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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., et al.,)	Case No.: 1:17-cv-00188-DAD-BAM
)	
Plaintiffs,)	FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
)	REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
v.)	DEFAULT JUDGMENT
)	
JEFFREY ALAN HATHCOCK individually)	
and d/b/a ROCK N’ HORSE SALOON; and)	(ECF No. 12)
JANET HAYRE, individually and d/b/a)	
ROCK N’ HORSE SALOON,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

On June 21, 2017, Plaintiffs Broadcast Music, Inc., Welsh Witch Music, Coral Reefer Music, Sony/ATV Songs LLC, Unichappell Music Inc., Sloopy II Inc. d/b/a Sloopy II Music, Bocephus Music, Inc., Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp., Big Yellow Dog LLC d/b/a International Dog Music and Scamporee Music (“Plaintiffs”) filed a motion for default judgment against Defendants Jeffrey Alan Hathcock, individually and d/b/a Rock N’ Horse Saloon and Janet Hayre, individually and d/b/a/ Rock N’ Horse Saloon (“Defendants”). No opposition was filed.

The motion was referred to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. The Court deemed the matter suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), and vacated the hearing scheduled for August 25, 2017. Having considered the moving papers and the Court’s file, the Court **RECOMMENDS** that Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment be **GRANTED**.

1 **I. BACKGROUND**

2 Plaintiffs allege five claims of willful copyright infringement arising from Defendants’
3 unauthorized public performance of the following musical compositions: (1) Dreams; (2)
4 Margaritaville; (3) Piece of My Heart; (4) Blues Man; and (5) Love Done Gone. Plaintiffs allege that
5 these musical compositions were performed without authorization at Defendants’ business
6 establishment, known as Rock N’ Horse Saloon, on July 12, 2016. Doc. 1, Complaint ¶¶ 20-21 and
7 Schedule.

8 According to Plaintiffs’ moving papers, Plaintiff Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) is a
9 “performing rights society” which licenses the right to publicly perform a repertoire of nearly 12
10 million copyrighted musical compositions works on behalf of the copyright owners of these works.
11 The remaining Plaintiffs in this action are the copyright owners of the five individual compositions
12 identified above from whom BMI has acquired the right to bring this action. Doc. 12-1, Declaration of
13 John Ellwood (“Ellwood Decl.”), ¶¶ 2, 5.

14 BMI’s main business is to license the right to publicly perform any of the works in BMI’s
15 repertoire by means of “blanket license agreements.” Id. at ¶¶ 2-3. These licenses are available to
16 music users, such as the Defendants, and permit music users to perform any of the nearly 12 million
17 musical compositions in the BMI repertoire. Id. at ¶ 5.

18 BMI operates as a non-profit-making performing rights organization. Id. at ¶ 3. BMI
19 distributes all of the money it collects in license fees from licensees, such as restaurants, hotels and
20 nightclubs, as royalties to its affiliated publishers and composers, after the deduction of operating
21 expenses and reasonable reserves. Id.

22 Between July 2015 and August 2016, BMI repeatedly informed the Defendants of the need to
23 obtain permission for public performances of copyrighted music. Doc. 12-4, Declaration of Brian
24 Mullaney (“Mullaney Decl.”) at ¶¶ 3-8. BMI offered to enter into a blanket license agreement with the
25 Defendants, but Defendants failed to do so. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 8. BMI’s records indicate that BMI licensing
26 personnel telephoned the Defendants on twenty-eight (28) occasions and sent more than twenty-five
27 (25) letters. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, 7, 12, 13.

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1 Plaintiffs filed the underlying action on February 9, 2017. Doc. 1. Plaintiffs personally served
2 Defendant Jeffrey Alan Hathcock with the summons and complaint on February 16, 2017, and served
3 Defendant Janet Hayre via substituted service on February 18, 2017. Docs. 4, 5, Proofs of Service.
4 Defendants did not respond to the complaint, and on April 3, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a request for entry
5 of default. Doc. 6. The following day, on April 4, 2017, the Clerk of the Court entered default against
6 Defendants. Docs. 7, 8. Thereafter, on June 21, 2017, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for default
7 judgment. Doc. 12.

8 II. LEGAL STANDARD

9 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), a plaintiff can apply to the court for a
10 default judgment against a defendant that has failed to plead or otherwise defend against the action.
11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). “Upon default, the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint relating to
12 liability are taken as true.” *Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Prods., Inc.*, 722 F.2d
13 1319, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983); *TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987).

14 Factors which may be considered by courts in exercising discretion as to the entry of a default
15 judgment include: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s
16 substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5)
17 the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable
18 neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions
19 on the merits. *PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans*, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002); *Eitel v.*
20 *McCool*, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).

21 III. ANALYSIS

22 Applying the factors articulated by the Ninth Circuit in *Eitel*, the Court finds these factors
23 weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment.

