Keys should have relatively short lifetimes, depending on the value of the data and the amount of data encrypted during a given period. The key for a gigabit-per-second communications link might have to be changed more often than the key for a 9600-baud modem link. Assuming there is an efficient method of transferring new keys, session keys should be changed at least daily.

Key-encryption keys don't have to be replaced as frequently. They are used only occasionally (roughly once per day) for key exchange. This generates little ciphertext for a cryptanalyst to work with, and the corresponding plaintext has no particular form. However, if a key-encryption key is compromised, the potential loss is extreme: all communications encrypted with every key encrypted with the key-encryption key. In some applications, key-encryption keys are replaced only once a month or once a year. You have to balance the inherent danger in keeping a key around for a while with the inherent danger in distributing a new one.

Encryption keys used to encrypt data files for storage cannot be changed often. The files may sit encrypted on disk for months or years before someone needs them again. Decrypting them and re-encrypting them with a new key every day doesn't enhance security in any way; it just gives a cryptanalyst more to work with. One solution might be to encrypt each file with a unique file key, and then encrypt all the file keys with a key-encryption key. The key-encryption key should then be either memorized or stored in a secure location, perhaps in a safe somewhere. Of course, losing this key would mean losing all the individual file keys.

Private keys for public-key cryptography applications have varying lifetimes, depending on the application. Private keys used for digital signatures and proofs of identity may have to last years (even a lifetime). Private keys used for coin-flipping protocols can be discarded immediately after the protocol is completed. Even if a key's security is expected to last a lifetime, it may be prudent to change the key every couple of years. The private keys in many networks are good only for two years; after that the user must get a new private key. The old key would still have to remain secret, in case the user needed to verify a signature from that period. But the new key would be used to sign new documents, reducing the number of signed documents a cryptanalyst would have for an attack.

8.11 DESTROYING KEYS

Given that keys must be replaced regularly, old keys must be destroyed. Old keys are valuable, even if they are never used again. With them, an adversary can read old messages encrypted with those keys [65].

Keys must be destroyed securely (see Section 10.9). If the key is written on paper, the paper should be shredded or burned. Be careful to use a high-quality shredder; many lousy shredders are on the market. Algorithms in this book are secure against brute-force attacks costing millions of dollars and taking millions of years. If an adversary can recover your key by taking a bag of shredded documents from your trash and paying 100 unemployed workers in some backwater country ten cents per hour for a year to piece the shredded pages together, that would be \$26,000 well spent.

If the key is in a hardware EEPROM, the key should be overwritten multiple times. If the key is in a hardware EPROM or PROM, the chip should be smashed into tiny bits and scattered to the four winds. If the key is stored on a computer disk, the actual bits of the storage should be overwritten multiple times (see Section 10.9) or the disk should be shredded.

A potential problem is that, in a computer, keys can be easily copied and stored in multiple locations. Any computer that does its own memory management, constantly swapping programs in and out of memory, exacerbates the problem. There is no way to ensure that successful key erasure has taken place in the computer, especially if the computer's operating system controls the erasure process. The more paranoid among you should consider writing a special erasure program that scans all disks looking for copies of the key's bit pattern on unused blocks and then erases those blocks. Also remember to erase the contents of any temporary, or "swap," files.

8.12 PUBLIC-KEY KEY MANAGEMENT

Public-key cryptography makes key management easier, but it has its own unique problems. Each person has only one public key, regardless of the number of people on the network. If Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she has to get Bob's public key. She can go about this several ways:

- She can get it from Bob.
- She can get it from a centralized database.
- She can get it from her own private database.

Section 2.5 discussed a number of possible attacks against public-key cryptography, based on Mallory substituting his key for Bob's. The scenario is that Alice wants to send a message to Bob. She goes to the public-key database and gets Bob's public key. But Mallory, who is sneaky, has substituted his own key for Bob's. (If Alice asks Bob directly, Mallory has to intercept Bob's transmission and substitute his key for Bob's.) Alice encrypts her message in Mallory's key and sends it to Bob. Mallory intercepts the message, decrypts it, and reads it. He re-encrypts it with Bob's real key and sends it on to Bob. Neither Alice nor Bob is the wiser.

Public-key Certificates

A **public-key certificate** is someone's public key, signed by a trustworthy person. Certificates are used to thwart attempts to substitute one key for another [879]. Bob's

certificate, in the public-key database, contains a lot more than his public key. It contains information about Bob—his name, address, and so on—and it is signed by someone Alice trusts: Trent (usually known as a **certification authority**, or CA). By signing both the key and the information about Bob, Trent certifies that the information about Bob is correct and that the public key belongs to Bob. Alice checks Trent's signature and then uses the public key, secure in the knowledge that it is Bob's and no one else's. Certificates play an important role in a number of public-key protocols such as PEM [825] (see Section 24.10) and X.509 [304] (see Section 24.9).

A complicated noncryptographic issue surrounds this type of system. What is the meaning of certification? Or, to put it another way, who is trusted to issue certificates to whom? Anyone may sign anyone else's certificate, but there needs to be some way to filter out questionable certificates: for example, certificates for employees of one company signed by the CA of another company. Normally, a certification chain transfers trust: A single trusted entity certifies trusted agents, trusted agents certify company CAs, and company CAs certify their employees.

Here are some more things to think about:

- What level of trust in someone's identity is implied by his certificate?
- What are the relationships between a person and the CA that certified his public key, and how can those relationships be implied by the certificate?
- Who can be trusted to be the "single trusted entity" at the top of the certification chain?
- How long can a certification chain be?

Ideally, Bob would follow some kind of authentication procedure before the CA signs his certificate. Additionally, some kind of timestamp or an indication of the certificate's validity period is important to guard against compromised keys [461].

Timestamping is not enough. Keys may be invalidated before they have expired, either through compromise or for administrative reasons. Hence, it is important the CA keep a list of invalid certificates, and for users to regularly check that list. This key revocation problem is still a difficult one to solve.

And one public-key/private-key pair is not enough. Certainly any good implementation of public-key cryptography needs separate keys for encryption and digital signatures. This separation allows for different security levels, expiration times, backup procedures, and so on. Someone might sign messages with a 2048-bit key stored on a smart card and good for twenty years, while they might use a 768-bit key stored in the computer and good for six months for encryption.

And a single pair of encryption and signature keys isn't enough, either. A private key authenticates a relationship as well as an identity, and people have more than one relationship. Alice might want to sign one document as Alice the individual, another as Alice, vice-president of Monolith, Inc., and a third as Alice, president of her community organization. Some of these keys are more valuable than others, so they can be better protected. Alice might have to store a backup of her work key

with the company's security officer; she doesn't want the company to have a copy of the key she signed her mortgage with. Just as Alice has multiple physical keys in her pocket, she is going to have multiple cryptographic keys.

Distributed Key Management

In some situations, this sort of centralized key management will not work. Perhaps there is no CA whom Alice and Bob both trust. Perhaps Alice and Bob trust only their friends. Perhaps Alice and Bob trust no one.

Distributed key management, used in PGP (see Section 24.12), solves this problem with **introducers**. Introducers are other users of the system who sign their friends' public keys. For example, when Bob generates his public key, he gives copies to his friends: Carol and Dave. They know Bob, so they each sign Bob's key and give Bob a copy of the signature. Now, when Bob presents his key to a stranger, Alice, he presents it with the signatures of these two introducers. If Alice also knows and trusts Carol, she has reason to believe that Bob's key is valid. If she knows and trusts Carol and Dave a little, she has reason to believe that Bob's key is valid. If she doesn't know either Carol or Dave, she has no reason to trust Bob's key.

Over time, Bob will collect many more introducers. If Alice and Bob travel in similar circles, the odds are good that Alice will know one of Bob's introducers. To prevent against Mallory's substituting one key for another, an introducer must be sure that Bob's key belongs to Bob before he signs it. Perhaps the introducer should require the key be given face-to-face or verified over the telephone.

The benefit of this mechanism is that there is no CA that everyone has to trust. The down side is that when Alice receives Bob's public key, she has no guarantee that she will know any of the introducers and therefore no guarantee that she will trust the validity of the key.

