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12 AMAZON WEB SERVICES INC., and  
13 TWITCH INTERACTIVE, INC.

14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
15 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
16 SAN JOSE DIVISION

17 IN RE: PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES,  
LLC ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION,

18 AMAZON.COM, INC., and AMAZON WEB  
SERVICES, INC.,

19 Plaintiffs,

20 v.

21 PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC and  
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

22 Defendants.

23 PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC and  
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

24 Plaintiffs,

25 v.

26 TWITCH INTERACTIVE, INC.,

27 Defendant.  
28

Case No.: 5:18-md-02834-BLF

Case No.: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF

Case No. 5:18-cv-05619-BLF

**RESPONSE OF AMAZON.COM, INC.,  
AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC., AND  
TWITCH INTERACTIVE, INC. TO  
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ON  
REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEY  
FEES**

1 **I. PERSONALWEB BASED ITS PROPOSED REDUCTIONS ON AN INCORRECT**  
2 **LEGAL STANDARD.**

3 PersonalWeb devotes most of its brief to legal arguments about tying the fee award to  
4 discrete acts of litigation misconduct and limiting it to successful defense motions. These incorrect  
5 arguments would have the Court commit legal error in service of a reduced award.

6 Section 285 empowers the district court to award fees for an exceptional case—*i.e.*, one that  
7 “stands out from others” based on the totality of the circumstances or for specific acts of litigation  
8 misconduct. *See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.*, 572 U.S. 545, 554 (2014).  
9 In the former circumstance, the district court can award fees from “the entire case, including any  
10 subsequent appeals.” *Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.*, 745 F.3d 513, 517 (Fed. Cir.  
11 2014) (quoting *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has  
12 instructed that district courts should *not* rely just on “discrete acts of litigation conduct” when  
13 setting the amount of such an award. *AdjustaCam, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 2018 WL 1335308  
14 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2018) (citing *Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Sorensen Research*, 581 Fed.  
15 App’x 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 2014); *see also Blackbird Tech LLC v. Health in Motion LLC*, 944 F.3d  
16 910, 918-19 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (affirming award of fees for entire case), *cert. denied.*, 140 S. Ct. 2765  
17 (2020); *Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc.*, 876 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2017)  
18 (same).

19 This is consistent with *Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co v. Haeger*, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct.  
20 1178 (2017). *Goodyear* did not address fees awarded under a fee-shifting statute—much less one  
21 that expressly makes fees recoverable for a “case” based on a showing of exceptionality. Rather,  
22 *Goodyear* concerned fees awarded under the court’s inherent power to sanction and held that in  
23 such cases the award should consist of fees incurred due to the misconduct. *Id.* at 1186; *Comm’r,*  
24 *I.N.S. v. Jean*, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1990) (“fee-shifting statutes[] favor[] treating a case as an  
25 inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”). But even if this holding is applicable, when  
26 a district court has already found *the case* exceptional, all the fees reasonably incurred in defense  
27 *of the exceptional case* satisfy the “but for” standard of *Goodyear*. The question at that point is  
28

1 only how the district court will use its discretion to arrive at a reasonable award.<sup>1</sup>

2 Moreover, the grounds the Court relied on here concern conduct that goes to the case as a  
3 whole. The Court found that that the case *both* lacked “substantive strength” *and* was litigated in an  
4 “unreasonable manner.” Dkt. 636 at 33. PersonalWeb brought baseless claims, frequently changed  
5 its infringement positions in order to avoid dismissal, unreasonably prolonged the case after claim  
6 construction, took unreasonable positions in the customer cases and submitted inaccurate  
7 declarations. *Id.* That conduct was pervasive—the defense fees incurred all flow from Amazon  
8 and Twitch’s attempts to put an end to just that abuse. PersonalWeb’s legal arguments are therefore  
9 irrelevant, and an award of the full costs of defense is appropriate.

10 **II. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT PERSONALWEB’S PROPOSED REDUCTIONS.**

11 PersonalWeb chose to file more than 80 patent infringement cases against Amazon’s  
12 customers on claims that had already been decided. The fee request here—less than \$100,000 per  
13 case—is reasonable considering the results achieved and the actual expense to defend against  
14 PersonalWeb’s unreasonable conduct. But for the points of agreement addressed below, the Court  
15 should reject PersonalWeb’s misguided proposed reductions to the award.

16 ***Investigation; Motion for Declaratory Judgment; Motion for Preliminary Injunction;***  
17 ***Motions to Stay; MDL.*** In response to dozens of customer suits filed around the country, Amazon  
18 promptly filed a declaratory judgment complaint and moved to enjoin those cases, moved to stay  
19 the cases proceeding in other jurisdictions, and responded to PersonalWeb’s attempt to circumvent  
20 that effort at the JPML. These costs relate entirely to Amazon’s attempt to defend claims that the  
21 Court has already found were baseless, and to do so in the most efficient way possible. That the  
22 Court and the JPML ultimately chose to structure the proceedings differently is wholly irrelevant  
23 to whether these fees are recoverable. *See Mathis v. Spears*, 857 F.2d 749, 756 (Fed. Cir. 1988);  
24 *Phigenix, Inc. v. Genentech Inc.*, 2019 WL 2579260, at \*18 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2019) (noting that

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>1</sup> *In re Rembrandt Techs. LP Patent Litig.*, 899 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2018) is not to the contrary.  
27 There, the Federal Circuit held the district court failed to explain how its \$51 million fee award  
28 related to its exceptional case finding. That case cannot be read as requiring the district court to  
apportion fees to specific acts of misconduct, as doing so would place it in irreconcilable conflict  
with the line of Federal Circuit cases that hold that the reasonable cost of defense is recoverable on  
a finding of exceptional case. *See e.g. Therasense and Homeland Housewares supra*

