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The TLS Protocol
 Version 1.0

Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

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Abstract

This document specifies Version 1.0 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications privacy over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery.

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1. Introduction

The primary goal of the TLS Protocol is to provide privacy and data integrity between two communicating applications. The protocol is composed of two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake Protocol. At the lowest level, layered on top of some reliable transport protocol (e.g., TCP[TCP]), is the TLS Record Protocol. The TLS Record Protocol provides connection security that has two basic properties:

- The connection is private. Symmetric cryptography is used for data encryption (e.g., DES [DES], RC4 [RC4], etc.) The keys for this symmetric encryption are generated uniquely for each connection and are based on a secret negotiated by another protocol (such as the TLS Handshake Protocol). The Record Protocol can also be used without encryption.
- The connection is reliable. Message transport includes a message integrity check using a keyed MAC. Secure hash functions (e.g., SHA, MD5, etc.) are used for MAC computations. The Record Protocol can operate without a MAC, but is generally only used in

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this mode while another protocol is using the Record Protocol as a transport for negotiating security parameters.

The TLS Record Protocol is used for encapsulation of various higher level protocols. One such encapsulated protocol, the TLS Handshake

Protocol, allows the server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys before the application protocol transmits or receives its first byte of data. The TLS Handshake Protocol provides connection security that has three basic properties:

- The peer's identity can be authenticated using asymmetric, or public key, cryptography (e.g., RSA [RSA], DSS [DSS], etc.). This authentication can be made optional, but is generally required for at least one of the peers.
- The negotiation of a shared secret is secure: the negotiated secret is unavailable to eavesdroppers, and for any authenticated connection the secret cannot be obtained, even by an attacker who can place himself in the middle of the connection.
- The negotiation is reliable: no attacker can modify the negotiation communication without being detected by the parties to the communication.

One advantage of TLS is that it is application protocol independent. Higher level protocols can layer on top of the TLS Protocol transparently. The TLS standard, however, does not specify how protocols add security with TLS; the decisions on how to initiate TLS handshaking and how to interpret the authentication certificates exchanged are left up to the judgment of the designers and implementors of protocols which run on top of TLS.

2. Goals

The goals of TLS Protocol, in order of their priority, are:

1. Cryptographic security: TLS should be used to establish a secure connection between two parties.
2. Interoperability: Independent programmers should be able to develop applications utilizing TLS that will then be able to successfully exchange cryptographic parameters without knowledge of one another's code.
3. Extensibility: TLS seeks to provide a framework into which new public key and bulk encryption methods can be incorporated as necessary. This will also accomplish two sub-goals: to prevent

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the need to create a new protocol (and risking the introduction of possible new weaknesses) and to avoid the need to implement an entire new security library.

4. Relative efficiency: Cryptographic operations tend to be highly CPU intensive, particularly public key operations. For this reason, the TLS protocol has incorporated an optional session caching scheme to reduce the number of connections that need to be established from scratch. Additionally, care has been taken to

reduce network activity.

3. Goals of this document

This document and the TLS protocol itself are based on the SSL 3.0 Protocol Specification as published by Netscape. The differences between this protocol and SSL 3.0 are not dramatic, but they are significant enough that TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 do not interoperate (although TLS 1.0 does incorporate a mechanism by which a TLS implementation can back down to SSL 3.0). This document is intended primarily for readers who will be implementing the protocol and those doing cryptographic analysis of it. The specification has been written with this in mind, and it is intended to reflect the needs of those two groups. For that reason, many of the algorithm-dependent data structures and rules are included in the body of the text (as opposed to in an appendix), providing easier access to them.

This document is not intended to supply any details of service definition nor interface definition, although it does cover select areas of policy as they are required for the maintenance of solid security.

4. Presentation language

This document deals with the formatting of data in an external representation. The following very basic and somewhat casually defined presentation syntax will be used. The syntax draws from several sources in its structure. Although it resembles the programming language "C" in its syntax and XDR [XDR] in both its syntax and intent, it would be risky to draw too many parallels. The purpose of this presentation language is to document TLS only, not to have general application beyond that particular goal.

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4.1. Basic block size

The representation of all data items is explicitly specified. The basic data block size is one byte (i.e. 8 bits). Multiple byte data items are concatenations of bytes, from left to right, from top to bottom. From the bytestream a multi-byte item (a numeric in the example) is formed (using C notation) by:

```
value = (byte[0] << 8*(n-1)) | (byte[1] << 8*(n-2)) |
        ... | byte[n-1];
```

This byte ordering for multi-byte values is the commonplace network byte order or big endian format.

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