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Index

- A5, 389, 662–667
- Abadi, Martin, 66
- Absolute rate, of language, 234
- Accreditation, 103
- Active attacks, 27
- Active cheaters, 27
- Adams, Carlisle, 334
- Adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack, 6
- Addition chaining, 244
- Additive generators, 390–392
- Adjudicated protocol, 26, 71
- Adjudicator, 26
- Adleman, Leonard M., 163–164, 467
- Adler, Roy, 266
- Agnew, G. B., 423
- Algebraic structure, DES, 282–283
- Algorithm M, 393–394
- Algorithms, 2–4, 17
 - all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets, 543–546
 - Asmuth-Bloom, 529–530
 - Barrett's, 244
 - Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, 380, 404
 - block
 - chain mode, 206–207
 - choosing, 354–355
 - replay, 191–193
 - breaking, 8
 - CAST, 334–335
 - choosing, 214–216
 - cipher block chaining mode, 193–197, 208–210
 - cipher block chaining of plaintext difference mode, 208
 - cipher block chaining with checksum, 207–208
 - cipher-feedback mode, 200–202, 208–210
 - cipher mode
 - choosing, 208–210
 - summary, 209
 - classes, 217
 - coin flipping
 - using Blum integers, 543
 - using exponentiation modulo p , 542–543
 - using square roots, 541–542
 - complexity, 237–239
 - constant, 238
 - convertible undeniable signatures, 538–539
 - counter mode, 205–206, 209
 - cubic, 238
 - data compression, 226
 - designated confirmer signatures, 539–540
 - Diffie-Hellman, fair, 546–547
 - digital signatures, 39
 - exponential, 238
 - for export, 215–216
 - extended Euclidean, 246–248
 - factoring, 256
 - ISO/IEC 9979 registered, 607
 - Karnin-Greene-Hellman, 530
 - Khafre, 317–318
 - Khufu, 317
 - linear, 238
 - linear syndrome, 381
 - modes, DES, 277–278
 - multiple block
 - cascading, 367–368
 - combining, 368
 - multiple-key public-key cryptography, 527–528
 - oblivious transfer, 550
 - one-way accumulators, 543
 - output-feedback mode, 203–205, 208–210
 - output feedback with a non-linear function, 208
 - plaintext block chaining mode, 208
 - plaintext feedback mode, 208
 - polynomial, 238
 - polynomial-time, 238
 - probabilistic encryption, 552–554
 - propagating cipher block chaining mode, 207
 - public-key, 4–5, 33
 - quadratic, 238
 - quantum cryptography, 554–557
 - restricted, 3
 - running times, 238–239
 - secret-sharing algorithms, 528–531
 - secure multiparty computation, 551–552

- Algorithms (*Cont.*)
 security, 8-9
 self-synchronizing stream cipher, 198-199
 stream ciphers, 197-198
 subliminal-channel signature, 79
 superpolynomial, 238
 symmetric, 4
 synchronous stream cipher, 202-203
 TEA, 346
 types, 189
 unconditionally secure, 8
 undeniable digital signatures, 536-539
 using, 213-229
 vector scheme, 529
 zero-knowledge proofs, 548-550
See also Block ciphers, Stream ciphers
- All-or-nothing disclosure of secrets, 96, 543-546
 voting with a single central facility, 128-130
- Alternating stop-and-go generator, 383, 385, 410-411
- American National Standards Institute, DES approval, 267-268
- Anderson, Ross, 391
- ANDOS, *see* All-or-nothing disclosure of secrets
- Anonymous message broadcast, 137-139
- ANSI X3.105, 267
- ANSI X3.106, 267
- ANSI X9.8, 267
- ANSI X9.17, 268, 359
 key generation, 175
- ANSI X9.19, 267
- ANSI X9.26, 268
- Arbitrated protocol, 23-26
- Arbitration, timestamping, 75-76
- Arbitrator, 23
 document signing with, 35-37
 group signatures with, 84-85
- AR hash function, 453
- Arithmetic, modular, 242-245
- Arms Export Control Act, 610
- Asmuth-Bloom scheme, 529-530
- Association for Computing Machinery, 608
- Asymmetric algorithms, *see* Public-key algorithms
- Atomic Energy Act, 610
- Attack, 5
- AT&T Model 3600 Telephone Security Device, 594-595
- Authentication, 2, 52-56
 DASS, 62
 Denning-Sacco protocol, 63
 dictionary attacks, 52
 ISO framework, 574-577
 Kerberos, 60
 message, 56
 Needham-Schroeder protocol, 58-59
 Neuman-Stubblebine protocol, 60-62
 Otway-Rees protocol, 59-60
 protocols, formal analysis, 65-68
 salt, 52-53
 Schnorr, 511
 SESAME, 572
 SKEY, 53
 SKID, 55-56
 using interlock protocol, 54-55
 using one-way functions, 52
 using public-key cryptography, 53-54
 Wide-Mouth Frog protocol, 56-57
 Woo-Lam protocol, 63-64
 Yahalom, 57-58
- Authenticators, 568
- Avalanche effect, 273
- Backup keys, 181-182
- BAN logic, 66-67
- Barrett's algorithm, 244
- BaseKing, 346
- Basis, polarization measurement, 555
- Battista, Leon, 11
- BBS generator, 417
 add to spelled out, 553-554
- Beacons, 64
- Bellovin, Steve, 518, 520-521, 571
- Bennett, Charles, 555, 557
- Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, 380, 404
- Bernstein, Dan, 616
- Berson, Tom, 441
- Best affine approximation attack, 381
- Beth-Piper stop-and-go generator, 383-384
- Bias, 425
- Bidirectional message authentication codes, 457
- Biham, Eli, 284-285, 288, 296, 301, 303, 306, 308, 311-312, 314, 316, 319, 354, 361, 434
- Bilateral stop-and-go generator, 384-385
- Binary trees, 78
- Biotechnology, as cryptanalysis tool, 156-157
- Birthday attack, 165-166, 430
- Bit commitment, 86-88
 using one-way functions, 87-88
 using pseudo-random-sequence generators, 88
 using symmetric cryptography, 86-87
- Blakley, George, 72, 529
- Blaze, Matt, 346, 364
- Blinding factor, 112
- Blind signatures, 112-115, 549-550
 patents, 115
 voting with, 126-127
- Blobs, 88
- Block algorithms, 4
- Block chain mode, 206-207
- Block ciphers, 4, 189
 Blowfish, 336-339
 CA-1.1, 327-328
 cascading algorithms, 367-368
 CAST, 334-335
 CDMF key shortening, 366
 choosing algorithms, 354-355
 combining algorithms, 368
 counter mode, 205-206, 209
 Crab, 342-344
 CRYPTO-MECCANO, 346
 designing, 351
 design theory, 346-351
 Feistel networks, 347
 group structure, 348
 S-box, 349-351
 simple relations, 347-348
 strength against differential and linear cryptanalysis, 348-349
 weak keys, 348
 double encryption, 357-358
 double OFB/counter, 363-364
 doubling length, 363

- electronic codebook mode, 189-191, 208-210
- encryption speeds, 355
- FEAL, 308-312
- feedback, 193
- GOST, 331-334
- IDEA, 319-325
- iterated, 347
- Li-Wang algorithm, 346
- LOKI, 314-316
- Lucifer, 303-304
- Madryga, 304-306
- McEliece algorithm, 346
- MMB, 325-327
- multiple encryption, 357
- NewDES, 306-308
- Rao-Nam algorithm, 346
- RC2, 318-319
- RC5, 344-346
- REDOC II, 311-313
- REDOC III, 313
- SAFER K-64, 339-341
- security, based on one-way hash functions, 353-354
- Skipjack, 328-329
- versus stream ciphers, 210-211
- SXAL8/MBAL, 344
- triple encryption, 358-363
- 3-Way, 341-342
- using one-way hash functions, 351-354
- whitening, 366-367
- xDES¹, 365-366
- Block length, doubling, 363
- Block replay, 191-193
- Blocks, 4
- Blowfish, 336-339, 354, 647-654
- Blum, Manuel, 89, 105, 108
- Blum, Blum, and Shub generator, 417-418
- Blum integers, 253
 - coin flipping, 543
 - zero-knowledge proofs, 549
- Blum-Micali generator, 416-417
- Boolean functions, in S-boxes, 350
- Bosselaers, Antoon, 436, 441
- Boyar, Joan, 369
- Brassard, Gilles, 555, 557
- Broadcasting:
 - anonymous, 137-139
 - secret, 523-524
- Brute-force attack, 8, 151-152
 - software-based, 154-155
 - time and cost estimates, 152-154
- Bureau of Export Administration, 610-611
- Burrows, Michael, 66
- CA-1.1, 327-328
- Cade algorithm, 500-501
- Caesar Cipher, 11
- CAFE, 606-607
- CALC, 346
- Cantwell Bill, 615-616
- Capstone, 593-594
- Cascade generators, 405
- Cascades, Gollmann, 387-388
- Cascading:
 - multiple block algorithms, 367-368
 - multiple stream ciphers, 419-420
- Cash, digital, *see* Digital cash
- Cassells, Ian, 381
- CAST, 334-335
 - S-boxes, 349
- CBC, *see* Cipher block chaining mode
- CCEP, 269, 598-599
- CDMF, 366, 574
- Cellhash, 446
- Cellular automata, 500
- Cellular automaton generator, 414
- Certificates:
 - Privacy-Enhanced Mail, 579
 - public-key, 185-187
 - X.509, 574-575
- Certification authority, 186
- Certification path, 576
- Certified mail, digital, 122-123
- Chaining variables, 436
- Chambers, Bill, 385-386
- Characteristics, 286-288
- Chaum, David, 84, 115, 133, 137, 536, 549
- Cheater, 27
 - sharing secrets with, 531
- Chess Grandmaster Problem, 109
- Chinese Lottery, 156-157
- Chinese remainder theorem, 249-250, 470
- Chor-Rivest knapsack, 466
- Chosen-ciphertext attack, 6-7, 471-472
- Chosen-key attack, 7
- Chosen-plaintext attack, 6-7, 359
- Chosen-text attack, 7
- Cipher:
 - substitution, 10-12
 - transposition, 12
- Cipher block chaining mode, 193-197, 208-210
 - DES, 277-278
 - error extension, 196
 - error propagation, 195-196
 - initialization vector, 194
 - message authentication codes, 456
 - padding, 195
 - security, 196-197
 - self-recovering, 196
 - triple encryption, 360-361
- Cipher block chaining of plaintext difference mode, 208
- Cipher block chaining with checksum, 207-208
- Cipher-feedback mode, 200-202, 208-210
 - DES, 277
 - error propagation, 201-202
 - initialization vector, 201
- Cipher mode:
 - choosing, 208-210
 - summary, 208-210
- Ciphertext, 1-2
 - auto key, 198
 - hiding in ciphertext, 227-228
 - pairs, differential cryptanalysis, 285
 - stealing, 191
- Ciphertext-only attack, 5-6
- Cleartext, *see* Plaintext
- Clipper chip, 591-593
- Clipper key-escrow, 328
- Clipper phone, 594
- Clock-controlled generators, 381
- Clocking, 381
- CoCom, 610
- Code, 9
- Coefficients, solving for, 248
- Coin flipping, 89-92
 - fair, 541-543
 - into a well, 92
 - key generation, 92
 - using Blum integers, 543
 - using one-way functions, 90
 - using public-key cryptography, 90-91
 - using square roots, 541-542
- Collision, 166
- Collision-free, 30
- Collision-resistance, 429
- Combination generator, 381

