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United States District Court  
Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC,  
Plaintiff,  
v.  
JOHN DOE SUBSCRIBER ASSIGNED IP  
ADDRESS 73.71.176.191,  
Defendant.

Case No. [19-cv-01104-EMC](#)

**ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S EX  
PARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE  
TO SERVE A THIRD-PARTY  
SUBPOENA PRIOR TO A RULE 26(F)  
CONFERENCE**

Docket No. 7

Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings produces and owns the copyrights for adult motion pictures featured on its subscription-based websites. Plaintiff alleges that Doe Defendant, currently identified only by his IP address 73.71.176.191, infringed on those copyrights by downloading and distributing Plaintiff’s motion pictures. Plaintiff asks the Court for leave to serve a Rule 45 subpoena on non-party Comcast Cable Communications, LLC (“Comcast Cable”), Defendant’s internet service provider (“ISP”), to find out Defendant’s identity. Because Plaintiff has demonstrated that good cause exists to allow it to serve the subpoena, the Court **GRANTS** Plaintiff’s application.

**I. ANALYSIS**

A. Legal Standard

A court may authorize early discovery before the parties have conferred as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d). In the Ninth Circuit, courts use the “good cause” standard to determine whether discovery should be allowed to proceed prior to a Rule 26(f) conference. *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Doe*, No. C 08-1193 SBA, 2008 WL 4104214, at

\*2 (N.D. Cal. 8/13/08), 2008 WL 4104214, at \*1 (N.D. Cal. 8/13/08).

1 in consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding  
2 party. *Id.*; *Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc.*, 208 F.R.D. 273, 275–77 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

3 To determine whether a plaintiff has established good cause to learn the identity of a Doe  
4 defendant through early discovery, courts examine whether the plaintiff:

- 5 (1) identifies the Doe defendant with sufficient specificity that the court can determine that  
6 the defendant is a real person who can be sued in federal court,
- 7 (2) recounts the steps taken to locate and identify the defendant,
- 8 (3) demonstrates that the action can withstand a motion to dismiss, and
- 9 (4) shows that the discovery is reasonably likely to lead to identifying information that will  
10 permit service of process.

11 *Columbia Ins. Co. v. seescandy.com*, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–80 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (citations omitted  
12 and line breaks added).

13 As a court in this District has explained:

14 In Internet infringement cases, courts routinely find good cause  
15 exists to issue a Rule 45 subpoena to discover a Doe defendant’s  
16 identity, prior to a Rule 26(f) conference, where a plaintiff makes a  
17 prima facie showing of infringement, there is no other way to  
18 identify the Doe defendant, and there is a risk an ISP will destroy its  
19 logs prior to the conference. This is because, in considering “the  
20 administration of justice,” early discovery avoids ongoing,  
21 continuous harm to the infringed party and there is no other way to  
22 advance the litigation. As for the defendant, there is no prejudice  
23 where the discovery request is narrowly tailored to only seek their  
24 identity. Thus, Courts routinely find the balance favors granting a  
25 plaintiff leave to take early discovery.

26 *UMG Recordings*, 2008 WL 4104214, at \*3–4 (citations omitted).

27 B. Good Cause

28 Here, Plaintiff has established all four of the *seescandy* factors, and accordingly has  
29 demonstrated good cause for the Court to allow early discovery of the Doe Defendant’s identity.

30 First, Plaintiff has identified the Doe Defendant with sufficient specificity that the Court  
31 can determine that Defendant is a real person who can be sued in federal court. “A plaintiff may  
32 show that a defendant is a real person or entity by providing evidence of specific acts of

1 process.” *Distinct Media Ltd. v. Doe Defendants 1-50*, No. CV 15- 03312 NC, 2015 WL  
2 13389609, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here,  
3 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant downloaded 113 of its copyrighted works without authorization  
4 and distributed them over an extended period via BitTorrent. Compl. ¶ 4. “[B]ut for the Doe  
5 Defendant directing his or her BitTorrent client to download the torrent file, the alleged  
6 infringement would not have occurred.” Mot. at 9. In other words, it requires a real person to  
7 initiate the act of downloading a file via BitTorrent, so Defendant is likely a real person who  
8 perpetrated the alleged infringing acts at the identified IP address. Plaintiff has also used the  
9 established “Maxmind” geolocation technology to twice trace Defendant’s IP address to a physical  
10 location within this District. Compl. ¶ 9; see *Criminal Prods., Inc. v. Doe-72.192.163.220*, No.  
11 16-CV-2589 WQH (JLB), 2016 WL 6822186, at \*3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016) (citing in part “the  
12 documented success of the Maxmind geolocation service” to support the finding that plaintiff  
13 showed that a particular IP address corresponds to a physical address). This gives the Court  
14 personal jurisdiction over Defendant and over Plaintiff’s federal copyright claim. See *Strike 3*  
15 *Holdings, LLC v. Doe*, No. 18-CV-4988-LB, 2018 WL 4587185, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018).

16 Second, Plaintiff has recounted the previous steps it has taken to locate and identify the  
17 Doe Defendant. Plaintiff hired a forensic investigator, IPP, to verify using unique file hashes that  
18 Defendant downloaded and distributed Plaintiff’s motion pictures through his IP address. Compl.  
19 ¶¶ 25–30. Plaintiff then used geolocation technology to trace that IP address to this District. *Id.*  
20 ¶ 9. However, Plaintiff cannot deduce Defendant’s true name and other identifying information  
21 from his IP address alone. Only Comcast Cable, Defendant’s ISP, can provide that information.  
22 *Id.* ¶ 5. Thus, Plaintiff has “made a good faith effort to identify and locate the Defendant.” *Strike*  
23 *3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe*, No. 18CV47-WQH (RBB), 2018 WL 1427002, at \*4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 22,  
24 2018).

