1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12	EDWARD G. POPLAWSKI (SBN 113590) epoplawski@wsgr.com OLIVIA M. KIM (SBN 228382) okim@wsgr.com TALIN GORDNIA (SBN 274213) tgordnia@wsgr.com STEPHANIE C. CHENG (SBN 319856) stephanie.cheng@wsgr.com WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI Professional Corporation 633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1550 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Telephone: (323) 210-2900 Facsimile: (866) 974-7329 Attorneys for Defendant QUALYS INC.	RYAN R. SMITH (SBN 229323) rsmith@wsgr.com CHRISTOPHER D. MAYS (SBN 266510) cmays@wsgr.com WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI Professional Corporation 650 Page Mill Road Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050 Telephone: (650) 493-9300 Facsimile: (650) 493-6811
12	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
13	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
14	OAKLAND DIVISION	
15	EDWANIA C) CAGENIO 410 07000 NGD (TGH)
16	FINJAN LLC) CASE NO.: 4:18-cv-07229-YGR (TSH)
17	Plaintiff,) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF) DEFENDANT QUALYS INC.'S
18	v.) RENEWED MOTION TO STRIKE
19	QUALYS INC.,) PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF FINJAN) LLC'S INFRINGEMENT EXPERT
20	Defendant.) REPORTS
21	Determant.	Judge: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez
22) Rogers
23		Date: Tuesday, June 8, 2021 Time: 2:00pm
24		Location: Zoom Teleconference ¹
25		
26		
27		
$\begin{bmatrix} 27 \\ 28 \end{bmatrix}$		
ا ۵	Per the Court's Notice regarding Civil Law	and Motion Calendars and its Order at D.I. 48



I. INTRODUCTION

Finjan's Opposition says very little about Medvidovic's Report and the actual opinions contained therein. Finjan certainly fails to show how Medvidovic's opinions disclose a theory of infringement involving vulnerability scanning based on client devices' computer requests. Instead, Finjan attempts to distract from Medvidovic's failure to remain consistent with Finjan's infringement contentions by discussing Qualys's experts and citing technical documents (none of which, of course, appear anywhere in Medvidovic's Report or Finjan's infringement contentions).

Setting these distractions aside, the question for the Court is clear: Do Medvidovic's opinions about the '408 Patent's "receiving" limitation exceed the scope of Finjan's infringement contentions? The answer is <u>yes</u>. Finjan's contentions conditioned infringement upon a claimed computer receiving content based on a client device's request for that content. But even Finjan concedes (Opposition at 5) that Medvidovic's report offers no opinion conditioning infringement on a client device requesting content. Rather, what Medvidovic calls the claimed "computer" is nowhere shown to perform vulnerability scans "based on" a client device's request for content but instead simply based on customer-configurations directing an automatic process that is independent of any end-user devices. For these reasons, discussed more fully below, Qualys's motion should be granted.

II. ARGUMENT

As an initial point, Finjan nowhere disputes Qualys's discussion of what a "client device" is in the pertinent field, particularly in the context of the Court's Claim Construction Order in this case. *Compare* Motion at 2-3 *with* Opposition at 5, fn. 2. Finjan merely argues that because the term "client device" does not appear in the claims, the Court should ignore Qualys's arguments. But, of course, it was Finjan who placed the meaning of "client device" at issue by conditioning infringement of the '408 Patent on a client device requesting content. *See* Exhibit 5, D.I. 158-6, at 2-4. In any event, Finjan does not dispute that a client device refers to an end-user's device that requests content.



A. This Motion Seeks to Strike Only Those Paragraphs of the Medvidovic Report Pertaining to His New Theory for the "Receiving" Limitation.

Finjan takes issue with the fact that the instant motion identifies additional paragraphs of Medvidovic's report from Qualys's previous motion. But Qualys seeks to strike those paragraphs—and *only* those paragraphs—that pertain to Medvidovic's "receiving" limitation for the Vulnerability Management line of products. *See* Exhibit 13, D.I. 194-2, at ¶184-196. Qualys has correctly identified, based on the Court's Order, those paragraphs where Medvidovic renders opinions about infringement of the "receiving" limitation that are not based on a client device's request for content (and therefore exceed the scope of Finjan's infringement contentions). *See* D.I. 188 at 7. Therefore, these paragraphs each fall within the scope of the Court's Order and are properly the subject of this Renewed Motion.

B. Finjan's Infringement Contentions Do Not Disclose Medvidovic's Theory for the "Receiving" Limitation.

The parties agree that Medvidovic's theory of infringement is that Qualys scanners receive content. Where the parties disagree is that Medvidovic's opinions do not premise the receipt of that content on a *client device's* request. Finjan argues that both its infringement contentions and Medvidovic's report identify Qualys's scanners as being part of the claimed "computer." But that straw man argument fails to address the core issue: Finjan's infringement contentions specifically state that the claimed computer receives content "based on a client device requesting the content from a source computer." Exhibit 5, D.I. 158-6, at 2-3. Meanwhile, Finjan concedes that Medvidovic "did not expressly opine that a client device must request content for there to be infringement." Opposition at 5. Medvidovic's opinions no longer require any client device whatsoever, and thus jettison a foundational condition for infringement disclosed in Finjan's infringement contentions. Medvidovic's opinions are thus necessarily broader than the scope of the contentions and should be struck.