- Combining function, 381
- Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program, 269, 598-599
- Commercial Data Masking Facility, 366, 574
- Common Cryptographic Architecture, 573-574
- Common modulus, dangers of, 493
- Common modulus attack, RSA, 472
- Communications:
 - using public-key cryptography, 31-34
 - using symmetric cryptography, 28-29
- Communications channels, encryption, 216-220
- Communications Setup, 517-518
- Complementation property, 281
- Complement keys, DES, 281-282
- Completely blind signatures, 112-113
- Complete set of residues, 242
- Complexity-theoretic approach, stream ciphers, 415-418
- Complexity theory, 237-242
 - algorithms, 237-239
 - complexity of problems, 239-241
- Compression, 226
- Compression function, 431
- Compression permutation, 273-274
- Compromise, 5
- Compromised keys, 182-183
- Computational complexity, 237
- Computationally secure, 8
- Computer algorithms, 17
- Computer clock, as random-sequence generator, 424
- Computer Security Act of 1987, 600-601
- Computing, with encrypted data, 85-86, 540-541
- COMSET, 517-518
- Conditional Access for Europe, 606-607
- Conference key distribution, 524
- Confusion, 237, 346-347
- Congruent, 242
- Connection integer, 403
 - feedback with carry shift registers, maximal-period, 406-407
- Continued fraction algorithm, 256
- Contract signing, simultaneous:
 - with an arbitrator, 118
 - without an arbitrator
 - face-to-face, 118-119
 - not face-to-face, 119-120
 - using cryptography, 120-122
- Control Vector, 180
- Convertible undeniable signatures, 538-539
- Coppersmith, Don, 94, 266, 280, 283, 293, 398, 457
- Coppersmith's algorithm, 263
- Correlation attack, 380
- Correlation immunity, stream ciphers, 380
- Correlations, random-sequence generators, 425
- Counter mode, 205-206, 209
- Counting coincidences, 14
- Crab, 342-344
- Credit cards, anonymous, 147
- Crepeau, Claude, 555
- Crypt{1}, 414
- CRYPT{3}, 296
- Cryptanalysis, 1, 5-8
 - differential, *see* Differential cryptanalysis
 - FEAL, 311-312
 - GOST, 333-334
 - IDEA, 323
 - linear, 290-293
 - LOKI91, 316
 - Madryga, 306
 - N-Hash, 434-435
 - related-key, 290
 - Snefru, 432
 - types, 5-7
- Cryptanalysts, 1
- Crypt Breakers Workbench, 414
- Cryptographers, 1
- Cryptographic algorithm, *see* Cipher
- Cryptographically secure pseudo-random, 45
- Cryptographic facility, 562
- Cryptographic mode, 189
- Cryptographic protection, databases, 73-74
- Cryptographic protocol, 22
- Cryptography, 1
- CRYPTO-LEGGO, 414
- Cryptologists, 1
- Cryptology, 1
- CRYPTO-MECCANO, 346
- Cryptosystems, 4
 - fair, 97
 - finite automaton public-key, 482
 - hybrid, 32-34
 - security, 234-235
 - weak, 97
- Cusick, Thomas, 312
- Cut and choose, 103
- Cyberpunks, 609
- Daemen, Joan, 325, 341, 349, 414
- Damgard, Ivan, 446
- Damm, Arvid Gerhard, 13
- Data, encrypted:
 - computing with, 85-86, 540-541
 - discrete logarithm problem, 540-541
 - for storage, 220-222
- Databases, cryptographic protection, 73-74
- Data complexity, 9
- Data Encryption Algorithm, *see* Data Encryption Standard
- Data Encryption Standard, 17, 265-301
 - adoption, 267-268
 - algorithm, brute-force attack
 - efficiency, 152-153
 - characteristics, 286-288
 - commercial chips, 279
 - compared to GOST, 333-334
 - compression permutation, 273-274
 - CRYPT{3}, 296
 - decryption, 277
 - description, 270
 - DESX, 295
 - development, 265-267
 - differential cryptanalysis, 284-290
 - DES variants, 298
 - expansion permutation, 273-275
 - final permutation, 277
 - generalized, 296-297
 - hardware and software implementation, 278-279
 - with independent subkeys, 295
 - initial permutation, 271
 - iterated block cipher, 347
 - key transformation, 272-273
 - linear cryptanalysis, 290-293
 - modes, 277-278

- multiple, 294–295
- 1987 review, 268–269
- 1993 review, 269–270
- outline of algorithm, 270–272
- P-boxes
 - design criteria, 294
 - permutation, 275, 277
- RDES, 297–298
- related-key cryptanalysis, 290
- RIPE-MAC, 457–458
- S-boxes, 349
 - alternate, 296–298
 - design criteria, 294
 - key-dependent, 298, 300, 354
 - substitution, 274–276
- security, 278, 280–285
 - algebraic structure, 282–283
 - complement keys, 281–282
 - current, 300–301
 - key length, 283–284
 - number of rounds, 284
 - possibly weak keys, 281–282
 - S-box design, 284–285
 - semiweak keys, 280–281
 - weak keys, 280–281
- s^w DES, 298–299
- source code, 623–632
- speeds on microprocessors and computers, 279
- validation and certification of equipment, 268
- Data Exchange Key, 581
- Data Keys, 176
- Davies, Donald, 562
- Davies-Meyer, 448
 - abreast, 452
 - modified, 449–450
 - parallel, 451
 - tandem, 451–452
- Davies-Price, 358
- Decoherence, 165
- Decryption, 1
 - DES, 277
 - key, 3
 - key-error detection, 179
 - knapsack algorithms, 465
 - with a public key, 39
 - with symmetric algorithm, 4
- den Boer, Bert, 434, 436, 441
- Denning-Sacco protocol, 63
- Dense, 378
- Dereferencing keys, 221–222
- Derived sequence attack, 381
- Designated confirmer signatures, 82–83, 539–540
- Destruction:
 - information, 228–229
 - of keys, 184–185
- DESX, 295
- Dictionary attack, 52, 171–173
- Differential cryptanalysis, 284–290
 - attacks against
 - DES, 288–290
 - DES variants, 298
 - Lucifer, 303
 - extending to higher-order differentials, 293
 - strength against, block cipher design theory, 348–349
- Differential-linear cryptanalysis, 293
- Diffie, Whitfield, 31, 37, 122, 216, 283, 419, 461, 501, 565
- Diffie-Hellman:
 - EKE implementation, 519–520
 - extended, 515
 - failsafe, 547–548
 - fair, 546–547
 - Hughes variant, 515
 - key exchange without exchanging keys, 515
 - patents, 516
 - with three or more parties, 514
- Diffie's randomized stream cipher, 419
- Diffusion, 237, 346–347
- Digital card, properties, 146
- Digital cash, 139–147
 - anonymous, 139
 - credit cards, 147
 - money orders, 140
- double spending problem, 140–141
- off-line systems, 146
- on-line systems, 145–146
- other protocols, 145–147
- perfect crime, 145
- practical, 145
- secret splitting, 142–145
- Digital certified mail, 122–123
- Digital Notary System, 78
- Digital Signature Algorithm, 17, 483–494
 - attacks against k , 492
 - computation time comparison with RSA, 489
 - criticisms, 484–486
 - dangers of common modulus, 493
 - description, 486–488
 - ElGamal encryption with, 490–491
 - patents, 493–494
 - prime generation, 488–490
 - proposal for NIST standard, 483–486
 - RSA encryption with, 491
 - security, 491–492
 - speed precomputations, 487–488
 - subliminal channel, 493, 534–536
 - foiling, 536
 - variants, 494–495
- Digital signatures, 34–41
 - algorithms, 39
 - applications, 41
 - blind, 112–115, 549–550
 - convertible undeniable signatures, 538–539
 - converting identification schemes to, 512
 - definition, 39
 - designated confirmer signatures, 82–83, 539–540
 - ElGamal, 476–478
 - with encryption, 41–44
 - entrusted undeniable, 82
 - fail-stop, 85
 - Fiat-Shamir signature scheme, 507–508
 - group signatures, 84–85
 - Guillou-Quisquater signature scheme, 509–510
 - improved arbitrated solution, 76
 - key exchange with, 50
 - multiple, 39–40
 - Guillou-Quisquater, 510
 - nonrepudiation, 40
 - oblivious, 117
 - protocol, 40
 - proxy, 83
 - public-key algorithms, 483–502
 - Cade algorithm, 500–501
 - cellular automata, 500
 - Digital Signature Algorithm, *see* Digital Signature Algorithm
 - discrete logarithm signature schemes, 496–498
 - ESIGN, 499–500
 - GOST digital signature algorithm, 495–496