25 Third, Plaintiff has demonstrated that its copyright claim can withstand a motion to  
26 dismiss. A plaintiff “must satisfy two requirements to present a prima facie case of direct  
27 infringement: (1) [it] must show ownership of the allegedly infringed material and (2) [it] must

28 demonstrate that the alleged infringer violates at least one exclusive right granted to copyright

1 holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106.” *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th  
 2 Cir. 2007) (citing *A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)); *see*  
 3 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). Under 17 U.S.C. § 106, a copyright holder has the exclusive rights to  
 4 reproduce, distribute, publicly display, perform, and create derivative works of the copyrighted  
 5 work. Here, Plaintiff alleges that it owns valid copyrights in the motion pictures, and that  
 6 Defendant reproduced and distributed the motion pictures without authorization. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 28,  
 7 32; *see* Docket No. 8. Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a prima facie case of direct  
 8 copyright infringement.<sup>1</sup> *See UMG Recordings*, 2008 WL 4104214, at \*5. Moreover, the Court  
 9 has subject matter jurisdiction over this copyright action under 28 U.S.C. 1338(a) as well as  
 10 personal jurisdiction over Defendant since his IP address is tied to a physical location in this  
 11 District. *See Ballard v. Savage*, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a plaintiff need  
 12 only make a “prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts” to survive a motion to dismiss for lack  
 13 of personal jurisdiction). Venue is also proper. *See Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon &*  
 14 *Recordon*, 606 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that in copyright infringement actions, 28  
 15 U.S.C. § 1400(a) “allow[s] venue in any judicial district where, if treated as a separate state, the  
 16 defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction.”).

17 Fourth, Plaintiff has shown that the subpoena it seeks is reasonably likely to lead to  
 18 identifying information that will permit service of process on the Doe Defendant. Plaintiff has  
 19 used the American Registry for Internet Numbers to identify Comcast Cable as the ISP that owns  
 20 Defendant’s IP address. Docket No. 7-1, Exh. D (Declaration of Susan B. Stalzer) ¶ 11. Thus,  
 21 Comcast Cable is able to provide information regarding Defendant’s true identity based on his IP  
 22 address. Compl. ¶ 5. The subpoena will only seek Defendant’s name and address; with this  
 23 information, Plaintiff will be able to effectuate service on Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of  
 24

25 <sup>1</sup> The Court notes, however, that in granting this motion, it is neither precluding the Doe  
 26 Defendant from filing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) nor prejudging any such motion.  
 27 The Court also advises Plaintiff that, upon obtaining the name and address of the Doe Defendant,  
 28 it has a Rule 11 obligation to determine whether to proceed with the lawsuit and, in that regard, it  
 29 should be mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding that “a bare allegation that a defendant is  
 30 the registered subscriber of an Internet Protocol (“IP”) address associated with infringing activity  
 is insufficient to state a claim for direct or contributory infringement.” *Cobbler Nevada, LLC v.*

1 Civil Procedure 4(a) and (e).

2 In addition to satisfying the *seesandy* factors, Plaintiff has also established that “there is  
3 no other way to identify the Doe defendant, and there is a risk an ISP will destroy its logs prior to  
4 the [Rule 26(f)] conference.” *UMG Recordings*, 2008 WL 4104214, at \*4. With respect to the  
5 former, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has been infringing on its copyrighted works  
6 anonymously, and that only Comcast Cable can link Defendant’s IP address to his actual name  
7 and physical address. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 13; Docket No. 7-1, Exh. C (Declaration of Philip Pasquale)  
8 ¶ 10. With respect to the latter, Plaintiff asserts that ISPs tend to “only retain [IP address logs] for  
9 a limited period of time.” Mot. at 8. This means that, without early discovery, Comcast Cable  
10 may inadvertently destroy the data that would allow Plaintiff to identify Defendant. *See id.*

11 In sum, Plaintiff has shown that its need for expedited discovery, in consideration of the  
12 administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the Doe Defendant. *See Semitool*, 208 F.R.D.  
13 at 275–77.

14 C. Protective Order

15 “[U]nder Rule 26(c), the Court may *sua sponte* grant a protective order for good cause  
16 shown.” *McCoy v. Sw. Airlines Co., Inc.*, 211 F.R.D. 381, 385 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Several  
17 considerations in this case counsel in favor of a protective order to preserve Defendant’s privacy,  
18 and Plaintiff does not oppose such an order. *See* Mot. at 13.

19 First, courts in this District have repeatedly cautioned that “the ISP subscribers [unveiled  
20 by a subpoena] may not be the individuals who infringed upon Strike 3 Holdings’s copyright,”  
21 since, for example, another person may be using the ISP subscriber’s IP address to download files.  
22 *Strike 3 Holdings*, 2018 WL 4587185, at \*3 (collecting cases). Second, allowing a defendant to  
23 proceed pseudonymously is appropriate where “necessary to preserve privacy in a matter of a  
24 sensitive and highly personal nature,” and an “allegation that an individual illegally downloaded  
25 adult motion pictures likely goes to matters of a sensitive and highly personal nature.” *Id.*

26 In view of the potential implication of an innocent third party, and the sensitivity of the  
27 subject matter of the suit, the Court orders that Strike 3 Holdings shall not publicly disclose any of

28 Defendant’s identifying information until further order of this Court and is forewarned that in

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