1 the non-prevailing party could not “cite a single case in which a court declined to award a party  
2 fees for losing on an argument, as opposed to losing on a claim”); *Monsanto Co. v. Bayer*  
3 *Cropscience, N.V.*, 2007 WL 1098504, at \*9 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (awarding over \$8 million, refusing  
4 to “divide the fee based on whether hours were spent in preparation for one legal question or  
5 another”), *aff’d*, 275 Fed. App’x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Moreover, it was Amazon’s declaratory  
6 judgment action and presence in the MDL that made it possible for the Court to resolve the case as  
7 efficiently as it did. And had the Court accepted PersonalWeb’s proposal to have multiple customer  
8 cases go forward, the MDL proceeding would have been significantly more expensive.

9 ***Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.*** PersonalWeb accused CloudFront for the first  
10 time ten months into the case—one of the changes in infringement positions that the Court found  
11 made the case exceptional. At the Court’s suggestion (Dkt. 381 at 10, 27), which itself came about  
12 because PersonalWeb and Level 3 did not provide the Court with a clear answer about their  
13 respective rights to the patents, Amazon moved for judgment on the pleadings asserting that  
14 PersonalWeb lacked standing to accuse CloudFront. Again, that the Court ultimately denied the  
15 motion does not bear on whether these fees are recoverable. *See Hensley*, 461 U.S. at 435; *Mathis*,  
16 857 F.2d at 755; *Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc.*, 264 F. Supp. 2d 753, 771 (S.D.  
17 Ind. 2003) (holding that, in a successful lawsuit, “reasonable efforts” leading to “some dead ends”  
18 are compensable). PersonalWeb’s cited authority on this point is inapposite. *See* Supp. Br. at 5  
19 (citing *Chamberlain Grp, Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co.*, 915 F. Supp. 3d 977, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 2018)  
20 (denying fees to a *non-prevailing* party that lost on appeal)).

21 ***Infringement Contentions, Invalidity Contentions, and Damages Contentions.***  
22 PersonalWeb argues these costs should be excluded because Amazon did not rely on an invalidity  
23 defense, and because the other contentions relate either in whole or in part to the CloudFront claims  
24 that the Court did not find baseless as it did the S3 claims. But Amazon had to perform all this  
25 work as part of its defense of an exceptional case that the Court did find “substantively weak” and  
26 “unreasonably litigated.” For example, Amazon’s invalidity contentions would not have been  
27 needed at all but for PersonalWeb filing 80+ baseless lawsuits that it then unreasonably prolonged  
28 by changing its theories repeatedly. Given the case schedule, Amazon could not have avoided

1 drafting the contentions without waiving its defenses. Again, PersonalWeb asks the Court to take  
2 a uniquely myopic view of awardable fees and its own unreasonable conduct.

3 ***Fact Discovery and Discovery Disputes.*** PersonalWeb’s arguments for reducing fees for  
4 fact discovery fees are unsupported. First, it asks the Court to exclude fact discovery that did not  
5 relate specifically to the baseless S3 claims, ignoring the other reasons that the Court found the case  
6 exceptional. The Court should reject that reduction for the reasons discussed above.

7 Next, PersonalWeb asks the Court to make a 75% reduction based on an erroneous analysis  
8 of the bills. Staffing during discovery was appropriate to the task and not “top-heavy.” Partner  
9 hours account for only 19.6% of this work, over half of which were Ms. Mayer’s, who defended  
10 multiple depositions and supervised fact discovery. *See* Dkt. 592-7 (Gregorian Dec.) Ex. 6;  
11 Supplemental Gregorian Declaration (“Supp. Gregorian”) Ex. 18. PersonalWeb cites no authority  
12 suggesting that these hours are unreasonable or excessive; instead, it points to cases where, unlike  
13 here, attorneys “billed excessive hours for routine and duplicative work.” *See, e.g., Hernandez v.*  
14 *Taqueria El Grullense*, 2014 WL 2611214, at \*2-3 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2014).

15 Depositions were also reasonably staffed. PersonalWeb claims without support that it is  
16 excessive to have two attorneys attend depositions—while failing to mention that it brought at least  
17 two attorneys to *nine depositions*, and in fact staffed the depositions in this case with many more  
18 attorneys than Amazon and Twitch. Supp. Gregorian Ex. 17. Regardless, such fees are only  
19 excessive if the additional attorneys duplicate work and do not provide benefit to the client. *See*  
20 *Oberfelder v. City of Petaluma*, 2002 WL 472308, at \*7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2002); *see also Lopez*  
21 *v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist.*, 385 F. Supp. 2d 981, 993-994 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (refusing to reduce fees  
22 for multiple attorneys present at a deposition given size and complexity of the case); *Chang v. Cnty*  
23 *of Santa Clara*, 2016 WL 6162460, at \*9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2016) (reducing fees where the  
24 prevailing party billed nearly \$5,000 per deposition hour). PersonalWeb’s other purported evidence  
25 for “overstaffing” mischaracterizes the record: (1) it assumes time billed by associates was “training  
26 time,” when those attorneys took or defended the depositions in question; and (2) it includes  
27 Twitch’s in house counsel and two summer associates who attended depositions but, as  
28 PersonalWeb itself acknowledges, *were excluded* from the fee request for that time. Supp.

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