- Digital signatures (*Cont.*)
 - public-key algorithms (*Cont.*)
 - Matsumoto-Imai algorithm, 500
 - Ong-Schnorr-Shamir, 498-499
 - public-key cryptography, 37-38
 - attacks against, 43-44
 - one-way hash functions and, 38-39
 - resend attack, foiling, 43
 - RSA, 473-474
 - Schnorr signature scheme, 511-512
 - subliminal-free, 80
 - with symmetric cryptosystems and arbitrator, 35-37
 - terminology, 39
 - timestamps, 38
 - trees, 37
 - undeniable, 81-82, 536-539
- Dining Cryptographers Problem, 137
- Discrete logarithm, 245
 - in finite field, 261-263
 - zero-knowledge proofs, 548
- Discrete Logarithm Problem, 501, 540-541
- Discrete logarithm signature schemes, 496-498
- Distributed Authentication Security Service, 62
- Distributed convertible undeniable signatures, 539
- Distributed key management, 187
- DNA computing, 163-164
- DNRSG, 387
- DoD key generation, 175
- Double encryption, 357-358
- Double OFB/counter, 363-364
- Double spending problem, 140-141
- Driver-level encryption, 222-223
- DSA, *see* Digital Signature Algorithm
- Dynamic random-sequence generator, 387
- E-box, 273
- ECB, *see* Electronic codebook mode
- Electronic checks, 146
- Electronic codebook mode, 189-191, 208-210
 - combined with OFB, 364
- DES, 277-278
 - padding, 190-191
 - triple encryption, 362-363
- Electronic coins, 146
- Electronic Frontier Foundation, 608
- Electronic-funds transfer, DES adoption, 268
- Electronic Privacy Information Center, 608
- ElGamal, 532-533
 - EKE implementation, 519
 - encryption, 478
 - with DSA, 490-491
 - patents, 479
 - signatures, 476-478
 - speed, 478-479
- ElGamal, Taher, 263
- Elliptic curve cryptosystems, 480-481
- Elliptic curve method, 256
- Ellison, Carl, 362
- Encoding, 226
- Encrypt-decrypt-encrypt mode, 359
- Encrypted Key Exchange:
 - applications, 521-522
 - augmented, 520-521
 - basic protocol, 518-519
 - implementation with
 - Diffie-Hellman, 519-520
 - ElGamal, 519
 - RSA, 519
 - strengthening, 520
- Encryption, 1
 - communication channels, 216-220
 - combining link-by-link and end-to-end, 219-221
 - with compression and error control, 226
 - data, for storage, 220-222
 - detection, 226-227
 - digital signatures with, 41-44
 - driver-level versus file-level, 222-223
 - ElGamal, 478
 - with DSA, 490-491
 - end-to-end, 217-220
 - with interleaving, 210-211
 - key, 3
 - knapsack algorithms, 464
 - link-by-link, 216-218
 - multiple, 357
 - with a private key, 39
 - probabilistic, 552-554
 - RSA, 468
 - with DSA, 491
 - with symmetric algorithm, 4
 - using public key, 5
- End-to-end encryption, 217-220
 - combined with link-by-link, 219-221
- Enigma, 13, 414
- Entropy, 233-234
- Entrusted undeniable signature, 82
- Error detection:
 - during decryption, 179
 - during transmission, 178
- Error extension, cipher block chaining mode, 196
- Error propagation:
 - cipher block chaining mode, 195-196
 - cipher-feedback mode, 201-202
 - output-feedback mode, 204
- Escrow agencies, 592
- Escrowed Encryption Standard, 97, 593
- ESIGN, 499-500, 533-534
- Euclid's algorithm, 245
- Euler totient function, 248-249
- Expansion permutation, 273-275, 315
- Export:
 - of algorithms, 215-216, 610-616
 - foreign, 617
- Exportable Protection Device, 389
- Export Administration Act, 610
- EXPTIME, 241
- Extended Euclidean algorithm, 246-248
- Factoring, 255-258
 - general number field sieve, 159-160
 - long-range predictions, 162
 - public-key encryption algorithms, 158-159
 - special number field sieve, 160-161
 - using quadratic sieve, 159
- Factoring Problem, 501
- Failsafe:
 - Diffie-Hellman, 547-548
 - key escrowing, 98
- Fail-stop digital signatures, 85
- Fair cryptosystems, 97
- Fait-Shamir, 508
- FAPKCO, 482
- FAPKC1, 482
- FAPKC2, 482

- FEAL, 308–312
 cryptanalysis, 311–312
 description, 308–10
 patents, 311
- Feedback:
 cipher block chaining mode,
 193, 195
 internal, output-feedback
 mode, 203
- Feedback function, 373
- Feedback shift register, 373
- Feedback with carry shift regis-
 ters, 402–404
 combining generators, 405,
 410
 maximal-length, tap
 sequences, 408–409
 maximal-period, connection
 integers, 406–407
- Feedforward, cipher block
 chaining mode, 195
- Feige, Uriel, 503–504
- Feige-Fiat-Shamir, 503–508
 enhancements, 506–507
 identification scheme,
 504–505
 simplified, 503–504
- Feistel, Horst, 266, 303
- Feistel network, 347
 Blowfish, 337
 practically secure, 349
- Fermat's little theorem, 248
 Euler's generalization, 248
- FFT-Hash, 446
- Fiat, Amos, 503–504
- Fiat-Shamir signature scheme,
 507–508
- Fibonacci configuration, 373,
 379
- Fibonacci shrinking generator,
 391
- File-level encryption, 222–223
- Filter generator, 381
- Finite field, 254
 discrete logarithms, 261–263
- FIPS PUB 46, 267
- FIPS PUB 74, 267
- FIPS PUB 81, 267
- FIPS PUB 112, 267
- Fish, 391
- Fixed bit index, 543
- Flat keyspace, 176
- Flipping coins, *see* Coin flipping
- Fortified key negotiation, 522
- Galois configuration, linear
 feedback shift registers,
 378–379
- Galois field, computing in,
 254–255
- Garey, Michael, 241
- Gatekeeper, 278
- Geffe generator, 382–383
- General number field sieve,
 159–160, 256
- General Services Administra-
 tion, DES adoption, 268
- Generators, 253–254
- Gifford, 392–393
- Gifford, David, 392
- Gill, J., 501
- Global deduction, 8
- Goldwasser, Shafi, 94, 552
- Gollmann, Dieter, 386
- Gollmann cascade, 387–388
- Goodman-McAuley cryptosys-
 tem, 466
- Goresky, Mark, 404
- GOST, 331–334, 354
 source code, 643–647
- GOST digital signature algo-
 rithm, 495–496
- GOST hash function, 454
- GOST R 34.10–94, 495
- Gosudarstvennyi Standard
 Soyuzs SSR, 331–334
- Graham-Shamir knapsacks, 465
- Graph isomorphism, 104–105
- Greatest common divisor,
 245–246
- Grossman, Edna, 266
- Group signatures, 84–85
- Group Special Mobile, 389
- Group structure, block ciphers
 design theory, 348
- GSM, 389
- Guillou, Louis, 102, 508
- Guillou-Quisquater:
 identification scheme,
 508–510
 signature scheme, 509–510
- Gutmann, Peter, 353
- Guy, Richard, 159
- Haber, Stuart, 75, 485, 488
- Hamiltonian cycles, 105–106
- Hard drive, encrypted, provid-
 ing random access to,
 222
- Hardware:
 DES implementation,
 278–279
 encryption, 223–225
 RSA, 469
- Hash functions, *see* One-way
 hash functions
- Hash value, 30
- HAVAL, 445–446
- Hellman, Martin, 31–32, 37,
 262, 283, 293, 358–359,
 461–462
- Hiding information from an
 oracle, 86
- Historical terms, 9
- Homophonic substitution
 cipher, 10–11
- Hughes, 515
- Hughes, Eric, 609
- Hughes XPD/KPD, 389–390
- Hybrid cryptosystems, 32–34,
 461
- IBC-Hash, 458
- IBM Common Cryptographic
 Architecture, 573–574
- IBM secret-key management
 protocol, 561–562
- IDEA, 319–325, 354
 cryptanalysis, 323
 description, 320–322
 modes of operation, 323–
 325
 overview, 320–321
 patents, 325
 S-boxes, 349
 source code, 637–643
 speed, 322–323
 strength against differential
 cryptanalysis, 348
 variants, 325
- Ideal secrecy, 236
- Identification schemes:
 converting to signature
 schemes, 512
 Feige-Fiat-Shamir, 503–508
 Guillou-Quisquater, 508–
 510
 Ohta-Okamoto, 508
 Schnorr authentication and
 signature scheme,
 510–512
- Identity-based cryptosystems,
 115
- Ignition key, 564
- Import, foreign, 617
- Index of coincidence, 14
- Information:
 amount, information theory
 definition, 233
 deduction, 8
 destruction, 228–229
- Information-theoretic approach,
 418
 stream ciphers, 415

