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Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 88-18 Filed 05/18/18 Page 1 of 6
`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 88-18 Filed 05/18/18 Page 1 of 6
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`EXHIBIT 20
`EXHIBIT 20
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 88-18 Filed 05/18/18 Page 2 of 6
`Junos Space Security Director ▾
`
`Security Director Application Guide
`
`>
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`TechLibrary >
`
`Creating IPS Signatures
`
`Use the Create IPS Signature page to monitor and prevent intrusions. The intrusion prevention system (IPS) compares traffic against
`signatures of known threats and blocks traffic when a threat is detected.
`
`The signature database is one of the major components of IPS. It contains definitions of different objects, such as attack objects, application
`signature objects, and service objects, which are used in defining IPS policy rules. There are more than 8,500 signatures for identifying
`anomalies, attacks, spyware, and applications.
`
`To keep IPS policies organized and manageable, attack objects can be grouped. An attack object group can contain one or more types of
`attack objects. Junos OS supports the following three types of attack groups:
`
`IPS signature—Contains objects present in the signature database.
`Dynamic—Contains attack objects based on certain matching criteria.
`Static—Contains customer-defined attack groups and can be configured through the CLI.
`
`Before You Begin
`Read the Understanding IPS Signatures topic
`Have a basic understanding of what attacks and patterns are.
`attack objects
`Review the IPS policy signatures main page for an understanding of your current data set. See IPS Policy Signatures Main Page Fields for field descriptions.
`Object that contains patterns of known attacks that can be used to compromise a network. Use
`attack objects in your firewall rules to enable security devices to detect known attacks and prevent
`malicious traffic from entering your network.
`
`Configuring IPS Signatures Settings
`
`X
`
`To configure an IPS signature:
`
`1. Select Configure > IPS Policy > Signatures.
`
`2. Click Create.
`
`3. Select IPS Signature.
`
`4. Complete the configuration according to the guidelines provided in the Table 1.
`
`5. Click OK.
`
`A new IPS signature with the predefined configurations is created. You can use this signature in IPS policies.
`
`Table 1: IPS Signatures Settings
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`Settings
`
`Guidelines
`
`Name
`
`Enter a unique string of alphanumeric characters, colons, periods, dashes, and underscores. No spaces are allowed and
`the maximum length is 63 characters.
`
`Description
`
`Enter a description for the IPS signature; maximum length is 1024 characters.
`
`Category
`
`Enter a predefined or a new category. Use this category to group the attack objects. Within each category, attack
`objects are grouped by severity. For example: FTP, TROJAN, SNMP.
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`Previous Page
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`Settings
`
`Action
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 88-18 Filed 05/18/18 Page 3 of 6
`Guidelines
`
`Select an action you want IPS signature to take when the monitored traffic matches the attack objects specified in the
`rules:
`
`None—No action is taken. Use this action to only generate logs for some traffic.
`Close Client & Server—Closes the connection and sends an RST packet to both the client and the server.
`Close Client—Closes the connection and sends an RST packet to the client but not to the server.
`Close Server—Closes the connection and sends an RST packet to the server but not to the client.
`Ignore—Stops scanning traffic for the rest of the connection if an attack match is found. IPS disables the rulebase for the specific
`connection.
`Drop—Drops all packets associated with the connection, preventing traffic for the connection from reaching its destination. Use this
`action to drop connections for traffic that is not prone to spoofing.
`Drop Packet—Drops a matching packet before it can reach its destination but does not close the connection. Use this action to drop
`packets for attacks in traffic that is prone to spoofing, such as UDP traffic. Dropping a connection for such traffic could result in a
`denial of service that prevents you from receiving traffic from a legitimate source-IP address.
`
`Keywords
`
`Enter unique identifiers that can be used to search and sort log records. Keywords should related to the attack and the
`attack object. For example, Amanda Amindexd Remote Overflow.