C. Finjan and Medvidovic Fail to Show that Vulnerability Scanning is Based on Client Device's Requests for Content.

Finjan argues that Qualys's motion should be denied because Qualys cannot prove that Vulnerability Scanning is not based on Requests from a client device. This argument is incorrect: as discussed in its opening brief. Medvidovic's report shows that vulnerability scanning occurs



based on customer configurations as to when and where scans will occur. *See* Motion at 3-5. Any content requests come from Qualys's scanners, not an end-user device. *See id.* at 4. Finjan does not dispute these facts. Moreover, Finjan improperly shifts the burden of infringement and the local rules – Finjan bears the burden of disclosing its infringement theories and ensuring that its experts' opinions on infringement are consistent with those disclosures, not Qualys. And, of course, it is Finjan that bears the ultimate burden of proving infringement. Finjan's argument that Qualys cannot prove a negative—*i.e.*, that vulnerability scanning is not based on requests from a client device—merely obfuscates the fact that Finjan cannot point to a portion of Medvidovic's report opining that vulnerability scans are based on a client device's request for content.

Finjan also argues that the claims do not require vulnerability scans to be based on a client device requesting content. But that argument is legally immaterial, because this motion pertains to Finjan's disclosed infringement theory and whether Medvidovic's opinions are consistent with that theory. Specifically, what matters here is that (a) *Finjan's* infringement theory required a computer to receive content based on a client device's content request, and (b) Medvidovic's opinions are inconsistent with the original theory because his infringement opinions no longer involve client devices requesting content, let alone such a request being the basis of a vulnerability scan. *See* Exhibit 5, D.I. 158-6, at 2-3; Opposition at 5 (conceding point). Put another way, because Medvidovic opines that infringement can occur even if no client device requests content, his opinions go beyond the scope of Finjan's contentions and should be struck.

Finjan next argues that Qualys's products necessarily include a "client device," citing portions of *Qualys's* expert's report as well as several technical documents. There are two problems with this argument. First, Finjan makes no attempt to show that these materials (or the information disclosed therein) appear anywhere in either its infringement contentions or were ever considered or discussed in Medvidovic's report. The issue here is the scope of Medvidovic's opinions, not how Finjan's attorneys may interpret documents appearing nowhere in Medvidovic's report. Such extrinsic materials are not probative of whether Medvidovic's opinions are consistent with Finjan's infringement contentions.

Second, Finjan now suggests that devices like the Qualys Cloud Platform and the Qualys

scanners are "client devices" that request content. To be clear, there is no dispute that Qualys's

scanners can make content requests. See Motion at 4-5 (citing Exhibit 13, D.I. 194-2 at ¶¶ 186,

188, and 190). But Medvidovic did not opine that these scanners or the Cloud Platform are the

"client devices." Rather, Medvidovic specifically opined that these components were the claimed

"computer" that receives content. See Motion at 4-5; Exhibit 13, D.I. 194-2 at ¶¶ 185 ("At a high

level, the Qualys Cloud Platform relies on different techniques for scanning content that results in

the receipt, by a computer (the scanner engine of Qualys Cloud Platform used by the Vulnerability

Features, the WAS scanner of the Qualys Cloud Platform, or the Qualys Cloud Platform working

with a Cloud Agent)") and 196 ("Thus, in this example of the Vulnerability Features, the Qualys

Cloud Platform includes a 'computer,' such as the scanner engine, and the collected data by that

scanner engine..."). Thus, Finjan's argument is not probative because it is unconnected to the

scope of Medvidovic's opinions. Indeed, given Medvidovic's opinion that the scanners and Cloud

Platform are the "computer" of the '408 Patent's claims, the materials Finjan cites actually support

Qualys's point that Medvidovic opined that the claimed computer—not a client device—requests

content.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

D. Finjan's Cloud Agent Arguments Miss the Point

Finjan finally argues that some of the challenged paragraphs contain opinions about the "Cloud Agent" and should therefore be excluded. This, again, misses the point. Although the Court determined that Finjan sufficiently disclosed Cloud Agents as an accused product in its infringement contentions for the '408 Patent, the Court did not find that Medvidovic opined about the Cloud Agents in a manner consistent with Finjan's infringement contentions. Similar to Medvidovic's opinions involving scanners, Medvidovic's Cloud Agent opinions do not discuss or involve any vulnerability scans being based on a client device requesting content. *See* Motion at 4-5.

Finjan's argument that "Qualys does not dispute the client devices request content, which is the relevant inquiry" is also flawed. Opposition at 8. Both parties agree that Cloud Agents are software installed on end-user computers. *See* D.I 194 at 4-5. Medvidovic nowhere opines that



DOCKET

Explore Litigation Insights



Docket Alarm provides insights to develop a more informed litigation strategy and the peace of mind of knowing you're on top of things.

Real-Time Litigation Alerts



Keep your litigation team up-to-date with **real-time** alerts and advanced team management tools built for the enterprise, all while greatly reducing PACER spend.

Our comprehensive service means we can handle Federal, State, and Administrative courts across the country.

Advanced Docket Research



With over 230 million records, Docket Alarm's cloud-native docket research platform finds what other services can't. Coverage includes Federal, State, plus PTAB, TTAB, ITC and NLRB decisions, all in one place.

Identify arguments that have been successful in the past with full text, pinpoint searching. Link to case law cited within any court document via Fastcase.

Analytics At Your Fingertips



Learn what happened the last time a particular judge, opposing counsel or company faced cases similar to yours.

Advanced out-of-the-box PTAB and TTAB analytics are always at your fingertips.

API

Docket Alarm offers a powerful API (application programming interface) to developers that want to integrate case filings into their apps.

LAW FIRMS

Build custom dashboards for your attorneys and clients with live data direct from the court.

Automate many repetitive legal tasks like conflict checks, document management, and marketing.

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Litigation and bankruptcy checks for companies and debtors.

E-DISCOVERY AND LEGAL VENDORS

Sync your system to PACER to automate legal marketing.