- Information theory, 233-237
 cryptosystem security, 234-235
 entropy and uncertainty, 233-234
 in practice, 236-237
 rate of the language, 234
 unicity distance, 235-236
- Ingemarsson, Ingemar, 418
- Initialization vector:
 cipher block chaining mode, 194
 cipher-feedback mode, 201
 output-feedback mode, 204
- Inner-CBC, 360, 363
- Insertion attack, synchronous stream ciphers, 203
- Instance deduction, 8
- Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 608
- Integrated Services Digital Network, 563-565
- Integrity, 2
- Interactive protocol, 103
- Interchange Key, 581
- Interleave, 210-211
- Interlock protocol, mutual authentication using, 54-55
- Internal feedback, 203
- International Association for Cryptologic Research, 605
- International Standards Organization:
 authentication framework, 574-577
 DES adoption, 268
- International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 610-614
- Internet, Privacy-Enhanced Mail, 577-584
- Introducers, 187
- Inverses modulo a number, 246-248
- IPES, 319
- ISDN, 563-565
- ISO 8732, 359
- ISO 9796, 472, 474, 486
- ISO/IEC 9979, 607
- ISO X.509 protocols, 574-577
- Iterated block cipher, 347
- Jacobi symbol, 252-253
- J-algebras, 501
- Jam, 414
- Jennings generator, 383-384
- Johnson, David, 241
- Jueneman's methods, 457
- Kaliski, Burt, 342
- Karn, 351-352
- Karn, Phil, 351
- Karnin-Greene-Hellman, 530
- Kerberos, 60, 566-571
 abbreviations, 567
 authentication steps, 567
 credentials, 568
 getting initial ticket, 569
 getting server tickets, 569-570
 licenses, 571
 model, 566
 requesting services, 570
 security, 571
 Version 4, 570-571
 Version 5 messages, 568
- Kerckhoffs, A., 5
- Kerckhoffs's assumption, 7
- Key, 3
 backup, 181-182
 CDMF shortening, 366
 complement, DES, 281-282
 compromised, 182-183
 controlling usage, 180
 dereferencing, 221-222
 destroying, 184-185
 distribution in large networks, 177
 generating, 170-175
 ANSI X9.17 standard, 175
 DoD, 175
 pass phrases, 174-175
 poor choices, 171-173
 random keys, 173-174
 reduced keyspaces, 170-171
- ISDN, 563-564
 lifetime, 183-184
 possibly weak, DES, 281-282
 semiweak, DES, 280-281
 session, 33, 180
 storing, 180-181
 transferring, 176-177
 transmission, error detection, 178
 updating, 180
 using, 179-180
 verification, 178-179
 weak
 block ciphers design theory, 348
 DES, 280-281
- Key and message broadcast, 51-52
- Key and message transmission, 51
- Key Auto-Key, 202
- Keyboard latency, as random-sequence generator, 424-425
- Key Certification Authority, 43
- Key control vectors, 562
- Key distribution:
 anonymous, 94-95
 conference, 524
- Key Distribution Center, 43-44
- Key-Encryption Keys, 176, 184
- Key escrow, 97-100, 181-182, 591
 politics, 98-100
- Key exchange, 47-52
 DASS, 62
 Denning-Sacco protocol, 63
 with digital signatures, 50
 interlock protocol, 49-50
 Kerberos, 60
 key and message broadcast, 51-52
 key and message transmission, 51
 man-in-the-middle attack, 48-49
 Needham-Schroeder protocol, 58-59
 Neuman-Stubblebine protocol, 60-62
 Otway-Rees protocol, 59-60
 protocols, formal analysis, 65-68
 with public-key cryptography, 48
 with symmetric cryptography, 47-48
- Wide-Mouth Frog protocol, 56-57
 without exchanging keys, 515
- Woo-Lam protocol, 63-64
- Yahalom, 57-58
- Key-exchange algorithms:
 COMSET, 517-518
 conference key distribution and secret broadcasting, 523-525
 Diffie-Hellman, 513-516
 Encrypted Key Exchange, 518-522
 fortified key negotiation, 522
 Shamir's three-pass protocol, 516-517
 station-to-station protocol, 516

- Tatebayashi-Matsuzaki-Newman, 524-525
- Key generation, using coin flipping, 92
- Key length:
- comparing symmetric and public-key, 165-166
 - deciding on, 166-167
 - DES, 283-284
 - public-key, 158-165
 - DNA computing, 163-164
 - quantum computing, 164-165
 - recommended lengths, 161-163
 - symmetric, 151-158
 - biotechnology as cryptanalysis tool, 156-157
 - brute-force attack, 151-154
 - Chinese Lottery, 156-157
 - neural networks, 155
 - software-based brute-force attacks, 154-155
 - thermodynamic limitations on brute-force attacks, 157-158
 - using viruses to spread cracking program, 155-156
- Key management, 169-187
- distributed, 187
 - public-key, 185-187
- Key negotiation, fortified, 522
- Key notarization, 562
- Key revocation certificate, 585
- Keyspace, 3
- flat, 176
 - nonlinear, 175-176
 - reduced, 170-171
- Keystream generator, 197-198
- counter mode, 206
 - periodic, 202
- Khafre, 317-318, 349
- Khufu, 317, 349
- Kilian, Joe, 116
- Kim, Kwangjo, 298, 350
- Kinetic Protection Device, 389-390
- Klapper, Andy, 404
- Klein, Daniel, 53, 171
- Knapsack algorithms, 462-466
- decryption, 465
 - encryption, 464
 - implementations, 465
 - patents, 466
 - public key created from private key, 464
 - security, 465
 - superincreasing, 463-464
 - variants, 465-466
- Knapsack problem, 501
- Known-plaintext attack, 6-7, 151, 359
- Knudsen, Lars, 8, 293, 314, 316, 348-349
- Knuth, 393, 501
- Koblitz, Neal, 480
- Konheim, Alan, 266, 280
- Kravitz, David, 493
- Kravitz-Reed, 481
- KryptoKnight, 571-572
- Lagged Fibonacci generators, 390
- LaGrange interpolating polynomial scheme, 528-529
- Lai, Xuejia, 319, 449
- Langford, Susan, 293
- Law Enforcement Access Field, 591
- Legal issues, 618
- Legendre symbol, 251
- Lehmann, 259
- Lehmann algorithm, 259
- Length, shift register, 373
- Lenstra, Arjen, 159, 162, 257, 485, 488
- LFSR/FCSR summation/parity cascade, 410-411
- Lidl, Rudolph, 481
- Linear complexity:
- profile, 380
 - stream ciphers, 380
- Linear congruential generators, 369-372
- combining, 371-372
 - constants, 370
- Linear consistency test, 381
- Linear cryptanalysis:
- DES, 290-293
 - strength against, block cipher design theory, 348-349
- Linear error-correcting codes, algorithms based on, 480
- Linear feedback shift registers, 372-379
- Galois, 378-379
 - primitive polynomials mod 2, 376-377
 - software, 378-379
 - stream ciphers using, *see* Stream ciphers
- Linear syndrome algorithm, 381
- Link-by-link encryption, 216-218
- combined with end-to-end, 219-221
- Linking protocol, timestamping, 76-77
- Li-Wang algorithm, 346
- Local deduction, 8
- Lock-in, 388
- Logarithms, discrete, *see* Discrete logarithm
- LOKI, 314-316
- S-boxes, 349
 - source code, 632-637
- LOKI Double-Block, 451
- Low decryption exponent attack, RSA, 473
- Low encryption exponent attack, RSA, 472-473
- Luby, Michael, 352
- Luby-Rackoff, 352-353
- xDES¹, 365
- LUC, 481
- Lucas number, 481
- Luccio-Mazzone, 501
- Lucifer, 266, 303-304
- Lu-Lee cryptosystem, 466
- Lyndon words, 501
- MacGuffin, 346
- Madryga, W. E., 304
- Mafia Fraud, 110
- Magic numbers, 423
- Manasse, Mark, 159, 257
- Man-in-the-middle attack, 48-49
- Masks, REDOC II, 312
- Massey, James, 319, 339, 386, 418, 449
- Master Key, 561
- Master Terminal Key, 561
- Matsui, Mitsuru, 290-291
- Matsumoto-Imai algorithm, 500
- Mauborgne, Joseph, 15
- Maurer, Ueli, 419
- Maurer's randomized stream cipher, 419
- Maximal period generator, 369
- MBAL, 344
- McEliece, Robert, 479
- McEliece algorithm, 346, 479-480
- MD2, 441
- MD3, 446
- MD4, 435-436
- MD5, 436-441
- MDC, 353-354

- MDC-2, 452–453
 MDC-4, 452–454
 MD-strengthening, 431
 Meet-in-the-middle attack, 358, 381
 Mental poker, 92–95
 Merkle, Ralph, 34, 316–318, 358–359, 432, 455, 461–462
 Merkle's puzzles, 34
 Merritt, Michael, 67, 518, 520–521, 571
 Message:
 authentication, 56
 broadcasting, 69
 Privacy-Enhanced Mail, 579–582
 recovery, 497–498
 resending as receipt, 42–43
 Message authentication codes, 31, 455–459
 bidirectional, 457
 CBC-MAC, 456
 IBC-Hash, 458
 Jueneman's methods, 457
 message authenticator algorithm, 456–457
 one-way hash functions as, 458–459
 RIPE-MAC, 457–458
 stream ciphers, 459
 Message authenticator algorithm, 456–457
 Message broadcast, anonymous, 137–139
 Message Digest, 435–436
 Message Digest Cipher, 353
 Message Integrity Check, 578
 Message-meaning rule, 66
 Message Security Protocol, 584
 Meyer, Carl, 266, 278
 Meyer, Joseph A., 614
 Meyer-Schilling, 452
 Micali, Silvio, 94, 508, 546–547, 552
 Miller, Gary, 259
 Miller, V. S., 480
 Mimic functions, 10
 Minimum-disclosure proofs, 108
 MITRENET, 562–563
 Miyaguchi, Shoji, 308
 MMB, 325–327
 $m \cdot n$ -bit S box, 349
 Modular arithmetic, 242–245
 Modular Multiplication-based Block cipher, 325–327
 Modular reduction, 242
 Modulo, inverses, 246–248
 Monoalphabetic cipher, 10
 Montgomery's method, 244
 Moore's Law, 153
 m -sequence, 374
 MSP, 584
 Muller, Winfried, 481
 Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols, 137
 Multiple-bit generator, 421
 Multiple encryption, 357
 quintuple, 366
 Multiple Identity Fraud, 111
 Multiple-key public-key cryptography, 527–528
 Multiple signatures, 39–40
 Multiplier, 369
 Multispeed inner-product generator, 386–387
 Mush, 392
 Mutual shrinking generator, 392
 MYK-80, 593–594
 Mykotronx Clipper chip, 328
 MYK-78T, 591–593

