

# EXHIBIT 3

DECLARATION OF MELODY DRUMMOND HANSEN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S  
RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF

Case No. 5:15-CV-02008-EJD

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**Kudelski et al.**

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(54) **GENERATING A ROOT KEY FOR DECRYPTION OF A TRANSMISSION KEY ALLOWING SECURE COMMUNICATIONS**

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(\* ) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this patent is extended or adjusted under 35 U.S.C. 154(b) by 1022 days.

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(Continued)

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**G06F 12/14** (2006.01)

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(52) **U.S. Cl.** ..... 713/194; 726/4; 380/44  
 (58) **Field of Classification Search** ..... 713/194;  
 726/9; 380/44  
 See application file for complete search history.


(57) **ABSTRACT**

A method is used to restore the security of a secure assembly such as a chip card, after the contents of its second memory zone have been read by a third party. The method is for generating a security key implemented by a secure module comprising a central unit, a first conditional access memory zone and at least one second memory zone containing all or part of the user program. The method includes reading of all or part of the second memory zone, and generation of at least one root key based on all or part of the second zone data and on at least one item of secret information stored in the first memory zone.

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**12 Claims, 1 Drawing Sheet**



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


Fig. 1




Fig. 2




Fig. 3

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**GENERATING A ROOT KEY FOR  
DECRYPTION OF A TRANSMISSION KEY  
ALLOWING SECURE COMMUNICATIONS**

The present application hereby claims priority under 35 5  
U.S.C. §119 on Swiss patent application number CH 0953/03  
filed May 28, 2003, the entire contents of which are hereby  
incorporated herein by reference.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

This invention generally concerns the domain of security  
modules, preferably those including at least one central unit  
and two memory areas.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Units are used in operations implementing cryptographic  
systems and are given in monolithic form. They are either  
produced on the same silicon chip or they are assembled on a  
support and embedded in a resin or protected by a sheet  
covering the different elements and acting as a fuse in the case  
of an attempted intrusion.

These security processors have a first memory zone called  
a bootstrap that is executed during the activation of the pro-  
cessor or at each resetting to zero. This memory is of the ROM  
type, namely that it is Read Only Memory.

During the execution of the start-up program, this program  
verifies the second memory zone that is of the rewritable type,  
usually of the EEPROM, NVRAM or Flash type. This veri-  
fication is important as it serves to ensure that the data in this  
second zone is valid, namely that it is definitely a program (at  
least in part). This verification can be carried out in various  
ways such as the calculation of an imprint (CRC, Hash) and  
the comparison of this imprint with a value stored in the same  
zone.

Once the master program that has been initially started  
completes its verification, it connects with the second zone  
and begins the execution of the user program at a conventional  
address.

The particularity of this type of processor is that at the time  
of the execution of the program in the second zone, it does not  
have free access to the memory of the first zone. This access  
is either definitively prohibited or is subject to a verification  
mechanism (password for example).

This offers important security because the verification  
means, as well as the start-up data, are not accessible to the  
user program. All the data contained in the first zone is thus  
protected from any intrusion.

It is possible that this first bootstrap zone, in addition to  
having a part in read-only memory (ROM), includes a rewrit-  
able part of memory that is subjected to the same security  
conditions.

When the first zone is of a very limited size, the execution  
of the verification program can be carried out from the second  
zone. The latter is divided into a verification part and a user  
part.

Therefore, the verification of the user program is carried  
out on the basis of the data of the first zone. Namely, it is  
carried out on the basis of a first key that is generally stored in  
the first zone and which allows the verification of the data  
imprint of the second zone.

The second zone contains data constituting the program  
and a signature that is encrypted by this first key.

The verification program that can either be in the first zone,

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To verify that the data is correctly validated, the second  
zone contains the imprint encrypted by a key that is initially  
stored in the first zone. This key is used to decrypt the  
encrypted imprint and the result obtained is compared with  
the calculated imprint.

This key can be in the first zone either in a definitive form  
(ROM) or in the programmed form (EEPROM or Flash for  
example). In this second case, programming is carried out in  
a machine or in an authorized centre for example. The pro-  
gram of the first zone accepts this program as long as no other  
key is already found in this memory location.

This key can be of the symmetrical type and thus secret or  
it can be of the asymmetrical type. In this second variant, this  
key can be found in a memory zone other than the first zone  
because even if a third party discovered this key, the third  
party would not be able to identify a modified data set because  
he must have the corresponding private key to identify the  
data. Obviously, this key is not issued from the management  
centre that is responsible for preparing the updating of the  
data.

The data of the second memory zone can represent either  
one or several programs, either important data such as rights  
or decryption keys, or a combination of both.

One of the known types of attacks used to discover the  
contents of the second zone is to search a security defect such  
as a memory overflow that allows control to be taken of the  
processor. Once control has successfully been taken, a third  
party transfers the contents of the second zone towards the  
exterior and is able to analyse the security mechanism and the  
keys used.

Using the knowledge of the contents of the second memory  
zone, the third party has the keys serving to manage the  
different rights and access to services that control this pro-  
cessor.

Therefore, if a change of keys takes place, managed by the  
management centre, this change command will be encrypted  
by a key present in the second memory zone. The third party,  
who has knowledge of this key, can decrypt this message and  
also update the contents of this new key.

Therefore, it is apparent that while a secure mechanism has  
been used to verify the contents of the program zone (second  
zone), once security has been violated, none of the changes  
initiated by the management centre have an effect on security  
because the changing means (new transmission key for  
example) use keys that the third party already has in his  
possession. He can thus decipher the updating message and  
also change its transmission key. The breach cannot be  
stopped even if the security breach has been corrected in the  
application.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

An object of an embodiment of this invention is to propose  
a method to restore the security of this type of security assem-  
bly once the contents of the second memory zone have been  
read by a third party.

This aim may be achieved using a method for generating a  
security key carried out by a security module including a  
central unit, a first conditional access memory zone and at  
least one second memory zone containing all or part of the  
user program, wherein it includes the following steps:

- reading all or part of the second memory zone,
- generation of at least one root key based on all or part of the

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