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ESET, LLC and ESET SPOL. S.R.O.

11 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**

12 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

13 FINJAN, INC.,

14 Plaintiff,

15 v.

16 ESET, LLC, et al.,

17 Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-0183-CAB-BGS

**ESET, LLC AND ESET SPOL. S.R.O.’S  
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF FINJAN,  
INC.’S SUPPLEMENTAL  
INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF  
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF THE  
TERM “DOWNLOADABLE” FOR U.S.  
PATENT NOS. 9,189,621 AND 9,219,755**

Judge: Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo

20 AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS.

1 ESET spol. s.r.o. and ESET, LLC (collectively “ESET”) respectfully submit this  
2 responsive brief regarding the term “Downloadable” for U.S. Patent Nos. 9,189,621 (“the  
3 ’621 patent”) and 9,219,755 (“the ’755 patent”) pursuant to this Court’s Preliminary  
4 Claim Construction Order (D.I. 178-1 at 2).

5 First, Finjan’s IPR submissions do not address the salient question at issue, which  
6 is whether the term Downloadable should be construed in line with the definition  
7 provided in U.S. Patent No. 6,480,962 (“the ’962 patent”), one of the incorporated  
8 patents from which the inventions of the ’621 and ’755 patents derive their support. In  
9 both IPRs submitted by Finjan to this Court on September 29, 2017, the issue of the  
10 incorporated specifications was never raised by either party and therefore not considered  
11 by the PTAB when deciding whether to institute IPRs on the ’621 and ’755 patents.  
12 Moreover, neither party proposed, as ESET does here, that the construction should be  
13 consistent with the patentee’s definition from the ’962 patent: “a small executable or  
14 interpretable application program which is downloaded from a source computer and run  
15 on a destination computer.” D.I. 138-9 at 1:39-41. Thus, the PTAB was never presented  
16 with the argument, and did not consider, whether the incorporated specification and  
17 alternative definition should be used, and whether the alternative and contradictory  
18 construction renders the claims invalid (an issue the PTAB cannot consider during an IPR  
19 in any event).

20 Second, the case law is clear that when multiple specifications are incorporated by  
21 reference it is improper to incorporate only portions of those specifications. Instead, the  
22 entirety of all specifications incorporated by reference must be considered. *See Telemac*  
23 *Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc.*, 247 F.3d 1316, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“When a  
24 document is ‘incorporated by reference’ into a host a document, such as a patent, the  
25 referenced document becomes effectively part of the host document as if it were  
26 explicitly contained therein.”); *Harari v. Lee*, 656 F.3d 1331, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2011)  
27 (discussing incorporating multiple patent applications into a patent specification by  
28 reference). Here, and with the term “Downloadable” for U.S. Patent Nos. 6,154,844

1 (“the ’844 patent”), 8,079,086 (“the ’086 patent”), and 6,804,780 (“the ’780 patent”), the  
2 Court must consult *all* of the identified incorporated-by-reference specifications and  
3 cannot pick and choose only one of the incorporated specifications. This is particularly  
4 true for the ’086 patent which does not include a definition of Downloadable at all. For  
5 that patent, this Court looked only to the incorporated ’780 patent specification because  
6 the ’780 patent was the most recent patent from which the ’086 patent claimed priority.  
7 In doing so, this Court did not also consider the incorporated ’962 patent specification,  
8 which must be given equal weight. *See Joao Control & Monitoring Sys., LLC v. Protect*  
9 *Am., Inc.*, No. 1-14-cv-134-KY, 2015 WL 4937464, at \*7-8 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2015)  
10 (finding the disputed terms indefinite – patentee not allowed to rely on definitions from  
11 one of the two incorporated references when those definitions are directly contradicted by  
12 additional statements contained in both of the references). Because the ’621 and ’755  
13 patents (like the ’086 patent) contain no express definition of “Downloadable” and  
14 because each of the patents incorporates the ’962 patent’s definition: “small ...  
15 interpretable” as well as the ’780 patent’s contradictory definition, which leaves out the  
16 “small” and “interpretable” language, the term is indefinite.<sup>1</sup> The Court is required to  
17 construe the claims as the specification requires, and if the resulting construction renders  
18 the claim invalid, then that is the appropriate outcome. *See Rhine v. Casio, Inc.*, 183 F.3d  
19 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“We have also admonished against judicial rewriting of  
20 claims to preserve validity.”).

21         Nonetheless, to the extent the Court does not find the term indefinite due to the  
22 multiple incorporated and contradictory definitions, at the very least, there is no dispute  
23 that the asserted claims of the ’621 and ’755 patents are supported solely by the  
24 specification of the ’962 patent. The prosecution history (D.I. 138-10 at 6-7; 138-11 at 6-  
25 9) and oral argument at the claim construction hearing, confirmed that the ’962 patent  
26 specification provides the sole support for the claims. Thus, to the extent the Court  
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28 <sup>1</sup> The same argument applies with respect the ’844 and ’780 patents which also

1 decides to look only to the specification that provides the purported support for the  
2 alleged inventions (as opposed to all incorporated specification as the case law requires),  
3 then at the very least the term Downloadable for the '621 and '755 patents should be  
4 limited to the definition set forth in the incorporated by reference '962 patent  
5 specification: “a small executable or interpretable application program which is  
6 downloaded from a source computer and run on a destination computer.” '962 patent  
7 (D.I. 138-9) at 1:38-40.

8 In summary, the parties in the IPRs did not dispute the definition of  
9 “Downloadable” for the '621 and '755 patents and thus the PTAB did not consider the  
10 implications of the multiple incorporated specifications. The case law, however, is clear,  
11 that the entirety of all incorporated specifications must be considered and that it is  
12 improper to pick and choose only a subset of the incorporated disclosure. Because all of  
13 the claims that use the term Downloadable in this case are from patents that incorporate  
14 contradictory definitions, these claims should all be held invalid for indefiniteness.  
15 Nonetheless, if this Court looks to the specification providing the support for the alleged  
16 inventions, then there is no dispute that construction of Downloadable for the '621 and  
17 '755 patents should be limited to the express definition the patentee provided in the '962  
18 patent because only the '962 patent specification provides support for the alleged  
19 inventions of the '621 and '755 patents. Therefore, Downloadable, to the extent not  
20 indefinite for the '621 and '755 patents, should be construed exactly as the patentee  
21 defined the term: “a small executable or interpretable application program which is  
22 downloaded from a source computer and run on a destination computer.” '962 patent  
23 (D.I. 138-9) at 1:38-40.

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Dated: October 6, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

**FOLEY & LARDNER LLP**

*/s/ Nicola A. Pisano*

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