 Nanoteg, 390
 National Bureau of Standards, *see* National Institute of Standards and Technology
 National Computer Security Center, 599–600
 National Institute of Standards and Technology, 600–603
 DES development, 265–267
 Memorandum of Understanding, 601–603
 National Security Agency, 597–599
 DES development, 266–267
 export of cryptography, 614–615
 Memorandum of Understanding, 601–603
 S-box development role, 278, 280
 Navy Research Laboratory, protocol analyzer, 67–68
 Needham, Roger, 58, 66, 216
 Needham-Schroeder protocol, 58–59
 Networks, large, key distribution, 177
 Neuman-Stubblebine protocol, 60–62
 Neural networks, breaking algorithms, 155
 NewDES, 306–308

 N-Hash, 433–435
 Niederreiter, Harald, 501
 Niederreiter algorithm, 480
 Niemi cryptosystem, 466
 Nobauer, Wilfried, 481
 Noise, random, using as random-sequence generator, 423–424
 Nonce-verification rule, 66
 Non-Interactive Key Sharing systems, 115
 Nonlinear-feedback shift registers, 412–413
 Nonlinear keyspace, 175–176
 Nonrepudiation, 2
 Notz, Bill, 266
 NP-complete problem, 240–242
 graph isomorphism, 104
 knapsack algorithms, 462
 McEliece algorithm, 479
 solving, 163–164
 NRL Protocol Analyzer, 67–68
 NSDD-145, 268
 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 610
 Number field sieve, 256
 Numbers:
 2-adic, 404
 large, 17–18
 Number theory, 242–255
 Barrett's algorithm, 244
 Blum integers, 253
 Chinese remainder theorem, 249–250
 Euclid's algorithm, 245
 Euler totient function, 248–249
 extended Euclidean algorithm, 246–248
 Fermat's little theorem, 248
 Galois field, computing in, 254–255
 generators, 253–254
 greatest common divisor, 245–246
 inverses modulo a number, 246–248
 Jacobi symbol, 252–253
 Legendre symbol, 251
 modular arithmetic, 242–245
 Montgomery's method, 244
 prime numbers, 245
 quadratic residues, 250–251
 solving for coefficients, 248
 Nyberg, Kaisa, 348

 Oblivious transfer, 116–117, 550

 Oblivious si
 OFB, *see* Ou
 Ohta, Kazu
 Ohta-Okam
 scher
 Okamoto, T
 1/p generat
 One-time p
 hiding ci
 text,
 One-time t
 One-way ac
 543
 One-way fu
 authent
 bit comm
 coin flip
 trap-door
 One-way h
 351–
 backgrou
 birthday
 430
 choosing
 cipher se
 compres
 encryptio
 HAVAL,
 improve
 76
 Karn, 35
 length, 4
 Luby-Ra
 MD2, 44
 MD3, 44
 MD4, 43
 MD5, 43
 MD-stre
 message
 codi
 Message
 353
 multipl
 N-Hash,
 RIPE-M
 Secure I
 442
 signing
 38–
 Snefru,
 as unbi
 ato
 using p
 455
 using s
 ritl
 AR h
 GOS'

- Oblivious signatures, 117
- OFB, *see* Output-feedback mode
- Ohta, Kazuo, 146, 501
- Ohta-Okamoto identification scheme, 508
- Okamoto, Tatsuaki, 146, 501
- 1/p generator, 414
- One-time pad, 15–17
 - hiding ciphertext in ciphertext, 227–228
- One-time tape, 418
- One-way accumulators, 95–96, 543
- One-way function, 29–30
 - authentication using, 52
 - bit commitment using, 87–88
 - coin flipping using, 90
 - trap-door, 158
- One-way hash functions, 30–31, 351–354
 - background, 429–431
 - birthday attacks, 165–166, 430
 - choosing, 455
 - cipher security, 353–354
 - compression function, 431
 - encryption speeds, 456
 - HAVAL, 445–446
 - improved arbitrated solution, 76
 - Karn, 351–352
 - length, 430–431
 - Luby-Rackoff, 352–353
 - MD2, 441
 - MD3, 446
 - MD4, 435–436
 - MD5, 436–441
 - MD-strengthening, 431
 - message authentication codes, 455–459
 - Message Digest Cipher, 353–354
 - multiple signatures, 40
 - N-Hash, 433–435
 - RIPE-MD, 445
 - Secure Hash Algorithm, 442–445
 - signing documents with, 38–39
 - Snefru, 432
 - as unbiased random-bit generator, 107
 - using public-key algorithms, 455
 - using symmetric block algorithms, 446–455
 - AR hash function, 453
 - GOST hash function, 454
 - hash length equals block size, 447–449
 - LOKI Double-Block, 451
 - MDC-2 and MDC-4, 452–454
 - modified Davies-Meyer, 449–450
 - parallel Davies-Meyer, 451
 - Preneel-Bosselaers-Govaerts-Vandewalle, 450
 - Quisquater-Girault, 450
 - tandem and abreast Davies-Meyer, 451–452
- Ong-Schnorr-Shamir, 498–499, 531–532
- Orange Book, 599–600
- Otway-Rees protocol, 59–60
- Outerbridge, Richard, 363
- Outer-CBC, 360
- Output-feedback mode, 203–205, 208–210
 - combined with ECB, 364
 - DES, 277
 - with a nonlinear function, 208
- Overtake, 598
- Overwriting, 229
- Padding:
 - cipher block chaining mode, 195
 - electronic codebook mode, 190–191
 - MD5, 436
 - Secure Hash Algorithm, 442
 - triple encryption with, 362
- Painvin, Georges, 12
- Pass phrases, 174–175
- Passive attack, 27
- Passive cheaters, 27
- Patents, 609–610; *See also* specific algorithms
- P-boxes:
 - design criteria, 294
 - permutation, 275, 277, 316
- PEM, *see* Privacy-Enhanced Mail
- Perfect secrecy, 235
- Period, 11
 - shift register, 373
- Permutation, 237
 - key, DES, 272–273
- PES, 319, 324
- Pike, 391–392
- PKZIP, 394–395
- Plaintext, 1–2
- Plaintext block chaining mode, 208
- Plaintext feedback mode, 208
- Plaintext pair, right and wrong pairs, 287
- Pless generator, 413–414
- p-NEW scheme, 498
- Pohlig, Stephen, 262
- Pohlig-Hellman encryption scheme, 474
- Polarized photons, 555
- Pollard's Monte Carlo algorithm, 256
- Polyalphabetic substitution cipher, 10–11
- Polygram substitution cipher, 10–11
- Polynomials:
 - degree, shift register length, 374
 - dense, 378
 - irreducible, 255, 481
 - sparse, 378
- Pomerance, Carl, 257
- Powerline System, 466
- Pre-image, 30
- Preneel, Bart, 457
- Preneel-Bosselaers-Govaerts-Vandewalle, 450
- Pretty Good Privacy, 584–587
- Price, William, 562
- Prime numbers, 245
 - generation, 258–261
 - DSA, 488–490
 - practical considerations, 260–260
 - relatively prime, 245
 - strong, 261
- Primitive, 253
- Principal square root, 251
- Privacy-Enhanced Mail, 577–584
 - certificates, 579
 - documents, 578
 - messages, 579–582
 - RIPEM, 583–584
 - security, 582–583
 - TIS/PEM, 583
- Private key, 5
 - creating public key from, 464
 - for public-key cryptography, lifetime, 184
- Probabilistic encryption, 552–554
- Problems:
 - complexity, 239–241
 - EXPTIME, 241
 - hard, 239
 - intractable, 239
 - PSPACE, 241

