

Network Working Group  
Request for Comments: 2401  
Obsoletes: 1825  
Category: Standards Track

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November 1998

## Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol

### Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

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background understanding of this system. In particular, prospective users of this technology (end users or system administrators) are part of the target audience. A glossary is provided as an appendix

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to help fill in gaps in background/vocabulary. This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the Internet Protocol, related networking technology, and general security terms and concepts.

### 1.3 Related Documents

As mentioned above, other documents provide detailed definitions of some of the components of IPsec and of their inter-relationship. They include RFCs on the following topics:

- a. "IP Security Document Roadmap" [TDG97] -- a document providing guidelines for specifications describing encryption and authentication algorithms used in this system.
- b. security protocols -- RFCs describing the Authentication Header (AH) [KA98a] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [KA98b] protocols.
- c. algorithms for authentication and encryption -- a separate RFC for each algorithm.
- d. automatic key management -- RFCs on "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)" [HC98], "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)" [MSST97], "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol" [Orm97], and "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP" [Pip98].

## 2. Design Objectives

### 2.1 Goals/Objectives/Requirements/Problem Description

IPsec is designed to provide interoperable, high quality, cryptographically-based security for IPv4 and IPv6. The set of security services offered includes access control, connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, protection against replays (a form of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic flow confidentiality. These services are provided at the IP layer, offering protection for IP and/or upper layer protocols.

These objectives are met through the use of two traffic security

protocols, the Authentication Header (AH) and the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), and through the use of cryptographic key management procedures and protocols. The set of IPsec protocols employed in any context, and the ways in which they are employed, will be determined by the security and system requirements of users, applications, and/or sites/organizations.

When these mechanisms are correctly implemented and deployed, they ought not to adversely affect users, hosts, and other Internet components that do not employ these security mechanisms for

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protection of their traffic. These mechanisms also are designed to be algorithm-independent. This modularity permits selection of different sets of algorithms without affecting the other parts of the implementation. For example, different user communities may select different sets of algorithms (creating cliques) if required.

A standard set of default algorithms is specified to facilitate interoperability in the global Internet. The use of these algorithms, in conjunction with IPsec traffic protection and key management protocols, is intended to permit system and application developers to deploy high quality, Internet layer, cryptographic security technology.

## 2.2 Caveats and Assumptions

The suite of IPsec protocols and associated default algorithms are designed to provide high quality security for Internet traffic. However, the security offered by use of these protocols ultimately depends on the quality of their implementation, which is outside the scope of this set of standards. Moreover, the security of a computer system or network is a function of many factors, including personnel, physical, procedural, compromising emanations, and computer security practices. Thus IPsec is only one part of an overall system security architecture.

Finally, the security afforded by the use of IPsec is critically dependent on many aspects of the operating environment in which the IPsec implementation executes. For example, defects in OS security, poor quality of random number sources, sloppy system management protocols and practices, etc. can all degrade the security provided by IPsec. As above, none of these environmental attributes are within the scope of this or other IPsec standards.

## 3. System Overview

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