`
`Severity
`
`Select a severity level for the attack that the signature will report:
`
`Critical—Contains attack objects matching exploits that attempt to evade detection, cause a network device to crash, or gain
`system-level privileges.
`Info—Contains attack objects matching normal, harmless traffic containing URLs, DNS lookup failures, SNMP public community
`strings, and peer-to-peer (P2P) parameters. You can use informational attack objects to obtain information about your network.
`Major—Contains attack objects matching exploits that attempt to disrupt a service, gain user-level access to a network device, or
`activate a Trojan horse previously loaded on a device.
`Minor—Contains attack objects matching exploits that detect reconnaissance efforts attempting to access vital information
`through directory traversal or information leaks.
`Warning—Contains attack objects matching exploits that attempt to obtain noncritical information or scan a network with a
`scanning tool.
`
`The most dangerous level is critical, which attempts to crash your server or gain control of your network. Informational
`is the least dangerous level and is used by network administrators to discover holes in their security systems.
`
`Signature Details
`
`Binding
`
`Select an option to detect the service or protocol that the attack uses to enter your network:
`
`IP—Allows IPS to match the signature for a specified IP protocol type.
`ICMP—Allows IPS to match the signature for a specified ICMP ID.
`TCP—Allows IPS to match the signature for specified TCP port(s).
`UDP—Allows IPS to match the signature for specified UDP port(s).
`RPC—Allows IPS to match the signature for a specified remote procedure call (RPC) program number. The RPC protocol is used by
`distributed processing applications to handle interaction between processes remotely.
`Service—Allows IPS to match the signature for a specified service.
`IPv6 or ICMPv6—Specifies the header match information for the signature attack. You can specify that IPS search a packet for a
`pattern match for IPv6 and ICMPv6 header information.
`
`Protocol
`
`Enter the name of the network protocol. For example: IGMP, IP‐IP.
`
`Next Header
`
`Enter the type of IP protocol for the header that immediately follows the IPv6 header.
`
`For example, if the device performs IPsec on exchanged packets, the Next Header value is probably 50 (ESP extension
`header) or 51 (AH extension header).
`
`Port
`Range(s)
`
`Program
`Number
`
`Enter the port ranges for TCP and UDP protocol types.
`
`Enter the program ID for the RPC protocol.
`
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 88-18 Filed 05/18/18 Page 4 of 6
`Guidelines
`
`Settings
`
`Service
`
`Specify the service that the attack uses to enter your network. You can select the specific service used to perpetrate
`the attack as the service binding.
`
`For example, suppose you select the DISCARD service. Discard protocol is an Application Layer protocol where TCP/9,
`UDP/9 describes the process for discarding TCP or UDP data sent to port 9.
`
`Time Scope
`
`Select the scope within which the count of an attack occurs:
`
`Source IP—Detect attacks from the source address for the specified number of times, regardless of the destination address.
`Dest IP—Detect attacks sent to the destination address for the specified number of times, regardless of the source address.
`Peer—Detect attacks between source and destination IP addresses of the sessions for the specified number of times.
`
`Time Count
`
`Specify the number of times that the attack object must detect an attack within the specified scope before the device
`considers the attack object to match the attack.
`
`The range is from 0 through 4,294,967,295.
`
`Match
`Assurance
`
`Specify this filter to track attack objects based on the frequency that the attack produces a false positive on your
`network.
`
`Select an option:
`
`High—Provides information on the frequently tracked false positive occurrences.
`Medium—Provides information on the occasionally tracked false positive occurrences.
`Low—Provides information on the rarely tracked false positive occurrences.
`
`Performance
`Impact
`
`Specify this filter to filter out slow-performing attack objects. You can use this filter to only select the appropriate
`attacks based on performance impacts.
`
`Select an option:
`
`High—Add a high performance impact attack object that is vulnerable to an attack. The performance impact of signatures is high7
`to high9, where the application identification is slow.