- Problems (*Cont.*)
 tractable, 239
 undecidable, 240
See also NP-complete problem
- Processing complexity, 9
- Product cipher, 347
- Proofs of Membership, 111
- Propagating cipher block chaining mode, 207
- Proposed Encryption Standard, 319
- Protocols, 21, 47
 adjudicated, 26, 70-71
 all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets, 96
 analysis, approaches, 65-66
 anonymous message broadcast, 137-139
 arbitrated, 23-26
 attacks against, 27
 authentication, 576-577
 authentication and key-exchange, formal analysis, 65-68
 BAN logic, 66-67
 basic zero-knowledge, 102-104
 bit commitment, 86-88
 blind signatures, 112-115
 characteristics, 21
 cryptographic, 22
 DASS, 62
 definition, 21
 Denning-Sacco, 63
 digital cash, *see* Digital cash
 digital certified mail, 122-123
 digital signatures, 40
 distributed, timestamping, 77-78
 fair coin flips, 89-92
 IBM Common Cryptographic Architecture, 573-574
 IBM secret-key management, 561-562
 identity-based public-key cryptography, 115
 interactive, 103
 interlock, 49-50, 54-55
 Kerberos, 60, 566-571
 key escrow, 97-100
 key exchange, 47-52
 KryptoKnight, 571-572
 lessons, 64-65
 mental poker, 92-95
 multiparty unconditionally secure, 137
 Needham-Schroeder, 58
- Neuman-Stubblebine, 60-62
 oblivious signatures, 117
 oblivious transfer, 116-117
 one-way accumulators, 95-96
 Otway-Rees, 59-60
 purpose, 22-23
 secret splitting, 70-71
 secure circuit evaluation, 137
 secure elections, *see* Secure elections
 secure multiparty computation, 134-137
 self-enforcing, 26-27
 SESAME, 572
 simultaneous contract signing, 118-122
 simultaneous exchange of secrets, 123-124
 subliminal channel, 79-80
 timestamping, 75-79
 types, 24
 Wide-Mouth Frog, 56-57
 Woo-Lam, 63-64
 Yahalom, 57-58
See also Authentication; Zero-knowledge proofs
- Pseudo-Hadamard Transform, 340
- Pseudo-random function family, SEAL, 398-399
- Pseudo-random-number generator, 78, 416
- Pseudo-random sequence, 44-45
- Pseudo-random-sequence generator, 44
 bit commitment using, 88
 generating multiple streams, 420-421
 linear congruential generators, 369-372
 linear feedback shift registers, 372-379
- PSPACE, 241
- Public key, 5
 certificates, 185-187
 creating from private key, 464
 key length, 158-165
 recommended lengths, 161-163
 key management, 185-187
- Public-key algorithms, 4-5, 33, 500-502
 background, 461-462
 based on linear error-correcting codes, 480
 Diffie-Hellman, 513
 ElGamal, 476-479
- elliptic curve cryptosystems, 480-481
- finite automaton cryptosystems, 482
- knapsack algorithms, 462-466
- LUC, 481
- McEliece, 479-480
- one-way hash functions using, 455
- Pohlig-Hellman, 474
- Rabin, 475-476
- RSA, *see* RSA
- security, 461-462
 strength, 502
- Public-key cryptography:
 attacks against, 43-44
 authentication using, 53-54
 coin flipping using, 90-91
 communications using, 31-34
 identity-based, 115
 key exchange with, 48
 multiple-key, 68-69
 private keys, lifetime, 184
 signing documents with, 37-38
 one-way hash functions, 38-39
 versus symmetric cryptography, 216-217
- Public-Key Cryptography Standards, 588-589
- Public Key Partners, 604-605
- Public-key ring, 585
- Purchase-key attack, 7
- Quadratic nonresidues, 251
- Quadratic residues, 250-251
 generator, 417
- Quadratic sieve, 256
 factoring, 159
- Quantum computing, 164-165
- Quantum cryptography, 554-557
- Quintuple encryption, 366
- Quisquater, Jean-Jacques, 102, 508
- Quisquater-Girault, 450
- Rabin, 475-476
- Rabin, Michael, 103, 259, 518, 550
- Rabin-Miller algorithm, 259-260
- RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation, 605-606
- Rackoff, Charles, 352

- Rainbow Books, 600
- Rambutan, 390
- Random keys, 173–174
- Random noise, as random-sequence generator, 423–424
- Random-number generation, 44
- Random-sequence generators, 421–428
 - biases and correlations, 425–426
 - computer clock, 424
 - distilling randomness, 426–428
 - keyboard latency measurement, 424–425
 - RAND tables, 422–423
 - using random noise, 423–424
- Random sequences, real, 45–46
- Randomized approach, stream ciphers, 415
- Randomized stream cipher, 419
- Randomness, distilling, 426–428
- RAND tables, 422–423
- Rao-Nam algorithm, 346
- Rate of the language, 234
- RC2, 318–319
- RC4, 319, 397–398
- RC5, 344–346
 - source code, 659–662
- RDES, 297–298
- Receipt, resending message as, 42–43
- REDOC II, 311–313
- REDOC III, 313
- Redundancy, of language, 234
- Reeds, Jim, 369
- Related-key cryptanalysis, 290
- Renji, Tao, 482
- Renting Passports, 111
- Replay attacks, 58–59
- Research and Development in Advanced Communication Technologies, Integrity Primitives Evaluation, 605–606
- Resend attack, foiling, 43
- Residue, 242
 - quadratic, 250–251
 - reduced set, 248
- Restricted algorithms, 3
- RFC 1421, 578
- RFC 1422, 578
- RFC 1423, 578
- RFC 1424, 578
- Richter, Manfield, 423
- Riordan, Mark, 583–584
- RIPE, 605–606
- RIPEM, 583–584
- RIPE-MAC, 457–458
- RIPE-MD, 445
- Rip van Winkle cipher, 418–419
- Rivest, Ron, 159, 163, 318–319, 344, 397, 435, 440–441, 444, 446, 467
- Rivest Cipher, 318
- Robshaw, Matt, 342
- Rogaway, Phil, 398
- ROM key, 181
- ROT13, 11
- Rotor machines, 12–13
- RSA, 17, 466–474
 - ability to break, zero-knowledge proofs, 548–549
 - attack on encrypting and signing with, 473–474
 - blind signatures, 548
 - chosen ciphertext attack, 471–472
 - common modulus attack, 472
 - compared to DSA, 485
 - computation time comparison with DSA, 489
 - as *de facto* standard, 485–486
 - EKE implementation, 519
 - encryption, 468
 - with DSA, 491
 - in hardware, 469
 - low decryption exponent attack, 473
 - low encryption exponent attack, 472–473
 - patents, 474
 - restrictions on use, 473
 - security, 470–471
 - speed, 469
 - standards, 474
- RSA Data Security, Inc., 295, 603–604
- RSA Factoring Challenge, 257
- RSA generator, 417
- Rubber-hose cryptanalysis, 7
- Rueppel, Ranier, 385–386
- Running-key cipher, 12
- SAFER K-64, 339–341
- SAFER K-128, 341
- Salt, 52–53
- S-boxes:
 - alternate, DES, 296–298
 - Blowfish, 336
 - Boolean functions in, 350
 - DES, key-dependent, 298, 300
- design
 - criteria, 294
 - security questions, 284
 - theory, 349–351
- Lucifer, 303
 - NSA role, 278, 280
 - substitution, 274–276
- Scherbius, Arthur, 13
- Schlafly, Roger, 394
- Schneier, Bruce, 336, 346
- Schnorr, Claus, 418, 446, 510
- Schnorr authentication and signature scheme, 510–512
- Schroeder, Michael, 58, 216
- Schwartz, Winn, 300
- Sci.crypt, 608–609
- Scott, Robert, 306
- SEAL, 398–400
 - source code, 667–673
- Secrecy:
 - ideal, 236
 - perfect, 235
- Secrets, simultaneous exchange, 123–124
- Secret sharing, 71–73
 - without adjudication, 72
 - with cheaters, 72
 - with disenrollment, 73
 - without revealing shares, 73
 - schemes with prevention, 73
 - verifiable, 73
- Secret-sharing algorithms, 528–531
 - advanced threshold schemes, 530–531
 - Asmuth-Bloom, 529–530
 - cheater detection, 531
 - Karnin-Greene-Hellman, 530
 - LaGrange interpolating polynomial scheme, 528–529
 - vector scheme, 529
- Secret splitting, 70–71
 - digital cash, 142–145
- Secure and Fast Encryption Routine, 339
- Secure circuit evaluation, 137
- Secure elections, 125–134
 - divided protocols, 133
 - multiple-key ciphers, 133
 - simplicistic voting protocols, 125–126
 - voting with
 - blind signatures, 126–127
 - single central facility, 128–130
 - two central facilities, 127–128


