
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8	QUALYS INC.	
9	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
10	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
11	OAKLAND DIVISION	
12	EDITAN DIC) CAGENO 410 07220 VCD
13	FINJAN, INC.,) CASE NO.: 4:18-cv-07229-YGR)
14	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT QUALYS INC.'SREPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS
15	V.) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND) ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE
16	QUALYS INC.,) DEFENSES
17 18	Defendant.) Date: N/A ¹) Time: N/A
19) Place: Courtroom 1, 4 th Floor
20) Before: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers)
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22		
23	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY REDACTED VERSION OF DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO BE SEALED	
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27	¹ Subject to the Court's March 12, 2020 Order (D.I. 48) suspending in-person appearances.	
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I. INTRODUCTION

Finjan's Opposition ("Opp.") ignores material facts and fails to overcome the strong presumption to grant amendments "with extreme liberality." *Waldrip v. Hall*, 548 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2008). Nor does Finjan satisfy this Court's prior precedent granting leave to amend unless "there is strong evidence" of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, undue prejudice, or futility. *Buchanan v. Tata Consultancy Servs., Ltd.*, No. 15-CV-01696-YGR, 2017 WL 6611653, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2017). Finjan does not even argue that either bad faith or dilatory motive exists. Instead, it argues only delay, prejudice, and futility, but each of these arguments are factually and legally flawed.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Qualys' Preclusion Defense Is Not Futile, Untimely, or Prejudicial

1. Finjan Has Not Shown Undue Delay

Qualys did not unduly delay in seeking to assert preclusion as an affirmative defense. See Opp. at 6. Qualys was not a party to the reexamination proceedings or the subsequent Federal Circuit appeal. And Finjan did not apprise Qualys regarding the status of those proceedings. To the contrary, Finjan took steps to conceal the pendency of the reexamination. Specifically, on March 4, 2019, the Court requested a "chart that I can look at that gives me all of this information in terms of the other cases, where it's pending, which have constructions, which are terminated. That's one chart." D.I. 24, CMC Tr. at 11:18-23. Finjan then submitted a chart, which purported to identify all proceedings involving the patents-in-suit. See D.I. 30-1. However, Finjan omitted the '305 reexamination and the ongoing Federal Circuit appeal from its chart. Finjan should not now benefit from its omission.

Although Qualys learned of the Federal Circuit opinion shortly after its issuance in September 2019, at that junction Finjan could still seek an *en banc* rehearing or Supreme Court review. The last deadline for doing so elapsed in December 2019, less than three months before Qualys filed this Motion. And more importantly, the issuance of the Reexamination Certificate in January 2020 (only a month before this Motion) is the *legal act* by which the Patent Office formally canceled the Reexamination Claims. *See* 35 U.S.C. § 307 ("In a reexamination

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proceeding under this chapter, when the time for appeal has expired or any appeal proceeding has terminated, the Director will *issue and publish a certificate canceling any claim of the patent finally determined to be unpatentable...*).² Before that certificate, the Reexamination Claims had not yet been finally canceled.

2. Finjan Has Not Shown Futility

Finjan's futility argument fares no better.³ Here, Qualys' preclusion defense is based on the Patent Office's cancellation of the '305 Reexamination Claims. The Federal Circuit has explained that preclusion applies if the differences between the claims canceled during Reexamination (here, '305 claims 1, 2, 5, and 13, or the "Reexamination Claims") and the claims being asserted for infringement "do not materially alter the question of invalidity." *Soverain Software LLC v. Victoria's Secret Direct Brand Mgmt., LLC*, 778 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2015); *see also Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps South, LLC*, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (preclusion applies where the claims invalidated in the Patent Office use "slightly different language to describe substantially the same invention"). In other words, it is not required for Finjan to assert the *same claims* or claims with *identical* terms, as Finjan argues. *See* Opp. at 4. The Federal Circuit expressly rejected this argument. *See Soverain Software*, 778 F.3d at 1319 ("Complete identity of claims is not required to satisfy the identity-of-issues requirement for claim preclusion.").