`Medium—Add a medium performance impact attack object that is vulnerable to an attack. The performance impact of signatures is
`medium4 to medium6, where the application identification is normal.
`Low—Add a low performance impact attack object that is vulnerable to an attack. The performance impact of signatures is low1 to
`low3, where the application identification is faster.
`Unknown—Set all attack objects to unknown by default. As you fine-tune IPS to your network traffic, you can change this setting to
`help you track performance impact. The performance impact of signatures is 0 = unknown, where the application identification is
`also unknown.
`
`Expression
`
`Enter a Boolean expression of attack members used to identify the way attack members should be matched.
`
`For example: m01 AND m02, where m01, m02 are the attack members.
`
`Scope
`
`Specify if the attack is matched within a session or across transactions in a session:
`
`session—Allows multiple matches for the object within the same session.
`transaction—Matches the object across multiple transactions that occur within the same session.
`
`Reset
`
`Ordered
`
`Enable this option to generate a new log each time an attack is detected within the same session. If this option is not
`selected, then the attack is logged only once per session.
`
`Enable this option to create a compound attack object that must match each member signature or protocol anomaly
`in the order you specify. If you do not specify an order, the compound attack object still must match all members, but
`the pattern or protocol anomalies can appear in the attack in any order.
`
`A compound attack object detects attacks that use multiple methods to exploit a vulnerability.
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 88-18 Filed 05/18/18 Page 5 of 6
`Guidelines
`
`Settings
`
`Add Signature
`
`Context
`
`Select an option to define the location of the signature.
`
`If you know the service and the specific service context, specify that service and then specify the appropriate service
`contexts.
`
`If you know the service, but are unsure of the specific service context, specify one of the general contexts.
`
`For example: line—Specify this context to detect a pattern match within a specific line within your network traffic.
`
`Direction
`
`Specify the connection direction of the attack:
`
`Client to Server—Detects the attack only in client-to-server traffic.
`Server to Client—Detects the attack only in server-to-client traffic.
`Any—Detects the attack in either direction.
`
`Using a single direction (instead of Any) improves performance, reduces false positives, and increases detection
`accuracy.
`
`Pattern
`
`Enter a signature pattern of the attack you want to detect. A signature is a pattern that always exists within an attack;
`if the attack is present, so is the signature.
`
`To create the attack pattern, you must first analyze the attack to detect a pattern (such as a segment of code, a URL,
`or a value in a packet header), and then create a syntactical expression that represents that pattern.
`
`For example: Use \[<character-set>\] for case-insensitive matches.
`
`Regex
`
`Enter a regular expression to define rules to match malicious or unwanted behavior over the network.
`
`For example: For the syntax \[hello\], the expected pattern is hello, which is case sensitive.
`
`The example matches can be: hElLo, HEllO, and heLLO.
`
`Negated
`
`Select this option to exclude the specified pattern from being matched.
`
`Negating a pattern means that the attack is considered matched if the pattern defined in the attack does not match
`the specified pattern.
`
`Add Anomaly
`
`Anomaly
`
`Select an option to detect abnormal or ambiguous messages within a connection according to the set of rules for the
`particular protocol being used.
`
`Protocol anomaly detection works by finding deviations from protocol standards, most often defined by RFCs and
`common RFC extensions.
`
`Direction
`
`Specify the connection direction of the attack:
`
`Client to Server—Detects the attack only in client-to-server traffic.
`Server to Client—Detects the attack only in server-to-client traffic.
`Any—Detects the attack in either direction.
`
`Using a single direction (instead of Any) improves performance, reduces false positives, and increases detection
`accuracy.
`
`Supported
`Detectors
`
`Click the Supported Detectors link to display a table that shows the device platforms and the version number of the
`IPS protocol detector currently running on the device.
`
`For example:
`
`Platform - SRX550
`Detector Version - 9.1.140080400
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 88-18 Filed 05/18/18 Page 6 of 6
`
`Modified: 2016-04-13
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