- Secure elections (*Cont.*)
 voting without central tabulating facility, 130–133
- Secure European System for Applications in a Multi-vendor Environment, 572
- Secure Hash Algorithm, 442–445
- Secure multiparty computation, 134–137, 551–552
- Secure Telephone Unit, 565
- Security:
 of algorithms, 8–9
 Blowfish, 339
 cipher block chaining mode, 196–197
 ciphers based on one-way hash functions, 353–354
 cryptosystem, 234–235
 DES, 278, 280–285
 algebraic structure, 282–283
 current, 300–301
 key length, 283–284
 weak keys, 280–281
 DSA, 491–492
 ESIGN, 500
 Kerberos, 571
 knapsack algorithms, 465
 MD5, 440–441
 MMB, 326–327
 output-feedback mode, 205
 PKZIP, 395
 Privacy-Enhanced Mail, 582–583
 requirements for different information, 167
 RSA, 470–471
 SEAL, 400
 Secure Hash Algorithm, 444–445
 self-synchronizing stream cipher, 199
 Selector string, 143
 Self-decimated generator, 385–387
 Self-enforcing protocols, 26–27
 Self-recovering, cipher block chaining mode, 196
 Self-shrinking generator, 388
 Self-synchronizing stream cipher, 198–199
 Selmer, E. S., 381
 Semiweak keys, DES, 280–281
 SESAME, 572
 Session keys, 33, 180
 SHA, 442–445
- Shadows, 71–72
- Shamir, Adi, 72, 284–285, 288, 291, 296, 303, 311–312, 314, 319, 416, 434, 462, 467, 502–504, 508, 516, 528
- Shamir's pseudo-random-number generator, 416
- Shamir's three-pass protocol, 516–517
- Shimizu, Akihiro, 308
- Shor, Peter, 164
- Shrinking generator, 388, 411–412
- Signature equation, 496
- Signatures, *see* Digital signatures
- Silverman, Bob, 159
- Simmons, Gustavus, 72, 79, 493, 501, 531
- Simple columnar transposition cipher, 12
- Simple relations, 347–348
- Simple substitution cipher, 10–11
- Simultaneous exchange of secrets, 123–124
- Skew, 425
- SKEY, 53
- SKID, 55–56
- Skipjack, 267, 328–329
- Smart cards, 587
 observer, 146
 Universal Electronic Payment System, 589–591
- Smith, Lynn, 266
- s^e DES, 298–299
- Snefru, 432
- Software:
 DES implementation, 278–279
 encryption, 225
 linear feedback shift registers, 378–379
 RSA speedups, 469–470
 Software-based brute-force attack, 154–155
 Software Publishers Association, 608
 Solovay, Robert, 259
 Solovay-Strassen algorithm, 259
 Space complexity, 237
 Sparse, 378
 Special number field sieve, 160–161
 SP network, 347
- Square roots:
 coin flipping using, 541–542
 modulo n , 258
- Standards:
 public-key cryptography, 588–589
 RSA, 474
 Station-to-station protocol, 516
 Steganography, 9–10
 StepRightUp, 414
 Stereotyped beginnings, 190
 Stereotyped endings, 190
- Storage:
 data encryption for, 220–222
 keys, 180–181
 requirements, 9
- Stornetta, W. Scott, 75
- Straight permutation, 275
- Strassen, Volker, 259
- Stream algorithms, 4
- Stream ciphers, 4, 189, 197–198
 A5, 389
 additive generators, 390–392
 Algorithm M, 393–394
 versus block ciphers, 210–211
 Blum, Blum, and Shub generator, 417–418
 Blum-Micali generator, 416–417
 cascading multiple, 419–420
 cellular automaton generator, 414
 choosing, 420
 complexity-theoretic approach, 415–418
 correlation immunity, 380
 counter mode, 206
 crypt(1), 414
 design and analysis, 379–381
 Diffie's randomized stream cipher, 419
 encryption speeds, 420
 feedback with carry shift registers, 402–404
 Fish, 391
 Gifford, 392–393
 Hughes XPD/KPD, 389–390
 information-theoretic approach, 418
 linear complexity, 380
 Maurer's randomized stream cipher, 419
 message authentication codes, 459
 multiple, generating from single pseudo-random-sequence generator, 420–421

- Mush, 392
 Nanoteq, 390
 nonlinear-feedback shift registers, 412-413
 1/p generator, 414
 output-feedback mode, 205
 Pike, 391-392
 PKZIP, 394-395
 Pless generator, 413-414
 Rambutan, 390
 random-sequence generators, 421-428
 RC4, 397-398
 Rip van Winkle cipher, 418-419
 RSA generator, 417
 SEAL, 398-400
 self-synchronizing, 198-199
 synchronous, 202-203
 system-theoretic approach, 415-416
 using feedback with carry shift registers, 405-412
 alternating stop-and-go generators, 410-411
 cascade generators, 405
 FCSR combining generators, 405, 410
 LFSR/FCSR summation/parity cascade, 410-411
 shrinking generators, 411-412
 using linear feedback shift registers, 381-388
 alternating stop-and-go generator, 383, 385
 Beth-Piper stop-and-go generator, 383-384
 bilateral stop-and-go generator, 384-385
 DNRS, 387
 Geffe generator, 382
 generalized Geffe generator, 382-383
 Gollmann cascade, 387-388
 Jennings generator, 383-384
 multispeed inner-product generator, 386-387
 self-decimated generator, 385-387
 self-shrinking generator, 388
 shrinking generator, 388
 summation generator, 386-387
 threshold generator, 384-386
 WAKE, 400-402
 Strict avalanche criteria, 350
 Strong primes, 261
 STU-III, 565-566
 Subkey, 272
 Blowfish, 338-339
 Crab, 342-343
 IDEA, 322
 independent, DES, 295
 Subliminal channel, 79-80
 applications, 80
 DSA, 493, 534-536
 ElGamal, 532-533
 ESIGN, 533-534
 foiling, 536
 Ong-Schnorr-Shamir, 531-532
 signature algorithm, 79
 Subliminal-free signature schemes, 80
 Subprotocols, 26
 Substitution boxes, 274-276
 Substitution ciphers, 10-12
 Substitution-permutation network, 347
 SubStream, 414
 Summation generator, 386-387
 Superincreasing knapsack, 463-464
 Superincreasing sequence, 463-464
 Suppress-replay, 61
 Surety Technologies, 79
 SXAL8, 344
 Symmetric algorithms, 4
 Symmetric block algorithms, one-way hash functions using, 446-455
 Symmetric cryptography:
 bit commitment using, 86-87
 communication using, 28-29
 key exchange with, 47-48
 versus public-key cryptography, 216-217
 Symmetric cryptosystems, document signing, 35-37
 Symmetric key length, 151-158
 Synchronous stream cipher, 202-203
 System-theoretic approach, stream ciphers, 415-416
 Tap sequence, 373
 feedback with carry shift registers, maximal-length, 408-409
 Tatebayashi-Matsuzaki-Newman, 524-525
 Tavares, Stafford, 334
 TEA, 346
 TEMPEST, 224
 Terminology, 1-9, 39
 Terrorist Fraud, 110
 Thermodynamics, limitations
 on brute-force attacks, 157-158
 Three-pass protocol, Shamir's, 516-517
 Three-Satisfiability, 242
 3-Way, 341-342, 354
 source code, 654-659
 Three-Way Marriage Problem, 242
 Threshold generator, 384-386
 Threshold schemes, 71-72, 530-531
 Ticket-Granting Service, 567
 Ticket Granting Ticket, 569
 Tickets, 568
 Time complexity, 237
 Timestamping, 75
 arbitrated solution, 75-76
 digital signatures, 38
 distributed protocol, 77-78
 improved arbitrated solution, 76
 improvements, 78-79
 linking protocol, 76-77
 patented protocols, 78-79
 protocols, 75-79
 TIS/PEM, 583
 Total break, 8
 Traffic analysis, 219
 Traffic-flow security, 217
 Transfer, oblivious, 116-117
 Transposition, 237
 ciphers, 12
 Trapdoor one-way function, 30
 Traveling Salesman Problem, 241-242
 Trees, digital signatures, 37
 Trial division, 256
 Triple encryption, 358-363
 encrypt-decrypt-encrypt mode, 359
 with minimum key, 360
 modes, 360-362
 with three keys, 360
 with two keys, 358-359
 variants, 362-363
 TSD, 594-595
 Tsujii-Kurosawa-Itoh-Fujioka-Matsumoto, 501
 Tuchman, Walt, 266, 278, 280, 294, 303, 358
 Tuckerman, Bryant, 266
 Turing, Alan, 240

- Turing machine, 239, 241
 2-adic numbers, 404
- UEPS, 589-591
 Uncertainty, 234
 Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability, 138
 Undeniable digital signatures, 81-82, 536-539
 Unicity distance, 235-236
 Unit key, 591
 United States, export rules, 610-616
 Universal Electronic Payment System, 589-591
 Unpredictable, to left and to right, 417
 Updating, keys, 180
 Utah Digital Signature Act, 618
- van Oorschot, Paul, 359
 Vector scheme, 529
 Verification, keys, 178-179
 Verification block, 179
 Verification equation, 496
 Vernam, Gilbert, 15
 Vigenere cipher, 10-11, 14
 Vino, 346
 Viruses, to spread cracking program, 155-156
- VLSI 6868, 278
 Voting, *see* Secure elections
- WAKE, 400-402
 Wayner, Peter, 10
 Weak keys:
 block ciphers design theory, 348
 DES, 280-281
 Wheeler, David, 400
 Whitening, 363, 366-367
 Wide-Mouth Frog protocol, 56-57
 Wiener, Michael, 153, 284, 359
 Williams, 475-476
 Wolfram, Steve, 414, 446
 Wood, Michael, 311, 313
 Woo-Lam protocol, 63-64
 Word Auto Key Encryption, 400
 Work factor, 9
- xDES¹, 365-366
 XOR, 13-15
 XPD, 389-390
- Yagisawa algorithm, 501
 Yahalom, 57-58
 Yao's millionaire problem, 551
- Yung, Moti, 81
 Yuval, Gideon, 430
- Zero-knowledge proofs,
 101-109, 548-549
 ability to break RSA, 548-549
 Chess Grandmaster Problem, 109
 computational, 108
 discrete logarithm, 548
 generalities, 108-109
 identity, 109-111
 Mafia Fraud, 110
 minimum-disclosure, 108
 Multiple Identity Fraud, 111
 n is Blum integer, 549
 noninteractive, 106-107
 no-use, 108
 parallel, 106
 perfect, 108
 Proofs of Membership, 111
 Renting Passports, 111
 statistical, 108
 Terrorist Fraud, 110
- Zero-knowledge protocol:
 basic, 102-104
 graph isomorphism, 104-105
 Hamiltonian cycles, 105-106
 Zierler, Neal, 381
 Zimmermann, Philip, 584

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
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


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