Finjan fails to cite a single case from the Federal Circuit and ignores the authority that Qualys cited in its Motion. Instead, Finjan cites non-binding authority from the District of Delaware and general Ninth Circuit cases reciting the overall standard for preclusion. But it is Federal Circuit law that applies to "issues of issue preclusion that implicate substantive patent law issues." *Soverain*, 778 F.3d at 1319-1320. In *Soverain*, for example, the Federal Circuit applied its own standards to determine that "[t]he invalidity of the asserted claims . . . is

³ Finjan did not raise futility during the parties' meet and confer efforts.



² Unless stated otherwise, all emphasis in quotes is added.

established by issue preclusion." *Id.* at 1320. Qualys' proposed Second Amended Answer adequately pleads preclusion under *Soverain* by alleging that the asserted claims of the '305 Patent do not materially alter the question of invalidity. This is sufficient to overcome Finjan's futility arguments. In any event, Finjan's argument that the Reexamination Claims differ in scope with the asserted '305 claim is a factual argument properly the subject of fact and expert discovery and not a basis for finding futility.

Finjan also argues that certain of the '305 Patent's claims were found valid in a separate Patent Office proceeding before the Patent Trials and Appeals Board ("PTAB") in 2017. As a preliminary matter, Finjan's reliance on materials outside the pleadings is inappropriate. *See Nordyke v. King*, 644 F. 3d 776, 799 (9th Cir. 2011) ("In evaluating whether the district court should have granted the [Plaintiffs'] motion for leave to amend, therefore, we look only to facts pled in the Proposed Second Amended Complaint."). Moreover, as with the Reexamination proceedings, Qualys was not a party to the PTAB's proceedings. Accordingly, the Court should not consider the PTAB's 2017 opinion at the pleadings stage.

And even if the Court were to consider the PTAB materials submitted by Finjan, they do not establish futility. Indeed, other than noting the existence of this other proceeding, Finjan says nothing about how that proceeding bears any relevance to Qualys' proposed preclusion defense. For example, Finjan does not identify the claims, the legal issues, or the invalidity theories involved there. That the Patent Office rejected some other invalidity argument in a totally different proceeding says nothing about the preclusive effect of the Reexamination proceedings at issue here. It is also worth noting that this other proceeding concluded in January 2019, months before the Federal Circuit affirmed the invalidity of the Reexamination Claims and a year before the Patent Office canceled those claims through the Reexamination Certificate. Those proceedings, therefore, have no bearing on Qualys' preclusion defense.

In support of its futility argument, Finjan criticizes Qualys for "discuss[ing] only one claim as supposedly immaterially different from an invalidated claim...". Opp. at 5. But even if only one asserted claim of the '305 patent were precluded by patent exhaustion, that would constitute a non-futile affirmative defense. Finjan cites no authority to the contrary.



3. Finjan Has Not Shown Prejudice

Finjan finally argues that it would be prejudiced in discovery by Qualys' preclusion defense. But Finjan fails to explain the nature of this prejudice, nor does it explain how permitting Qualys' amendment would materially increase Finjan's burden of discovery. Opp. at 7. For example, Finjan does not identify any particular claim of the '305 patent that it would have asserted had it known of the preclusion defense. In any event, discovery does not close for many months, no depositions have been taken, and there is no claim construction order.

Qualys' proposed preclusion defense is not futile, untimely, or prejudicial, and amendment allowing it should therefore be granted in the interests of justice.

B. Qualys' Exhaustion/Implied License Defenses Are Not Futile, Untimely, or Prejudicial

1. Finjan Has Not Shown Futility

As to exhaustion, Finjan does not dispute that [1] it previously authorized Trend Micro to sell its software to customers and [2] that it now accuses licensed Trend Micro software residing in Qualys' products of infringement. This alone shows Qualys' defense is not futile.

But Finjan's argument misapplies the law.

Patent exhaustion focuses only on the nature of Finjan's authorization to Trend Micro. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) ("the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item."); Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 at 1535 (2017) ("So long as a licensee complies with the license when selling an item, the patentee has, in effect, authorized the sale. That licensee's sale is treated, for purposes of patent exhaustion, as if the patentee made the sale itself. The result: The sale exhausts the patentee's rights in that item."). Because Finjan

Finjan's patent rights with respect to any Trend

Micro software in Qualys' products are exhausted. It is immaterial whether



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