24 A. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiffs

25 The first factor considers whether a plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default judgment is not
26 entered. *See PepsiCo, Inc.*, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. Generally, where default has been entered against a
27 defendant, a plaintiff has no other means by which to recover damages. *Id.*; *Moroccanoil, Inc. v.*
28 *Allstate Beauty Prods.*, 847 F.Supp.2d 1197, 1200-01 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Therefore, the Court finds

1 Plaintiffs would be prejudiced if default judgment is not granted, and this factor weighs in favor of
2 default judgment.

3 **B. Merits of the Plaintiffs' claims and the Sufficiency of the Complaint**

4 The second and third *Eitel* factors, taken together, "require that [the] plaintiff[s] state a claim
5 on which [they] may recover." *Pepsico, Inc.*, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. Notably a "defendant is not
6 held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law." *DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa*
7 *Huynh*, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007).

8 Plaintiffs' complaint alleges violations of the United States Copyright Act. Under that act, the
9 owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights to publicly perform the copyrighted work, and may
10 institute an action against an infringer of that copyright. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501. To establish
11 copyright infringement, plaintiffs must show (2) ownership of the allegedly infringed material and (2)
12 demonstrate that the alleged infringers violated at least one exclusive right granted to copyright
13 holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106. *A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir.
14 2001), as amended (Apr. 3, 2001), *aff'd sub nom. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 284 F.3d 1091
15 (9th Cir. 2002), and *aff'd sub nom. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).

16 Here, Plaintiffs allege that they own valid copyrights for the musical compositions in the BMI
17 Repertoire: (1) Dreams; (2) Margaritaville; (3) Piece of My Heart; (4) Blues Man; and (5) Love Done
18 Gone. Complaint at ¶¶ 4-13 and Schedule. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants are liable for the
19 unauthorized public performance of these musical compositions, and the Defendants were not licensed
20 or otherwise authorized to publicly perform these musical compositions even though they were
21 previously and repeatedly admonished regarding the need for a license. Complaint ¶¶ 19, 20, 26.

22 The Court finds that Plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently states a claim for copyright infringement,
23 and this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.

24 **C. The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action**

25 Under the fourth factor cited in *Eitel*, "the court must consider the amount of money at stake in
26 relation to the seriousness of Defendant's conduct." *PepsiCo, Inc.*, 238 F Supp.2d at 1176; *see also*
27 *Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc.*, 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. Cal. 2003).

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1 Here, Plaintiffs seek a total judgment of \$20,830.00, which includes statutory damages of
2 \$15,000.00, attorneys' fees in the amount of \$5,000.00 and costs in the amount of \$830.00. Doc. 12.
3 The Court finds the amount at stake is proportional to the harm caused by Defendants' conduct and,
4 therefore, this factor does not weigh against entry of default judgment.

5 **D. The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts**

6 The facts of this case are straightforward, and Plaintiffs have provided the Court with well-
7 plead allegations and a declaration with exhibits in support. Here, the Court may assume the truth of
8 well-plead facts in the complaint following the clerk's entry of default and, thus, there is no likelihood
9 that any genuine issue of material fact exists. Defendants' failure to file an answer in this case or a
10 response to the instant motion further supports the conclusion that the possibility of a dispute as to
11 material facts is minimal. *See, e.g., Elektra Entm't Grp. Inc. v. Crawford*, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D.
12 Cal. 2005) ("Because all allegations in a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after the court clerk
13 enters default judgment, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists.").

14 **E. Whether the Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect**

15 The sixth *Eitel* factor considers the possibility that Defendants' default resulted from excusable
16 neglect. *PepsiCo, Inc.*, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. Courts have found that where defendants were
17 "properly served with the complaint, the notice of entry of default, as well as the paper in support of
18 the [default judgment] motion," there is no evidence of excusable neglect. *Shanghai Automation*
19 *Instrument Co. v. Kuei*, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Upon review of the record, the
20 Court finds that the default was not the result of excusable neglect. *See PepsiCo, Inc.*, 238 F. Supp. 2d
21 at 1177. According to the Court's docket, it appears that Plaintiffs properly served Defendant Jeffrey
22 Alan Hathcock by personally delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him on February 16,
23 2017. Doc. 5. Plaintiffs also properly served Defendant Janet Hayre by substituted service on
24 February 18, 2017, by leaving copies with Defendant Hathcock, her son, on February 18, 2017, and by
25 mailing copies on February 21, 2017. Doc. 4. Service of process was therefore sufficient.¹

26
27 ¹ Relevant here, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) permits an individual to be served by delivering a copy of the
28 summons of the complaint to the individual personally or by following state law where the district court is located. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(e)(1), (2)(A). Under California law, if the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be

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